THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
MARGARITA CHACON, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed the dismissal of a grand theft information against Margarita Chacon on statute of limitations grounds. The court reversed, holding that the applicable statute of limitations for grand theft is five years under Section 812.035(10), not three years, and that prosecution commenced when the arrest warrant was issued in May 1981, well within the five-year window.
The court held that the five-year statute of limitations under Section 812.035(10) applies to all theft prosecutions, not the three-year statute under Section 775.15(2)(b), and that prosecution commenced on May 12, 1981, when the arrest warrant was issued and placed in the hands of the proper official for execution, therefore making the prosecution timely.
[1] A criminal action for theft under Florida Statutes sections 812.012-812.037 may be commenced at any time within five years after the cause of action accrues, notwithstand…
[2] For the purposes of the statute of limitations, prosecution has commenced when an arrest warrant has been issued and placed in the hands of the proper official for execut…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal ... action or proceeding under ss. 812.012-812.037 may be commenced at any time within 5 years after the cause of action accrues.”
The statute of limitations provision specific to theft prosecutions that applies instead of the general three-year felony statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMargarita Chacon was charged with grand theft for crimes allegedly committed between November 8-12, 1980. An arrest warrant was issued on May 12, 1981…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the state from an order dismissing an information on the ground that the prosecution herein was barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse.
On May 22, 1981, an information was filed in the court below charging the defendant Margarita Chacon with grand theft in violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1981). The crime charged is alleged to have taken place between November 8-12, 1980. On May 12, 1981, an arrest warrant for the defendant on the aforesaid grand theft charge was issued and placed in the hands of the Dade County Public Safety Department for service. On October 25, 1984, the defendant was arrested in Dade County on the outstanding arrest warrant. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground that it was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations for second degree felonies [grand theft is a second degree felony] as provided by Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). The trial court granted the motion and this appeal follows.
First, the applicable statute of limitations for grand theft is not the three-year statute under Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), but, as the Fifth District has recently held, the five-year statute under Section 812.035(10), Florida Statutes (1981), which is made specifically applicable to all theft prosecutions notwithstanding any other contrary statute. State v. Bare, 473 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Section 812.035(10), Florida Statutes (1981) reads in pertinent part as follows:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal ... action or proceeding under ss. 812.012-812.037 may be commenced at any time within 5 years after the cause of action accrues.”
Second, the prosecution in this ease was plainly begun on May 12, 1981, when an arrest warrant for grand theft against the defendant was issued and placed in the hands of the Dade County Public Safety Department for service. The law is well-settled that “for the purposes of the statute of limitations, prosecution has commenced when a warrant has been issued and placed in the hands of the proper official for execution.” Sturdivan v. State, 419 So. 2d 300, 301 (Fla.1982); see Dubbs v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 799, 130 So. 36 (1930); Rosengarten v. State, 171 So. 2d 591 (Fla.2d DCA), cert. denied, 177 So. 2d 476 (Fla.1965). It follows, then, that the prosecution herein was properly commenced within five years after November 8-12, 1980, the dates of the alleged crime of grand larceny, and, therefore, the instant prosecution was not time-barred under Section 812.035(10), Florida Statutes (1981).
The order under review is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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State v. Fields, 505 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1987)…expiration of limitations period or if Fields had been served before the statute of limitations ran. We approve the opinion of the district court of appeal. We disapprove Warren v. Wainwright, 483 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), and State v. Chacon, 479 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), to the extent that they rely upon Sturdivan for an interpretation of section 775.15(5). It is so ordered. MCDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.…
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State v. Hampton, 692 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…eement with Bare. See, e.g., O’Malley v. Mounts, 590 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), rev. denied, 595 So. 2d 557 (Fla.1992); State v. Guthrie, 567 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Franklin v. State, 505 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); State v. Chacon, 479 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), disapproved on other grounds in State v. Fields, 505 So. 2d 1336 (Fla.1987). We agree with the state. In Wells the issue that was argued to, and addressed by, this court was the time at which a prosecution is deemed to have been…
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State v. Telesz, 873 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…in section 812.035 applied to grand theft rather than the more general statute, section 775.15); O’Malley v. Mounts, 590 So. 2d 437, 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (concluding that the statute of limitations for grand theft is five years); State v. Chacon, 479 So. 2d 229, 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (ruling [*1238] that the applicable statute of limitations for grand theft is the five-year statute under section 812.035(10), “which is made specifically applicable to all theft prosecutions notwithstanding any other contrar…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nelson v. M. P. Lehman Sheriff of Dade Cnty., 100 Fla. 799 (Fla. 1930)
- Sturdivan v. State, 419 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1982)
- Rosengarten v. State, 171 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- State v. Bare, 473 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Painters' Union Local 365, AFL-CIO v. Fountainebleau Hotel Corp., 177 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1965)
- Strawder v. State, 177 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1965)