ELDRIDGE LAW, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
HERCULES, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
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The court held that the 90-day period for filing a civil action under Title VII begins to run when the EEOC notice of right to sue is received by the plaintiff's household, not when the plaintiff personally receives it.
The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue, which was signed for by the plaintiff's son. The plaintiff filed suit 91 days after the notice was signed fo…
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PER CURIAM:
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether Eldridge Law’s complaint filed pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, is barred by the provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) which provides that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) must notify an aggrieved party that it is terminating action on the charge and “within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought.”
The parties agree that the essential facts are not in dispute. On March 31, 1981, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue, sent by certified mail to Eldridge Law. This piece of certified mail was picked up at the post office on April 14, 1981 by Mr. Law’s son, Chester, a seventeen year old high school student, at the request of his mother, Mr. Law’s wife. Chester Law took the letter home and placed it on the kitchen table. Eldridge Law received the notice “one or two days later.” Law commenced suit on July 14, 1981, ninety-one days after the notice was signed for by his son. On defendant’s motion, the district court entered summary judgment for the defendant based on the failure to comply with the ninety day deadline imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).
On appeal Eldridge Law urges adoption of an actual receipt rule contending that his complaint is timely since he did not receive the notice until “one or two days” after it was picked up at the post office. In Lewis v. Conners Steel Co., 673 F. 2d 1240 (11th Cir.1982), we confronted the issue of the notice being sent to a possibly outdated address, and stated:
We need not embrace the doctrine of constructive receipt, nor close our eyes to the liberal construction the act is entitled to in order to fashion a fair and reasonable rule for the circumstances of this case. There is no reason why a plaintiff should enjoy a manipulable open-ended time extension which would render the statutory limitation meaningless. Plaintiff should be required to assume some minimum responsibility himself for an orderly and expeditious resolution of his dispute.
Id. at 1242. In Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, 693 F. 2d 1086 (11th Cir.1982), we were presented with a situation where the notice of right to sue letter was signed for by Bell’s wife on December 18, 1979, but Bell claimed he was out of town and first learned of the letter on December 26,1979. “Approaching the issue on a case by ease basis as we did in Lewis,” we found that “the receipt of the EEOC notice by Bell’s wife at his residence triggered the running of the 90 day period.” Id. at 1087.
This case is not significantly distinguishable from Bell. Eldridge Law was living at home at the time of the receipt of the letter, which was picked up by his seventeen year old son and placed on the kitchen table. To allow additional time based on a claim that the letter was not actually received by Eldridge Law until “one or two days later,” would be to foster a “manipulable open-ended time extension which would render the statutory limitation meaningless.” Lewis, 673 F. 2d at 1242.
We therefore agree with the district court that Law’s Title VII claim is foreclosed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and the entry of summary judgment is AFFIRMED.
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Espinoza v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1985)…ed the running of the ninety-day period. See also Lewis v. Conners Steel Co., 673 F. 2d 1240 (11th Cir.1982) (notice mailed to address provided to EEOC; remand to determine if claimant failed to notify EEOC of address change); Law v. Hercules, Inc., 713 F. 2d 691 (11th Cir.1983) (notice picked up by claimant’s son at post office, but not seen by claimant until "one or two days later”; held, ninety-day period began to run when son picked up notice). In Mouriz, then District Judge Rubin determined that recei…
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Zillyette v. Cap. ONE Fin. Corp., 179 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 1999)…esolving them claims without “conditioning a claimant’s right to sue under Title VII on fortuitous circumstances or events beyond his control which are not spelled out in the statute.” Franks, 495 F. 2d at 404. For example, in Law v. Hercules, Inc., 713 F. 2d 691 (11th Cir.1983), and Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 693 F. 2d 1086 (11th Cir.1982), we affirmed the dismissal of suits for failure to meet the 90-day filing deadline where the EEOC notification letter was delivered to plaintiffs home and was recei…
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Hornsby v. United States Postal Serv., 787 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1986)….g., St. Louis v. Alverno College, 744 F. 2d 1314, 1316-17 (7th Cir.1984); Lewis v. Conners Steel Co., 673 F. 2d 1240, 1242-43 (11th Cir. 1982). . See Espinoza v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 754 F. 2d 1247, 1248-50 (5th Cir.1985); Law v. Hercules, Inc., 713 F. 2d 691, 692-93 (11th Cir.1983); Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 693 F. 2d 1086, 1086-87 (11th Cir.1982); Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union, 585 F. 2d 210, 213-16 (7th Cir.1978). . If a certified letter, a registered letter…
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- Lewis v. Conners Steel Co., 673 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1982)
- Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 693 F.2d 1086 (11th Cir. 1982)