GERALD BOOHER, PETITIONER,
v.
PEPPERIDGE FARM, INC., AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, RESPONDENTS
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The court held that the actual employment relationship, not the subjective intent of the parties, controls whether a special employee can sue the special employer for work-related injuries.
A driver employed by a temporary staffing agency was injured while working for a client company. The driver sued the client company for negligence, bu…
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McDONALD, Justice.
We have for review Pepperidge Farm, Inc. v. Booher, 446 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), in which the district court acknowledged apparent conflict with Thornton v. Paktank Florida, Inc., 409 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), review denied, 419 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.1982). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We approve Booher. Dixie Driving Service provides truck drivers on a temporary basis to companies such as Pepperidge Farm. Dixie employed Booher, but he had been driving exclusively for Pepperidge Farm when he suffered a work-related injury at a Pepperidge Farm warehouse. After Dixie paid workers’ compensation to Booher, he filed a negligence action against Pepperidge Farm. Pepperidge Farm’s defense included its contention that Booher, as its special employee, was barred from recovering tort damages for a compensable on-the-job injury. At trial the jury awarded damages against Pepperidge Farm after finding that no special employment relationship existed between Booher and Pepperidge Farm. The district court reversed, finding that the trial court should have granted Pepperidge Farm’s motion for directed verdict on this issue. The district court acknowledged its conflict with Thornton and agreed with Judge Grimes’ dissent in that case.
The actual employment relationship rather than the subjective intent of the parties should control in any determination of whether a special employee may sue the special employer for work-related injuries. Booher’s own trial testimony belies his contention that he never consented to an implied contract of hire with Pepperidge Farm. We agree with the district court that Pepperidge Farm was entitled to a directed verdict on this issue as a matter of law. Accordingly, we approve Booher and disapprove Thornton to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, ALDERMAN, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents.
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Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Avery W. Crawford and Lula Belle Crawford v. Fla. Steel Corp., 478 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…based on controlling facts not presently before us. . In his dissenting opinion in Thornton v. Paktank Florida, Inc., 409 So. 2d 31, 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), which was recently approved by the Florida Supreme Court in Booher v. Peppridge Farm, Inc., 468 So. 2d 985 (Fla., 1985), Judge Grimes points out that the fact that a special employer does not carry workers’ compensation insurance on a temporary employee is essentially irrelevant. Instead, the special employer secures workers' compensation coverage on the…
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Sagarino v. Marriott Corp., 644 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…Id. This court has held that a “definite arrangement between the general and special employer and the employee’s knowledge thereof’ must be shown. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. v. Booher, 446 So. 2d 1132, 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (emphasis added), approved, 468 So. 2d 985 (Fla.1985). Marriott has failed to make this showing. It is noteworthy that Sagarino filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that asserts facts that would, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, be sufficient to…
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Venezia v. Egan, 671 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…critical to the determination of whether Egan was a borrowed servant. Lund v. General Crane, Inc., 638 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 649 So. 2d 233 (Fla.1994); Pepperidge Farm, Inc. v. Booher, 446 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), approved, 468 So. 2d 985 (Fla.1985). The question also remains as to whether Egan’s consent to the new employment was deliberate and informed so as to constitute a bar to an action for negligence. See Sacarino v. Marriott Corporation, 644 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). As…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fulton Thornton v. Paktank Fla., Inc., 409 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Pepperidge Farm, Inc. v. Booher, 446 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)