WENDELL A. DAVIDSON AND MARY C. DAVIDSON, PETITIONERS,
v.
FOSHEE ENTERPRISES, INC., AND ST. JOHNS BUILDERS OF JAX, INC., RESPONDENTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida District Court of Appeal reviewed a non-final order disposing of motions to dismiss a third-party complaint. The court vacated the portion of the order that improperly placed the burden of initiating arbitration proceedings on the third-party defendants, holding that such burden belongs on the party seeking to compel arbitration under Florida law.
The court held that the lower court order departed from the essential requirements of law by placing the burden of initiating arbitration on the third-party defendants. The third-party defendants have the right to file a proper motion to compel Foshee Enterprises to arbitrate pursuant to Florida Statutes section 682.03, and the third-party action shall be stayed pending final disposition of arbitration if such a motion is properly filed.
[1] A court order compelling arbitration must place the burden of initiating the arbitration proceeding on the party seeking to compel arbitration, not the party against whom…
[2] A court may vacate an order that departs from the essential requirements of law, such as improperly allocating the burden of initiating arbitration.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The order departed from the essential requirements of law in placing the burden of initiating the arbitration proceeding on these third-party defendants.”
Statement of the legal error in the lower court's order regarding who bears the burden of initiating arbitration.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWendell and Mary Davidson filed motions to dismiss a third-party complaint and to strike. The lower court granted the third-party defendants leave to …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Pending Arbitration cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The petition for writ of certiorari to review the non-final order disposing of the petitioners' motions to dismiss the third-party complaint and to strike is granted. Although the petitioners’ motion did not expressly request an order compelling respondent Foshee Enterprises, Inc., to arbitrate the third-party claim as provided in the contract between the parties, the court below apparently treated the motion as including such a request, for the order granted the third-party defendants, Wendell A. Davidson and Mary C. Davidson, “leave to commence arbitration proceedings, provided that a notice of demand for arbitration shall be filed with the defendant and third-party plaintiff, Foshee Enterprises, Inc., and with the American Arbitration Association within thirty (30) days from the entry of this order.” The order departed from the essential requirements of law in placing the burden of initiating the arbitration proceeding on these third-party defendants.
Accordingly, we vacate this portion of the order without prejudice to the right of said third-party defendants to file a proper motion to compel Foshee Enterprises, Inc., to arbitrate the subject matter of said third-party claim pursuant to section 682.03, Florida Statutes (1981). In the event a proper motion is filed, the third-party action as to the Davidsons shall be stayed in accordance with the procedure specified in section 682.03 pending final disposition of the arbitration proceeding. Compare Schulman Investment Co. v. Olin Corp., 458 F.Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y.1978) with Post Tensioned Engineering Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Assoc., 429 So. 2d 1212 (Fla.3d DCA 1983), and Miller Construction Co. v.
First Baptist Church of Live Oak, 396 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
The order under review is in all other respects AFFIRMED.
JOANOS, THOMPSON and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Am. Sales & Mgmt. Org. v. Admanco Overseas, Inc., 842 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…certiorari. II. We conclude that the petition is well taken as it relates to the burden of going forward with the arbitration claim. We also conclude that this issue is within our certiorari jurisdiction. See Davidson v. Foshee Enterprises, Inc., 467 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). When the trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, it was saying in substance that the plaintiff had filed its claim in the wrong forum. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in court when the plaintiff should have filed a…
-
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Wilson, 523 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…s for concluding that irreparable injury would be suffered by the appellants; the error, if any, can be rectified on plenary appeal. We note that a conflicting position on the certiorari question is expressed in Davidson v. Foshee Enterprises, Inc., 467 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal. SCHEB and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Post Tensioned Eng'g Corp. & Commercial Constr. Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Assocs., 429 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Miller Constr. Co., Inc. v. The First Baptist Church OF Live OAK, Inc., 396 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)