CAMILLA NORRIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES; ALVIN TAYLOR, ETC., AND JESSIE BARKLEY, ETC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

11th Cir. | 1984-04-23
No. 83-3341
730 F.2d 682 Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (1984) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

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Holding

The court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) does not extend the 90-day filing period for a Title VII lawsuit when the period begins upon receipt of the right-to-sue notice.

Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiff received a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC on November 6, 1980, and filed her lawsuit 91 days later on February 5, 1981. The relevant stat…

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Topics
Equitable Tolling Title Vii Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM:

PER CURIAM:

Camilla Norris appeals from a summary judgment dismissing her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., because it was untimely filed. Norris received notice of her right to sue from the EEOC on November 6, 1980. On February 5, 1981, ninety-one days later, she filed the complaint in the present action. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the plaintiff must file suit within ninety days of receiving the right-to-sue notice. See Law v. Hercules, Inc., 713 F. 2d 691, 692 (11th Cir.1983) (ninety-day period under § 2000e-5 begins to run upon receipt of certified letter at plaintiff’s residence); Franks v. Bowman Transportation, 495 F. 2d 398, 405 (5th Cir.1974)1 (30-day limitation period under predecessor statute to § 2000e-5 does not begin until receipt of notification), rev’d on other grounds, 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976).

Norris argues that Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e) should be construed to add three days to the statutory 90-day period. Rule 6(e) provides:

Additional Time After Service By Mail. Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.

(Emphasis added). The rule only applies when the service is by mail and must be understood in light of Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b), which provides that “[sjervice by mail is complete upon mailing.” The reason for the three additional days is to account for the time required for delivery of the mail. However, in the instant context, the 90-day time period commences, as noted above, upon receipt, and not upon the mailing of the right-to-sue notice. Thus, there is no reason to apply Rule 6(e). See Suarez v. Little Havana Activities, 721 F. 2d 338, 340 (11th Cir.1983) (rejecting a Rule 6(e) argument in a similar Title VII case).

We therefore reject Norris’ argument that Rule 6(e) should be construed to add three days to the statutory 90-day time period. Norris having set forth no ground for equitable tolling, see Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F. 2d 584, 594 (5th Cir.1981), we conclude that Norris’ complaint was untimely, and that the district court committed no error in granting summary judgment against Norris on that ground.

AFFIRMED.

. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F. 2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. Id. at 1209.

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Cited By (11 total)

  • The Cleveland Newspaper Guild v. The Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 839 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1988)
    …v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 787 F. 2d 827, 828 (2d Cir.1986) (per curiam); Josiah-Faeduwor v. Communications Satellite Corp., 785 F. 2d 344, 346 (D.C.Cir.1986) (per curiam); Norris v. Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 730 F. 2d 682 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam). Where an action is based upon a statutory right for which Congress has provided a limitations period, laches is not a defense if the action is filed within the applicable limitations period. See United States v. RePas…
  • Mosel v. Hills Dep't Store, Inc., 789 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1986)
    …ct court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint as untimely and in refusing to apply Rule 6(e) in this case, we agree with the decision reached in an identical situation in Norris v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 730 F. 2d 682 (11th Cir.1984), and decline to follow Tavernaris v. Beaver Area School District, 453 F.Supp. 355 (W.D.Pa.1978) (applying Rule 6(e) by “analogy” to extend the statutory period for filing a Title VII complaint). The order of the district court will…
  • Martinez v. United States Sugar Corp., 880 F. Supp. 773 (M.D. Fla. 1995)
    …the burden to prove that he has adhered to the requirement. That 90 day period begins to run upon receipt of certified letter at plaintiff’s residence [emphasis added]. Norris v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 730 F.2d 682 (11th Cir.1984), see also Law v. Hercules, Inc., 713 F.2d 691 (11th Cir.1983). The Notice of Right to Sue was dated November 25, 1992, and this action was filed March 1, 1993, 95 days later. Plaintiff stated in trial testimony, contrary to…

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