MILTON GREEN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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In this escape conviction appeal, Milton Green challenges the court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that Green became a prisoner subject to lawful custody when Sergeant Robinson informed him he was under arrest, even though no physical restraint was yet applied.
Green properly met the definition of a prisoner subject to escape liability because he was under arrest and in the lawful custody of a law enforcement official, regardless of the fact that handcuffs had not yet touched him or transportation had not yet begun. A person's liberty is restrained upon arrest, and escape from lawful custody at that point constitutes the crime of escape.
[1] A person is considered a prisoner and in lawful custody for purposes of an escape charge once lawfully arrested, even if not yet physically restrained or transported.
[2] An arrest, which restrains a suspect's liberty and prevents them from leaving, constitutes the beginning of confinement for the purpose of an escape charge.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Despite the fact that the handcuffs never touched appellant, he met the definition of a prisoner because he was under arrest and in the lawful custody of a law enforcement official.”
Establishes the core holding that arrest alone, without physical restraint, creates prisoner status for escape liability purposes.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSergeant Robinson of the Manatee County Sheriff's Office, acting on teletyped information from Hillsborough County that Green was wanted for child mol…
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GRIMES, Judge.
In this appeal from a conviction of escape, appellant contends that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.
In his sworn motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), appellant asserted that Sergeant Robinson of the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office told appellant that he was under arrest. Although Robinson had no arrest warrant, he had teletyped information from Hillsborough County that appellant was wanted for child molestation. When appellant refused to accompany Sergeant Robinson downtown, Robinson attempted to handcuff him. Appellant pushed Robinson aside and fled.
We affirm on the authority of State v. Akers, 367 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Accord Johnson v. State, No. 84-2037 (Fla. 2d DCA March 8,1985), pet. for review filed (Fla. April 19, 1985) (No. 66,919). Despite the fact that the handcuffs never touched appellant, he met the definition of a prisoner because he was under arrest and in the lawful custody of a law enforcement official.
We acknowledge conflict with Ramsey v. State, 442 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), in which that court under similar circumstances reversed a conviction for escape on the theory that transportation of the prisoner had not yet begun. We prefer the reasoning expressed by Chief Judge Orfinger of the same court in his concurring opinion in State v. Iafornaro, 447 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984):
Since a suspect does not become a “prisoner” until he is placed under arrest, and since he cannot be transported to a place of confinement until he becomes a prisoner, unless the facts clearly show that the officer had no intention of taking him from the scene, “transportation to a place of confinement” begins at the time the suspect is placed under arrest, because that is the very first step in the process. Even though not yet physically restrained, one who has been placed under arrest has had his liberty restrained in that he is not free to leave. His confinement has thus begun and if he escapes from lawful custody, he may be properly charged with escape. The fact that he may also be charged with resisting arrest does not affect the result, because oftentimes a single act violates two or more criminal statutes.
447 So. 2d at 962-63.
Affirmed.
RYDER, C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. Akers, 367 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Wright v. State, 447 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Barber v. State, 442 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)