LAWRENCE W. SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Lawrence Smith appealed the denial of his motion to reduce his sentence for armed robbery and cannabis possession after the sixty-day modification period had expired. The court held that Smith was entitled to reconsideration because the trial judge had commenced the hearing within the statutory deadline but circumstances beyond Smith's control prevented timely completion, making him entitled to have the motion reviewed on its merits.
A trial court retains jurisdiction to reconsider a timely sentence reduction motion when it has commenced the hearing within the statutory sixty-day period, even if the hearing is not completed until after the deadline. Circumstances beyond the defendant's control that prevent timely completion do not divest the court of jurisdiction to consider the motion on its merits.
[1] A trial court generally lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence after the expiration of sixty days from sentencing, absent specific exceptions.
[2] A trial court may retain jurisdiction to modify a sentence beyond the sixty-day limit if a hearing on a timely motion to reduce the sentence was commenced within the sixt…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In the unusual circumstances presented by this case, however, the trial judge effectively enlarged the time during which he could reconsider Smith's sentence by having commenced the hearing on Smith's timely motion within the sixty-day limit.”
Establishes the core holding that commencing a hearing within the deadline extends the court's jurisdiction even if completion occurs after the deadline.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSmith pleaded guilty to armed robbery and possession of more than twenty grams of cannabis and was sentenced to concurrent three-year terms. He timely…
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FRANK, Judge.
Lawrénce Smith, having pleaded guilty to armed robbery and to possession of more than twenty-grams of cannabis, was sentenced to concurrent three year terms of imprisonment on each charge. Smith moved for a reduction of his sentence. Within the sixty-day limit prescribed in Rule 3.800(b) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court began to hear Smith’s motion but continued the proceeding because his witnesses were not available to testify. The hearing was reset for a time within the sixty-day period, but the original sentencing judge was on vacation; the fill-in judge refused to hear the matter and rescheduled it for a later date before the original sentencing judge. Although this date fell outside of the sixty day period, the judge nevertheless allowed Smith’s witnesses to testify but denied the motion on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to reduce a sentence after the expiration of sixty days from the imposition of the original sentences.
We note at the outset that Smith has attempted to appeal from a nonap-pealable order — the denial of a motion for reduction of sentence. Hallman v. State, 371 So. 2d 482 (Fla.1979), affirming 343 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Bertone v. State, 388 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Ziegler v. State, 380 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Suggs v. State, 358 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). We can and do, however, treat this appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari.
Generally, a court has no jurisdiction to modify a legal sentence after the passage of sixty days from sentencing. State v. Sutton, 371 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(b). In the unusual circumstances presented by this case, however, the trial judge effectively enlarged the time during which he could reconsider Smith’s sentence by having commenced the hearing on Smith’s timely motion within the sixty-day limit. The First District has so held under similar circumstances in State v. Golden, 382 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In Golden, the trial judge held a hearing within the time limit set forth in Rule 3.800(b), and the state agreed that the court could enter its order modifying the defendant’s sentence at the time scheduled for the trial of other charges against the defendant, in spite of the fact that by that date Rule 3.800(b)’s “jurisdictional” limit had been exceeded. Although the state subsequently withdrew its consent, the trial court nevertheless modified the sentence, and the First District, referring to Rule 3.050 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which generally permits the enlargement of time, affirmed.
The facts presented here disclose that Smith’s position is even stronger than was Golden’s. Smith timely moved for a reduction of his sentence, the hearing was begun, and through no fault of Smith’s the hearing was reset before another judge who refused to hear the motion. Circumstances beyond Smith’s control precluded the timely consideration of his motion. Furthermore, the only reason appearing in the record to support the denial of Smith’s motion is the judge’s impression that he lacked jurisdiction. This is not to say that the judge would otherwise have modified the sentence; rather, it is our opinion that Smith, under these particular circumstances, should not have been denied full and fair consideration of a motion that potentially could have a substantial bearing on the time he would be imprisoned.
Accordingly, to avert the possibility that Smith might suffer an injustice resulting from the sentencing judge’s good faith, but erroneous, impression that he was powerless to act, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari. See Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla.1983). The order denying Smith’s motion for modification of sentence is quashed, and the trial judge is directed to reconsider the motion and to enter an order deemed appropriate upon consideration of the motion’s merits.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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Moya v. State, 668 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b). Such an order is not appealable, but may be reviewed in an extraordinary case under this court’s certiorari jurisdiction. Arnold, v. State, 621 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Smith v. State, 471 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), approved sub nom., Abreu v. State, 660 So. 2d 703 (Fla.1995). Mr. Moya was sentenced to prison on October 10, 1995, following revocation of probation. He mailed his pro se motion to mitigate to the court in early November. It wa…
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Bruno Abreu v. State, 660 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1995)…GRIMES, Chief Justice. We have for review State v. Abreu, 650 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), which certified conflict with State v. Golden, 382 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), and Smith v. State, 471 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). We have [*704] jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. Bruno Abreu was convicted of one count of armed kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated battery, and…
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Grosse v. State, 511 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…tice hearings. This is the duty of parties under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.060. Although the result may be harsh on a pro se petitioner, there is no discretion where the court has lost jurisdiction. We have also considered Smith v. State, 471 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), and State v. Golden, 382 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), but find them inapposite. The order of the trial court is therefore affirmed. DOWNEY, J., concurs. ANSTEAD, J., specially concurs with opinion.…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1983)
- Hallman v. State, 371 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1979)
- Hallman v. State, 343 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Ziegler v. State, 380 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Suggs v. State, 358 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- THE Florida BAR v. Lewis, 358 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- State v. Golden, 382 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- State v. Sutton, 371 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Bertone v. State, 388 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)