PEPPERIDGE FARM, INC. AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
GERALD BOOHER, APPELLEE
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Pepperidge Farm sought reversal of a trial court's denial of its motion for directed verdict based on the affirmative defense that Booher was a special employee barred from tort recovery by workers' compensation. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Booher qualified as a special employee of Pepperidge Farm and therefore his tort claim was barred.
Booher was a special employee of Pepperidge Farm and his tort claim was barred by workers' compensation. The presence of a definite arrangement between the general and special employers and the employee's knowledge of such arrangement supported special employee status, distinguishing this case from others denying such status.
[1] An employee's tort claim against a special employer is barred if workers' compensation is available for the claim.
[2] The existence of a special employee relationship requires a definite arrangement between the general and special employers regarding the employee's services, and the empl…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In both the Berrier and Stuyvesant cases, there was a definite arrangement made between the general and special employers regarding the employees' services, and the employees were aware of these arrangements.”
Establishes the key factors for determining special employee status under Florida law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBooher was employed by a general employer in the business of providing temporary help and was assigned to work for Pepperidge Farm. There was a defini…
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PER CURIAM.
We believe the trial court erred in denying the motion for directed verdict of appellant, Pepperidge Farm, Inc., predicated on its affirmative defense that appellee, Gerald Booher, was a special employee of Pep-peridge Farm and that his tort claim was barred by virtue of the availability of workers compensation for the claim. We are unable to perceive any meaningful distinction between the facts of this case and our holding in Hamilton v. Shell Oil Co., 215 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968). We are particularly influenced also by the Florida Supreme Court’s statement in Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co., 246 So. 2d 98 (Fla.1971):
In both the Berrier [v. Associated Indemnity Co., 142 Fla. 351, 196 So. 188 (1939) ] and Stuyvesant [Corp. v. Waterhouse, 74 So. 2d 554 (Fla.1954)] cases, there was a definite arrangement made between the general and special employers regarding the employees’ services, and the employees were aware of these arrangements.
Id. at 100. The Supreme Court relied heavily on this distinction in upholding a finding that no special employee status existed in the case under review. We similarly place great reliance on the presence of a definite arrangement between the general and special employers here and the employee’s knowledge thereof.
We acknowledge that our decision is in apparent conflict with the holding in Thornton v. Paktank Florida, Inc., 409 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), although arguably the cases could be distinguished by the fact that the agreement between the general and special employers expressly provided that the general employer would be the employer for all purposes. We tend to agree, however, with the dissent of Judge Grimes therein that such a provision is not a valid basis for determining an employee’s status as a special employee. We also acknowledge that our decision is tantamount to a holding that where a general employer in the business of providing temporary help provides compensation coverage to an employee while he is on assignment working for another employer, then that employee is barred from suing his special employer for on-the-job injuries.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court with directions that judgment be entered in accord with this decision.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and LETTS and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
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Booher v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 468 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1985)…McDONALD, Justice. We have for review Pepperidge Farm, Inc. v. Booher, 446 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), in which the district court acknowledged apparent conflict with Thornton v. Paktank Florida, Inc., 409 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), review denied, 419 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.1982). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.…
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Sagarino v. Marriott Corp., 644 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…ment will be held to be a bar to an action for common law negligence. Id. This court has held that a “definite arrangement between the general and special employer and the employee’s knowledge thereof’ must be shown. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. v. Booher, 446 So. 2d 1132, 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (emphasis added), approved, 468 So. 2d 985 (Fla.1985). Marriott has failed to make this showing. It is noteworthy that Sagarino filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that asserts facts that wou…
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Venezia v. Egan, 671 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…ntract. Shelby provides that such knowledge is critical to the determination of whether Egan was a borrowed servant. Lund v. General Crane, Inc., 638 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 649 So. 2d 233 (Fla.1994); Pepperidge Farm, Inc. v. Booher, 446 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), approved, 468 So. 2d 985 (Fla.1985). The question also remains as to whether Egan’s consent to the new employment was deliberate and informed so as to constitute a bar to an action for negligence. See Sacarino v. Marriott Corpor…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Berrier v. Associated Indem. Co., 142 Fla. 351 (Fla. 1939)
- Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. AETNA Ins. Co., 246 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1971)
- Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse, 74 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1954)
- Hamilton v. Shell OIL Co., 215 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)
- Fulton Thornton v. Paktank Fla., Inc., 409 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)