INTERVAL MARKETING ASSOCIATES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
SEA CLUB ASSOCIATES IV, LTD., A FLORIDA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, AND SEA CLUB ASSOCIATES V, LTD., A FLORIDA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, APPELLEES
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Interval Marketing Associates challenged a trial court's denial of its motion for change of venue in a dispute with Sea Club Associates. The court affirmed, holding that while parties may contractually agree on venue, a court need not enforce such agreements when compelling reasons exist, such as multiple agreements specifying different venues and multiple parties that could result in fragmented litigation.
A trial court is not bound to enforce a contractual venue agreement when compelling reasons exist not to do so, particularly when multiple agreements specify different venues and multiple parties are involved, as this may avoid the necessity for multiple suits and expedite resolution of issues.
[1] Parties may contractually agree to a specific venue for actions arising from their agreement.
[2] A court is not bound to enforce a contractual venue provision when compelling reasons exist to do otherwise, such as the presence of multiple agreements with conflicting…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the parties may provide by their agreement where suit may be brought to enforce it”
Establishes that contractual venue agreements are generally permitted and enforceable
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceInterval Marketing signed an exclusive marketing agreement with Sea Club Associates IV on March 15, 1982, specifying Volusia County as venue. On April…
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[*263] SCHEB, Judge.
Interval Marketing Associates, Inc., challenges the trial court’s order denying its motion for change of venue. We have jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(A).
The record discloses that Interval Marketing, defendant below, and Sea Club Associates IV, Ltd., one of the plaintiffs, signed an exclusive marketing agreement on March 15, 1982. This agreement included a provision that venue for any action filed in relation to the agreement would be in Volusia County, Florida. On April 21, 1982, Interval Marketing entered into a similar agreement with Sea Club Associates V, Ltd., another plaintiff. This second agreement provided that venue would be in Sarasota County.
A dispute between the parties arose. Sea Club IV and Sea Club V, along with several other individual plaintiffs, sued Interval Marketing in the Circuit Court in Sarasota County. Interval Marketing filed a motion for change of venue pursuant to its agreement with Sea Club IV. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal ensued.
Sea Clubs IV and V, as plaintiffs, had the right to initially choose venue in Sarasota County where one of the causes of action arose. See § 47.041, Fla.Stat. (1983). Interval Marketing correctly argues that, notwithstanding this statutory provision, the parties may provide by their agreement where suit may be brought to enforce it. Producers Supply, Inc. v. Harz, 149 Fla. 594, 6 So. 2d 375 (1942); Deeb, Inc. v. Board of Public Instruction, 196 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). Nevertheless, a court is not bound to abide by such an agreement where, as here, there are compelling reasons not to enforce it. As noted, there were two agreements, one providing for venue in Volusia County, the other in Sarasota County. In addition, other plaintiffs and defendants were parties to the litigation. Thus, venue in one court may avoid the necessity for multiple suits and may expedite determination of the issues in this case. See Highland Insurance Co. v. Walker Memorial Sanitarium and Benevolent Ass’n, 225 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 232 So. 2d 181 (Fla.1969).
Furthermore, on the record before us, Interval Marketing failed to meet its burden of showing by affidavit or sworn motion that the venue selected by the plaintiffs was improper. See Davis v. Dempsey, 343 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Interval Marketing’s motion for change of venue.
Affirmed.
RYDER, C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
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RJG Env't, Inc. v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…between the homeowners and RJG appear to be mandatory. But State Farm is not a party to those agreements. Even if it were, the venue provision may yield to more compelling considerations. See Interval Mktg. Assocs. Inc. v. Sea Club Assocs. IV, Ltd., 468 So. 2d 262, 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Mason v. Homes By Whitaker, Inc., 971 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). The assignments did not alter the fact that the homeowners reside in Palm Beach County where the damage occurred and where the critical witnesses a…
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Girdley Constr. Co. & Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Architectural Exteriors, Inc., 517 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)…vision between the parties. In the instant case, such a transfer would result in multiple suits and a splitting of causes of action. Therefore, the provision should not be enforced. See Interval Marketing Associates, Inc. v. Sea Club Ass’s IV, Ltd., 468 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). The timeliness of the motion was not challenged or considered below. The order is reversed. REVERSED. DAUKSCH, COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur.…
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Mason v. Homes BY Whitaker, Inc., 971 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)…v. Roberts Plumbing Contractors, Inc., 800 So. 2d 285, 287 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). However, a court is not bound to abide by such an agreement where, as here, there are compelling reasons not to enforce it. Interval Mktg. Assocs. v. Sea Club Assocs. IV, 468 So. 2d 262, 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). In the instant case, the parties agree that the lien foreclosure action can only be brought in Clay County, where the property is located. Transfer of the Marion County case to Clay County would avoid multiple lawsuits, mini…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Producers Supply, Inc. v. Harz, 6 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1942)
- Davis v. Dempsey, 343 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Highland Ins. Co. v. Walker Mem'l Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 225 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- S. Indus. Sav. Bank v. Greene, 232 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1969)
- Est. of Maude L. Wood, 232 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1969)
- Deeb v. The Bd. OF Pub. Instruction OF Columbia Cnty., 196 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Scaglione v. Best, 196 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)