STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WALTER ABRAMS, JR., APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed a trial court's order discharging Walter Abrams for violation of his speedy trial rights after remand for a new trial. The court held that Abrams was bound by his public defender's continuance request, which waived his speedy trial rights, and reversed the discharge order.
The court reversed the discharge order, holding that a valid attorney-client relationship existed between Abrams and the public defender that did not terminate upon the order for retrial, and therefore the public defender's continuance request effectively waived Abrams' speedy trial rights. Abrams was bound by his attorney's actions regardless of whether he consulted with or approved the continuance.
[1] A defendant's right to a speedy trial is waived when the defendant or their attorney requests a continuance.
[2] The actions of an attorney on behalf of a client are binding on the client, even if done without the client's consultation or against the client's wishes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The principle is well established that the right to a speedy trial is waived when the defendant or his attorney request a continuance. The acts of an attorney on behalf of a client will be binding on the client even though done without consulting him and even against the client's wishes.”
Establishes the core legal principle that attorney actions bind the client and waive speedy trial rights
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAbrams was convicted of robbery and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. His conviction was reversed on appeal, and the case was remanded for a new tr…
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CROSS, Judge.
Appellant, State of Florida, seeks review of a trial court order granting appellee-de-fendant, Walter Abrams’ motion for discharge. We reverse.
Abrams was found guilty after a jury trial and sentenced to ten years imprisonment for robbery. On appeal, Abrams’ conviction was reversed by this court and remanded for new trial, as reported at 326 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). While a private attorney had initially represented Abrams, the public defender was appointed to prosecute the appeal. On remand, private counsel was served notice of Abrams’ new trial date, at which time he moved to withdraw from the case, which motion was granted. The minutes of the hearing reflect that the trial judge expressed an intention to enter a written order appointing the public defender, and directed the clerk to notify the public defender’s office to represent Abrams. Although the record does not reflect any written order of appointment of the public defender entered at that time, the public defender proceeded to represent Abrams. Trial date was set but due to the fact that Abrams did not arrive in the county for trial shortly before the set date, the public defender requested a continuance on the basis that proper trial preparations required further consultations with Abrams.
Upon the expiration of ninety days after the mandate was forwarded by this court to the trial court directing a new trial 'be granted, Abrams moved to be discharged pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(g). At that time, Abrams alleged he had not been afforded a speedy trial, and the public defender’s office did not represent him. After a hearing, the trial court determined the public defender’s office was without authority to seek a continuance and waive Abrams’ right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, the trial court found Abrams was not bound by the public defender’s action and granted his motion for discharge. This appeal then followed.
The question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting appellee’s petition for discharge.
The principle is well established that the right to a speedy trial is waived when the defendant or his attorney request a continuance. The acts of an attorney on behalf of a client will be binding on the client even though done without consulting him and even against the client’s wishes. McArthur v. State, 303 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Brown v. State, 328 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Rule 3.191 does not require that the accused be present when a waiver is made; nor does it require that waiver be made personally by the accused.
In the instant case, a public defender was appointed to prosecute Abrams’ appeal, pursuant to which the conviction was reversed. As a public defender was validly appointed to act as Abrams’ attorney, and the benefits of the public defender’s representation were accepted by Abrams, an attorney-client relationship was established which did not terminate upon the order for a new trial. The existence of an attorney-client relationship was never questioned until Abrams sought to be discharged for failure to be brought to trial within ninety days after the reversal of his conviction on appeal, contrary to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(g). There was in existence a valid attorney-client relationship at the time the public defender sought a continuance two weeks prior to the expiration of the ninety days. Therefore, Abrams’ right to a speedy trial was effectively waived. Abrams cannot accept the benefits of representation by the public defender until it is in his interest to deny the existence of that relationship. The public defender was authorized to act in Abrams’ behalf; therefore, Abrams is bound by his attorney’s actions.
Accordingly, the order of discharge is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceeding.
Reversed and remanded.
ALDERMAN, C. J., concurs specially, with opinion.
DOWNEY, J., dissents, with opinion.
ALDERMAN, Chief Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur and additionally point out that the defendant did not know that the public defender was purporting to represent him until after his return to Palm Beach County on June 4, 1976. At that time the ninety day period had not expired. The mandate had been received by the trial court on March 16, 1976; therefore, the ninety days allowed under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(g) would have expired on June 14, 1976. After talking with an assistant public defender, the defendant took no action to advise the trial court and the state attorney that he did not want a continuance; instead, he took advantage of the continuance, waited until the ninety days had expired, and then filed his motion for discharge.
The trial judge, the state attorney and the public defender were acting in good faith. The continuance was believed by them to be on behalf of, for the benefit of, and in the best interest of the defendant. Once the defendant became aware of the continuance, at a time prior to the expiration of the ninety days, I think he had a duty to advise the trial judge and the state attorney that he didn’t want the continuance and that he was ready for trial. If he had so advised the trial court and the state attorney, the case might have again been reset for trial before the expiration of the ninety day period. The defendant cannot take advantage of the continuance, count the days until the ninety days have expired, and then file his motion for discharge.
DOWNEY, Judge,
dissenting:
If appellee had known the Public Defender was purporting to represent him after the Mandate came down and stood silently by until the speedy trial time had expired, I would agree the order of discharge should be reversed. However, the record before this court demonstrates that appellee had no such knowledge. Thus, the Public Defender’s representation of appellee in the trial court and the two continuances which the Public Defender obtained were unauthorized and should not be binding upon appellee.
This position seems somewhat technical perhaps, but after the appeal was concluded the services for which the Public Defender was appointed were concluded and appellee then had three options. He could, if indigent, request the Public Defender to handle his new trial, he could represent himself, or he could employ private counsel. As far as appellee knew nothing was done so it is impossible to attribute any estoppel or waiver to the appellee. He knew nothing of the Public Defender’s proposed appointment (which was never effectuated), nor of the Public Defender’s activity on his behalf. When he first learned the Public Defender was purporting to represent him appellee advised the Public Defender he did not desire his counsel.
Therefore, I feel compelled to affirm the trial court’s order discharging appellee under the Speedy Trial Rule.
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State v. Kurtz, 354 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…a continuance of the trial and specifically waived his theretofore accrued right to speedy trial. Parenthetically, it is noted that the waiver is not necessary since the Order granting the Defendant’s Motion has that effect anyway. State v. Abrams, 350 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). On September 14, 1976, the second trial date, the court granted Appellee’s Motion of September 10, 1976, and rescheduled the trial for November 29,1976. On November 27,1976, the Appellant filed a proper Motion for Continuance of…1 / 2
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Albert Banks v. State, 691 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…, 380 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 392 So. 2d 1377 (Fla.1980); State v. Duda, 368 So. 2d 918, 919-920 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); State v. Kurtz, 354 So. 2d 890, 891-892 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 1249 (Fla.1978); State v. Abrams, 350 So. 2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); State ex rel. Godson v. Tyson, 334 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Finding no fault with the state, Appellant’s argument is that he should not lose his right to seek a speedy trial discharge simply because the court sc…
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Pressley v. Louie L. Wainwright, 367 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1979)…, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Spenkelink v. State, 350 So. 2d 85, 87 (Fla.) (England, J., concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 960, 98 S.Ct. 492, 54 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977); State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baker, 276 So. 2d 470, 471-72 (Fla. 1973); State v. Abrams, 350 So. 2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Brown v. State, 328 So. 2d 497, 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); State v. Nelson, 320 So. 2d 835, 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); State v. Earnest, 265 So. 2d 397, 400-01 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). . Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S.…
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Atkins v. State, 303 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- J. B. v. State, 328 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Renfroe v. Renfroe, 326 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Abrams v. State, 326 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)