RAYMOND STEWART, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Stewart petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review a circuit court order that reversed a county court's grant of his motion for discharge under Florida's speedy trial rule. The court addressed whether a defendant who requested a continuance in a felony case waived speedy trial rights when the state subsequently nolle prossed the felony and refiled as a misdemeanor based on the same criminal episode.
A request by a defendant for a continuance prior to expiration of the speedy trial time constitutes a waiver of speedy trial rights as to all charges arising from the same criminal episode. The purpose of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(h)(2)—to prevent circumvention by nolle prossing before expiration and refiling—does not apply when the defendant has waived speedy trial rights by requesting a continuance.
[1] A defendant's request for a continuance prior to the expiration of the speedy trial time for the crime charged constitutes a waiver of speedy trial rights as to all charg…
[2] The rule preventing the state from circumventing speedy trial by nol prossing and refiling charges based on the same criminal episode does not apply when the defendant ha…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A request by a defendant for a continuance prior to the expiration of the speedy trial time for the crime with which he is charged constitutes a waiver of speedy trial rights as to all charges arising from the criminal episode which gave rise to the original charge.”
Establishes the core legal principle that a continuance request waives speedy trial rights for all related charges from the same criminal episode.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStewart was charged with grand theft (felony) on June 13, 1983. Approximately 150 days later on December 2, 1983, Stewart waived his speedy trial righ…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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THOMPSON, Judge.
Stewart filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review an order of the circuit court which reversed a county court order granting his motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule.
Petitioner contends the circuit court misapplied the law with respect to the speedy trial rule. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(b)(2)(B), and approve the decision of the circuit court.
On June 13, 1983, petitioner was charged with grand theft, a felony. On December 2, 1983, approximately 150 days later, the petitioner waived his right to speedy trial by requesting a continuance. On January 17, 1984, the state nol prossed the felony information charging grand theft, and on January 24, 1984, filed a new misdemeanor information charging petit theft. Petitioner thereafter moved for discharge on speedy trial grounds and the motion was granted by the county court on March 21, 1984. The state appealed and the circuit court reversed.
A request by a defendant for a continuance prior to the expiration of the speedy trial time for the crime with which he is charged constitutes a waiver of speedy trial rights as to all charges arising from the criminal episode which gave rise to the original charge. Conner v. State, 398 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Gallego v. Purdy, 415 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). The purpose of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(h)(2) is to prevent the state from circumventing the speedy trial rule by nol prossing a charge prior to the expiration of the speedy trial period and then refiling a different charge based on the same criminal episode. It is not applicable under the facts of this case. We approve the decision of the circuit court, and decline to issue the writ.
We do feel that this case presents an issue of great public importance and therefore certify to the Supreme Court the following question:
IF THE STATE FILES A FELONY CHARGE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AND THE DEFENDANT MOVES FOR A CONTINUANCE MORE THAN 90 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 180 DAYS AFTER HIS ARREST, AND THE STATE THEN NOL PROSSES THE FELONY CHARGE AND REFILES THE INFORMATION CHARGING A MISDEMEANOR, IS THE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO AN IMMEDIATE DISCHARGE UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL RULE?
JOANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1986)…90 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 180 DAYS AFTER HIS ARREST, AND THE STATE THEN NOL PROSSES THE FELONY CHARGE AND REFILES THE INFORMATION CHARGING A MISDEMEANOR, IS THE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO AN IMMEDIATE DISCHARGE UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL RULE? Stewart v. State, 470 So. 2d 101, 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution. We answer in the negative and approve the opinion of the district court. Stewart was arraigned on June 18, 1983 on the charge of gra…
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Palmer v. State, 76 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…e v. Agee, 622 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla.1993). . See Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968, 970 (Fla.1980). Once a defendant waives speedy trial, the waiver carries over to any refiled charges arising from the same criminal episode. Stewart v. State, 470 So. 2d 101, 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), approved, 491 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1986). . See Nelson, 26 So. 3d at 578 (discussing Ryan v. State, 768 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), and State v. Leslie, 699 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)). . It appears that the Third Distri…
Authorities Cited
- Gallego v. The Honorable H. Mark Purdy as Judge of the Cir. Court of the 17th Jud. Cir. in & for Broward Cnty., 415 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Monahan v. State, 398 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)