STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
WILLIE FIELDS, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that under section 775.15(5), prosecution commences only when an arrest warrant is executed (served) on the defendant, not merely when issued. The Court overruled prior precedent interpreting an earlier statute to hold that issuance alone commenced prosecution, and affirmed the discharge of an information where the warrant was issued in 1982 but not served until 1985, causing the statute of limitations to expire.
Prosecution commences under section 775.15(5) only when an arrest warrant or other process is executed (served on the defendant), not when merely issued. Sturdivan, which held that issuance alone commenced prosecution, cannot be applied to interpret section 775.15(5) because it addressed an earlier statute with a different definition of commencement. Where execution is delayed unreasonably, the statute of limitations may expire despite timely filing of the information.
[1] A prosecution is commenced when an indictment or information is filed, provided the process issued on it is executed without unreasonable delay.
[2] The term "executed" in the statute defining commencement of prosecution refers to service upon the defendant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.”
This is the statutory language of section 775.15(5) that defines when prosecution commences and requires execution (service) of process without unreasonable delay.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWillie Fields was charged by information with aggravated assault on January 20, 1982. Although a warrant for his arrest was issued on that date, it wa…
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GRIMES, Judge.
We review State v. Fields, 502 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), because of asserted conflict with Sturdivan v. State, 419 So. 2d 300 (Fla.1982), and cases relying thereon; Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. On January 20, 1982, Fields was charged by information with committing an aggravated assault on January 4, 1982. A warrant for his arrest was issued on that date but was not served until August 7, 1985. Fields moved to discharge the information on grounds that the three-year statute of limitations for aggravated assault had expired by reason of section 775.15(5), which reads:
(5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.
In discharging the information the trial judge found that Fields had resided at the same address for the preceding five years, that the state knew his address, and that no attempt had been made to execute the capias until the date Fields was served. Acknowledging that its opinion could be in conflict with Sturdivan, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, nevertheless, affirmed.
In Sturdivan this Court said, “It is settled law in Florida that for the purposes of the statute of limitations, prosecution has commenced when a warrant has been issued and placed in the hands of the proper official for execution.” 419 So. 2d at 301. If this statement reflects current law, the prosecution of Fields was timely commenced and the delay in service was irrelevant. However, Sturdivan was referring to an arrest warrant issued and delivered to the police in 1971 — prior to enactment of section 775.15(5). The cases cited by Stur-divan in support of the foregoing quotation also interpreted earlier statutes which did not contain the present definition of commencement. Furthermore, the issue in Sturdivan was the effect of a late filed indictment rather than the timeliness of the execution of the arrest warrant. Hence, we hold that Sturdivan cannot be considered as having interpreted section 775.-15(5). Accord State ex rel. Welch v. Circuit Court of Escambia County, 487 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1330 (Fla.1986).
Likewise, we agree with the district court of appeal that the word “executed” in section 775.15(5) can only mean service upon the defendant. Since the record supports the trial judge’s findings concerning unreasonable delay, the order of discharge was properly entered. We do not decide whether the same result would ensue if the information had been filed immediately before the expiration of limitations period or if Fields had been served before the statute of limitations ran.
We approve the opinion of the district court of appeal. We disapprove Warren v. Wainwright, 483 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), and State v. Chacon, 479 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), to the extent that they rely upon Sturdivan for an interpretation of section 775.15(5).
It is so ordered.
MCDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (22 total)
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Brown v. State, 674 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…prosecution. The capias must also be executed without unreasonable delay. State v. Miller, 581 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA), review dismissed, 584 So. 2d 999 (Fla.1991). The word “executed” means completion of service on the defendant. State v. Fields, 505 So. 2d 1336 (Fla.1987). Section 775.15(5) further provides that “[i]n determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant’s absence from the state shall be considered.” In this case, each information was fil…1 / 2
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State v. Mack, 637 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…e license in Broward County in November of 1985, and that her married name was Schneider. We affirm the order of dismissal because we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that there was an unreasonable delay. State v. Fields, 505 So. 2d 1336 (Fla.1987). Although there is not an abundance of case law to guide us as to what the state must do to make a diligent search in criminal cases, in Kyte v. State, 49 Fla.Supp.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir.Ct.1991), Judge McNeal, writing in a similar case on ap…
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Myron Fleming v. State, 524 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…only that appellant was apprehended in Marietta, Georgia, and that he was in Georgia for some unspecified period of time. However, these facts are insufficient to prove the reasonableness of the four-year delay. While not on point, State v. Fields, 505 So. 2d 1336 (Fla.1987), is instructive on the issue of the timeliness of execution of the arrest warrant. In Fields, the information was discharged because the state made no attempt to execute the capias until years later, even though it knew where to find the…
Previewing 3 of 22 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sturdivan v. State, 419 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1982)
- State v. Chacon, 479 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- State v. The Cir. Court In & For Escambia Cnty., 487 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Bowes v. Bowes, 483 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Warren v. Louie L. Wainwright, 483 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- State v. Fields, 502 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)