RONALD LEO MCCALL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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LEHAN, Judge.
We affirm the denial of defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief.
The grounds of the motion were that defendant’s sentence was improper because among its terms was the provision that he be incarcerated for twenty-five years “to run consecutively with sentence now serving from North Carolina and consecutively with any additional sentence received from the state of North Carolina.” We agree that the sentence was improperly indefinite because it was vague and uncertain as to when it commenced relative to “any additional sentence” in North Carolina. See Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Teffeteller v. State, 396 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Keel v. State, 321 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). However, the record reflects that defendant began serving his Florida sentence after he served all of his sentences in North Carolina. Thus, the issue has become moot, and no purpose would be served by remanding for entry of a corrected sentence.
Affirmed.
OTT, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur.
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Citator
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Buss v. Reichman, 53 So. 3d 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…erated in federal prison. All of the sentences were to run consecutively and even if Florida courts had any influence over the order of the sentences, at this point, there is no way to change the order in which they were served. See McCall v. State, 475 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (concluding defendant’s challenge to his indefinite Florida sentence was moot because he completed the sentences from the other jurisdiction and was now serving his Florida sentence). By raising this issue after he completed his f…
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Smith v. State, 515 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…n other pending charges. It is improper to commence a sentence after the imposition of a sentence for any future unrelated crime. Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713 (1899); Percival v. State, 506 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); McCall v. State, 475 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), appeal dismissed, 486 So. 2d 596 (Fla.1986); Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Teffeteller v. State, 396 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Keel v. State, 321 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Accordingly, we re…
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Schlosser v. State, 554 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…sed, no federal sentence had been imposed at the time the probation and the foregoing incarceration were imposed. Thus, the sentence was improperly indefinite. See Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750, 751 (Fla.2d DCA 1983). See also McCall v. State, 475 So. 2d 1364 (Fla.2d DCA 1985). We do not agree with the state’s argument that because incarceration as a condition of probation is not a sentence, the trial court was free to link the incarceration to an as yet not existent federal sentence. See Van Tassel v.…
Authorities Cited
- Ellis Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Teffeteller v. State, 396 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Kubalski v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 321 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Keel v. State, 321 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)