JAMES P. BELL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
EAGLE MOTOR LINES, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
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The court held that the 90-day period for filing a Title VII suit begins to run when the right-to-sue letter is received at the plaintiff's residence, even if received by a spouse.
Bell received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, which was accepted by his wife while he was out of town. Bell filed his Title VII action more than …
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PER CURIAM:
In 1978 Bell filed a race discrimination charge against Eagle Motor Lines, Inc. with the EEOC. Bell subsequently requested a right to sue letter. On December 18, 1979 the right to sue letter was delivered. to Bell’s residence, and accepted and signed for by his wife. Bell claims that he was out of town on December 18 and first learned of the right to sue letter on December 26. Bell filed this action on March 20, 1980, alleging a violation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976). Eagle Motor moved for summary judgment on the ground that Bell filed the complaint more than 90 days after receipt of his right to sue letter. The district court granted summary judgment for Eagle Motor. Bell appeals.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that suit be brought within 90 days after receipt of notice of right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976). The district court calculated the 90 day period from the date Bell’s wife received the notice at his residence. Bell argues that the period should begin to run from the date of his actual receipt of the EEOC notice.
This court has refused to establish an inflexible rule determining when a complainant has “received” notice of his right to sue. As the Eleventh Circuit recently stated in Lewis v. Connors Steel Co., 673 F. 2d 1240, 1242 (11th Cir.1982):
We need not embrace the doctrine of constructive receipt, nor close our eyes to the liberal construction the act is entitled to in order to fashion a fair and reasonable rule for the circumstances of this case. There is no reason why a plaintiff should enjoy a manipulable open-ended time extension which could render the statutory limitation meaningless. Plaintiff should be required to assume some minimum responsibility himself for an orderly and expeditious resolution of his dispute.
Approaching the issue on a case by case basis as we did in Lewis, we find that the receipt of the EEOC notice by Bell’s wife at his residence triggered the running of the 90 day period. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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Espinoza v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1985)…y-day period unless the claimant, through no fault of his own, failed to receive the right-to-sue letter or unless, for some other equitable reason, the statute should be tolled until he actually receives notice. Cf. Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 693 F. 2d 1086 (11th Cir.1982); Mouriz v. Avondale Shipyard, Inc., 428 F.Supp. 1025 (E.D.La.1977).3 In this case, Espinoza has alleged no grounds for equitable relief from this rule. Unlike the claimant in Franks, Espinoza actually learned of his right to sue sho…
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Zillyette v. Cap. ONE Fin. Corp., 179 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 1999)…under Title VII on fortuitous circumstances or events beyond his control which are not spelled out in the statute.” Franks, 495 F. 2d at 404. For example, in Law v. Hercules, Inc., 713 F. 2d 691 (11th Cir.1983), and Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 693 F. 2d 1086 (11th Cir.1982), we affirmed the dismissal of suits for failure to meet the 90-day filing deadline where the EEOC notification letter was delivered to plaintiffs home and was received by a responsible family member who resided in the home. See Law,…
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Eldridge LAW v. Hercules, Inc., 713 F.2d 691 (11th Cir. 1983)…time extension which would render the statutory limitation meaningless. Plaintiff should be required to assume some minimum responsibility himself for an orderly and expeditious resolution of his dispute. Id. at 1242. In Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, 693 F. 2d 1086 (11th Cir.1982), we were presented with a situation where the notice of right to sue letter was signed for by Bell’s wife on December 18, 1979, but Bell claimed he was out of town and first learned of the letter on December 26,1979. “Approaching the…
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- Lewis v. Conners Steel Co., 673 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1982)