STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JIMMIE DWIGHT GREEN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The State appeals a circuit court's grant of post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850. The appellate court reverses, holding that the defendant's grounds for relief—insufficient inquiry into his request to discharge court-appointed counsel and alleged coercion of his guilty plea—were either cognizable on direct appeal or were withdrawn by the defendant's later conduct.
The court reversed, holding that ground (1)—the insufficiency of inquiry into the discharge request—does not provide sufficient grounds for relief under Rule 3.850 because it could have been raised on direct appeal. Ground (2)—that the guilty plea was coerced—fails as dependent upon ground (1). Additionally, the record shows defendant indicated satisfaction with his court-appointed counsel prior to trial, effectively withdrawing his discharge request, making any failure to conduct an inquiry moot.
[1] Matters that could have been raised on direct appeal are not cognizable in a motion for post-conviction relief.
[2] A claim that a guilty plea was coerced by the denial of a request to discharge counsel is dependent on the validity of the request to discharge counsel.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“matters which could have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised in a rule 3.850 motion”
Establishes the principal limitation on Rule 3.850 post-conviction relief that determines the outcome of this case
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJimmie Dwight Green was convicted and pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm in violation of Florida Statute § 790.23. Before trial, he requested that…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Coerced Guilty Plea cases and more on FLexlaw
LEHAN, Judge.
The state appeals the order of the circuit court granting defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to rule 3.850, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure. We reverse.
Defendant’s motion alleged three grounds, one of which was conceded by defendant to be insufficient, was not relied upon by the trial court, and is not an issue on appeal. We conclude that the other two grounds were (1) that, contrary to the requirements set forth in the case law, e.g., Parker v. State, 423 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), there was an insufficient inquiry into defendant’s request that his court appointed counsel be discharged, and (2)that defendant’s guilty plea to the charge of possessing a firearm in violation of Florida Statute § 790.23 was coerced because the defendant pleaded guilty to that charge only after the request referred to in ground (1) was denied.
Ground (2) is inextricably related to and dependent upon ground (1) because if defendant was not entitled to the inquiry referred to in ground (1) (and to the discharge of court appointed defense counsel) there could have been no “coercion” of the guilty plea of the type referred to in ground (2). Therefore, if ground (1) provides an insufficient basis for relief, ground (2) is also insufficient.
Ground (1) did not provide sufficient grounds for relief because matters which could have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised in a rule 3.850 motion. Jones v. State, 446 So. 2d 1059 (Fla.1984); Smith v. State, 444 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Williams v. State, 427 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); and Parker v. State, supra. Whether or not the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request for a discharge of counsel by failing to follow the proper procedures as required by the case law could have been determined from the record on direct appeal.
We note that on his prior direct appeal to this court defendant unsuccessfully argued that the trial court erred in failing to grant a continuance of the trial so that defendant could be represented by private counsel. To the extent that defendant’s rule 3.850 motion might arguably be construed to incorporate those same grounds, those grounds were not properly, included in the rule 3.850 motion. McCrae v. State, 437 So. 2d 1388 (Fla.1983).
Also, the record shows that the defendant indicated to the trial court prior to his trial that he was satisfied with proceeding to trial with his court appointed counsel. Therefore, it appears that defendant in effect withdrew his request for the discharge of court appointed counsel. There could hardly have been error in the failure to conduct an inquiry into a rescinded request.
The order vacating judgment and sentence is hereby reversed and the judgment and sentence is reinstated.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Kott v. State, 518 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…of habe-as corpus); United States v. Morrissey, 461 F. 2d 666 (2d Cir.1972) (trial court’s perfunctory inquiry was not erroneous where complete record showed no irreconcilable conflict which seriously impaired attorney’s usefulness); State v. Green, 476 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (no error caused by the court’s failure to conduct inquiry where defendant effectively withdrew request for discharge of court-appointed counsel); State v. Hurst, 82 N.C. App. 1,346 S.E. 2d 8 (1986) (although generally it is bette…
-
Jenkins v. State, 794 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…at “[wjhether or not the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request for a discharge of counsel by failing to follow the proper procedures as required by the case law could have been determined from the record on direct appeal.” State v. Green, 476 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Therefore, the claim is not cognizable in a rule 3.850 motion. Id.; Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(c) (“This rule does not authorize relief based on grounds that could have or should have been raised at trial and, if properly preserv…
-
Savala v. State, 554 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…So. 2d 639 (Fla.1982); Parrish v. State, 90 Fla. 25, 105 So. 130 (1925); Kott v. State, 518 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Johnson v. State, 486 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Fratello v. State, 496 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); State v. Green, 476 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); State v. Prieto, 439 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Perez v. State, 390 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Williams v. State, 353 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. dismissed, 372 So. 2d 64 (Fla.1977); New v. State, 211 So. 2d 35 (F…
Authorities Cited
- McCRAE v. State, 437 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 1983)
- Williams v. State, 427 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- State v. Thompson, 444 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Jones v. State, 446 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1984)
- Billie v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 423 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- W.T. Parker v. State, 423 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)