CANADIAN HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
IRIS NORRIS AND JOSEPH NORRIS, HER HUSBAND, LUC LESSARD AND MARC LESSARD, RESPONDENTS
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Canadian Home Insurance Company sought a writ of common law certiorari to overturn a trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss from a lawsuit filed by an injured third party. The court granted the writ, holding that under Florida Statute § 627.7262, a liability insurer cannot be joined in an action by an injured third party prior to entry of judgment against the insured.
Under Florida Statute § 627.7262, a liability insurer cannot be joined in an action by an injured third party prior to entry of final judgment against the insured. The application of the statute does not hinge on the existence of a no-joinder provision in the contract between insurer and insured.
[1] An order denying a motion to dismiss is generally not subject to non-final appeal, but may be reviewed by common law certiorari if adequate relief cannot be obtained on p…
[2] Florida law prohibits the direct joinder of a liability insurer in an action against the insured prior to the entry of a judgment against the insured.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 627.7262, Florida Statutes (1983), amended as of October 1, 1982, modifies the common law rule which permitted direct joinder of an insurer in an action by the injured third-party beneficiary.”
Establishes that the statute changed the prior common law rule allowing direct joinder of insurers
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNorris, an injured party, simultaneously filed suit against both the alleged tortfeasor and Canadian Home Insurance Company as the insurer. Canadian m…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Canadian Home Insurance Company seeks a writ of common law certiorari, contending that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss. We grant the writ and quash the order. An order denying a motion to dismiss is not one of the enumerated orders subject to non-final appeal. See Rule 9.130(a)(3), Fla.R.App.P. However, because adequate relief cannot be obtained on plenary appeal and because the trial court’s order constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law, review may be had by common law certiorari. See Home Insurance Company of Illinois v. Sentry Insurance A Mutual Company, 461 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); New Hampshire Insurance Company v. Kimbrell, 343 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Beta Eta House Corporation v. Gregory, 230 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).
Norris, the plaintiff in the action below, simultaneously filed suit against the alleged tortfeasor and Canadian as the insurer. Canadian moved to dismiss, contending, as a liability insurer, it could not be joined in an action prior to the entry of judgment against the person who is insured under the terms of the liability policy. As indicated, the trial court denied the motion.
Section 627.7262, Florida Statutes (1983), amended as of October 1, 1982, modifies the common law rule which permitted direct joinder of an insurer in an action by the injured third-party beneficiary. VanBibber v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Insurance Company, 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla.1983); Osborne v. Elizabeth Mas sey Investment Corporation, 467 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). As the statute is currently drafted, a plaintiff’s third-party interest in the insurance policy must vest, by way of final judgment, before an action is filed against the insurer. Neither the plain language of the statute, nor the decisions which have touched on its meaning, support Norris’ contention that application of section 627.7262 hinges on the existence of a “no-joinder” provision in the contract between insurer and insured.' See, e.g., VanBibber v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Insurance Company, 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla.1983); Home Insurance Company of Illinois v. Sentry Insurance A Mutual Company, 461 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
Accordingly, we quash the order in question and instruct the trial court to dismiss Canadian Home Insurance Company from the action now pending before it.
Certiorari granted.
HERSEY, GLICKSTEIN and HURLEY, JJ., concur.
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Authorities Cited
- Ara Williams VanBIBBER v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983)
- Beta ETA House Corp. v. Gregory, 230 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)
- NEW Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Kimbrell, 343 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- J.H. Dowling, Inc. v. Carlton Sheffield and Redia T. Sheffield, 467 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Home Ins. Co. OF Ill. v. Sentry Ins. A Mut. Co., 461 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- The Edward B. Freeman Co. v. Roxine Fagen, 461 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)