LAWRENCE W. MACPHEE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Lawrence MacPhee appealed his armed robbery conviction, claiming he was denied his right to be present at two pretrial conferences where his attorney waived speedy trial. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that while the trial court violated procedural rules by holding conferences without MacPhee present, the error was harmless because MacPhee's presence at a subsequent conference reaffirmed the speedy trial waiver.
The trial court violated Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(3) by conducting pretrial conferences without MacPhee's presence and without a written waiver. However, the error was harmless because MacPhee's attendance at the January 24 conference reaffirmed the speedy trial waiver, and his absence at the February 4 conference caused no prejudice since only the trial date was set.
[1] A defendant's right to be present at pretrial conferences is governed by rule, not the constitution.
[2] A defendant must be present at pretrial conferences unless the presence is waived in writing.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant's right to be present at pretrial conferences is not constitutional but, rather, is provided by rule.”
Establishes that the right to presence is statutory under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(3), not a constitutional guarantee
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMacPhee was not present at a November 8, 1983 pretrial conference where his attorney waived speedy trial and requested a continuance, which was grante…
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RYDER, Chief Judge.
Lawrence W. MacPhee appeals his conviction and sentence for armed robbery on the ground that he was denied his right to be present at two pretrial conferences. MacPhee asserts that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s waiver of speedy trial in his absence. We affirm.
There were three hearings, designated by the trial court as pretrial conferences. MacPhee was not present at the November 8, 1983 hearing where his attorney waived speedy trial and requested a continuance of the trial, which was granted. MacPhee was present at the January 24, 1984 hearing where another defense request for a continuance was granted. MacPhee was again absent at the February 4, 1984 hearing when the trial date was set.
A defendant’s right to be present at pretrial conferences is not constitutional but, rather, is provided by rule. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(3) provides that a defendant shall be present at any pretrial conference unless waived in writing. MacPhee never waived his presence at either conference in writing.
The state argues that none of the hearings were pretrial conferences as contemplated by the rule but can provide no authority supporting this statement. The criminal rules do not define a pretrial conference. Because the trial court itself designated the hearings in question as pretrial conferences, we shall treat them as such.
By not requiring MacPhee’s presence at the November 8 and February 14 conferences, the trial court violated rule 3.180(a)(3). We hold, however, that the error was harmless because MacPhee was not prejudiced by his absence. MacPhee’s presence at the January 24 conference, wherein the court granted his motion for a continuance of the trial, cured the error committed at the November 8 conference. A defense-requested continuance waives speedy trial. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(3); State v. Abrams, 350 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Although a defense attorney may waive speedy trial on his client’s behalf without consulting him and without his presence,1 MacPhee’s presence at the January 24 conference reaffirmed the waiver. Having requested a continuance, MacPhee was not prejudiced by his absence at the February 14 conference, where the only action taken was the setting of the trial date.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we affirm MacPhee’s conviction and sentence.
GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur. . State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baker, 276 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1973); State v. Abrams, 350 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
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Americo Junco and Ernesto R. Esquivel v. State, 510 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…ions had been sustained. Thus, the pretrial confer- . ence essentially consisted of legal and administrative matters in which neither appellant would have had any control on input, and therefore, their presence was unnecessary. See MacPhee v. State, 471 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Furthermore, even though one appellant’s theory of defense was that he was not present during the actual homicides, and the other appellant’s theory was that he had abandoned the criminal intent at the time he became aware…
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Kirkland v. State, 1 So. 3d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…sustained any prejudice from his absence at the January 21 hearing. In addition, we cannot determine whether any potential prejudice to Mr. Kirkland resulting from his absence at that hearing was cured at a subsequent hearing as in MacPhee v. State, 471 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). For these reasons, the trial court erred in summarily denying claim G. See Doward v. State, 802 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“[R]elief may be summarily denied only where the record conclusively refutes [a facially su…
Authorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Juan Gutierrez v. Honorable Paul Baker, 276 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1973)
- State v. Abrams, 350 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)