JOHN EDWARD TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Taylor appealed the trial court's denial of his request to be tried after his severed co-defendant, who had offered to provide exculpatory testimony. The court held that while a defendant may seek severance to obtain a co-defendant's testimony under strict conditions, Taylor's proffer of that testimony was untimely because it was made during trial rather than beforehand.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. While a defendant seeking severance based on a co-defendant's exculpatory testimony must demonstrate (1) a bona fide need, (2) the substance of the testimony, (3) its exculpatory nature and effect, and (4) that the co-defendant will testify, Taylor's proffer was untimely because it was made during trial rather than at the pretrial stage without showing it could not have been presented earlier.
[1] A defendant seeking a severed trial to present a co-defendant's exculpatory testimony must demonstrate a bona fide need for the testimony, its substance, its exculpatory…
[2] The sequence of separate trials for co-defendants is a matter within the trial court's discretion, absent special circumstances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To obtain a severed trial based on a defendant's desire to offer a co-defendant's potentially exculpatory testimony, the defendant must show: (1) a bona fide need for the testimony, (2) the substance of the testimony, (3) its exculpatory nature and effect, and (4) that the co-defendant will in fact testify if the cases are severed.”
Establishes the four-part test a defendant must satisfy to obtain severance based on co-defendant testimony.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTaylor and Ortiz were co-defendants in a first-degree murder case. The cases were severed due to an extrajudicial statement by Taylor that implicated …
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FERGUSON, Judge.
Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to be tried after a severed co-defendant,1 where the co-defendant agreed to give testimony exculpatory as to appellant if the State tried him first.
Appellant’s co-defendant, in a first-degree murder case, stated by sworn affidavit:
1. My name is Jesus Ortiz and I am a co-defendant with John Taylor in the above numbered indictment.
2. I am presently scheduled to be tried separately from John Taylor. 3. I have evidence that is exculpatory to John Taylor. 4. I am willing to testify at John Taylor’s trial; however, I cannot do so if his trial takes place before my trial. I will testify for John Taylor whether I am acquitted or convicted at my trial.
In a pretrial hearing on appellant’s motion that he be brought to trial after the trial of the co-defendant, counsel presented the affidavit but “could not” proffer the precise testimony which the co-defendant would give. The court denied the motion, deferring to the State’s election to try the defendant first.
To obtain a severed trial based on a defendant’s desire to offer a co-defendant’s potentially exculpatory testimony, the defendant must show: (1) a bona fide need for the testimony, (2) the substance of the testimony, (3) its exculpatory nature and effect, and (4) that the co-defendant will in fact testify if the cases are severed. United States v. Hewes, 729 F. 2d 1302 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 790, 83 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985); Tifford v. Wainwright, 588 F. 2d 954 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 592 F. 2d 233 (5th Cir.1979); Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F. 2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970).
The sequence of separate trials is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, barring special circumstances.2 United States v. Rosson, 441 F. 2d 242, 248 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 843, 92 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed.2d 78 (1971); Byrd, 428 F. 2d at 1022. Although the bare-boned motion that co-defendant be tried first was made prior to appellant’s trial, the proffer of co-defendant’s alleged “exculpatory” testimony was only made after commencement of the trial, without a showing that it could not have been presented before trial.3 The proffer was therefore untimely. See United States v. Butler, 611 F. 2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830, 101 S.Ct. 97, 66 L.Ed.2d 35 (1980); United States v. Rice, 550 F. 2d 1364, 1369-70 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 954, 98 S.Ct. 479, 54 L.Ed.2d 312 (1977).
Appellant’s remaining points on appeal are without merit.
Affirmed.
. The severance was granted, upon the co-defendant’s motion, because of an extrajudicial statement by appellant which implicated the co-defendant. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).
. The court in Byrd found that the defendant had a unique interest in being tried after the co-defendants. The special circumstance in that case was the strong doubt raised as to defendant’s guilt because of inconsistencies between the co-defendants’ confessions. Other factors that may be considered by the court are the demands of effective judicial administration, and the likelihood of prejudice to any defendant. Byrd, 428 F. 2d at 1022; United States v. Sanders, 266 F.Supp. 615 (W.D.La.1967), aff'd, 415 F. 2d 621 (5th Cir.1969).
.The proffered testimony was that appellant was never in the victim’s apartment, which conflicted with appellant’s sworn confession that he was in the apartment, but was not a participant in the homicide. In light of the apparent conflict, which points inescapably to untruthfulness on the part of the co-defendant, the proffer could have been found lacking in substance.
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Daniels v. State, 634 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…tory testimony, the defendant must show: (1) a bona fide need for the testimony, (2) the substance of the testimony, (3) its exculpatory nature and effect, and (4) that the codefendant will in fact testify if the cases are severed. Taylor v. State, 472 So. 2d 814, 815 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Daniels did not proffer the need for the testimony of either codefendant, the substance of the testimony sought to be elicited, nor the exculpatory nature and effect of said testimony. Furthermore, Daniels never asserted a d…
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The Florida Bar v. Jonathan Stephen Schwartz & The Fla. Bar v. Jonathan Stephen Schwartz, 334 So. 3d 298 (Fla. 2024)…imony, and it must show the following: “(1) a bona fide need for the testimony, (2) the substance of the testimony, (3) its exculpatory nature and effect, and (4) that the co-defendant will in fact testify if the cases are severed.” Taylor v. State, 472 So. 2d 814, 815 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (citing Byrd). - 7 - ---PAGE 7--- represented by counsel at the time the affidavit was executed and that his lawyer was not present. Schwartz, who proffered that Johnson would testify that the drugs at issue in the criminal c…
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Lopez v. State, 566 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. McCray v. State, 416 So. 2d 804 (Fla.1982); Andrade v. State, 564 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Taylor v. State, 472 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); M.C. v. State, 450 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); McCain v. State, 390 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), rev. denied, 399 So. 2d 1144 (Fla.1981).…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (15 total)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (U.S. 1968)
- Byrd v. Louie L. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970)
- United States v. Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir. 1984)
- United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1977)
- United States v. Butler, 611 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1980)
- Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1969)
- Mason v. McDowell, 449 U.S. 830 (U.S. 1980)
- Hecker v. Twp. of Dover, 449 U.S. 830 (U.S. 1980)
- Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 434 U.S. 954 (U.S. 1977)
- Sandoval-Roman v. United States, 434 U.S. 954 (U.S. 1977)