DAN R. WARREN, APPELLANT,
v.
MARY FRANCES WARREN, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed most of the trial court's judgment dividing marital property and awarding alimony to the former wife, but remanded the issue of exclusive possession of the marital home to determine an appropriate duration and whether the conditions supporting such exclusive use still existed.
The court affirmed the equitable distribution of marital property and permanent alimony awards as within the trial judge's discretion, but remanded the exclusive possession issue to allow the trial judge to establish an appropriate period of exclusive occupancy and determine whether the reasons supporting exclusive use still exist.
[1] An award of exclusive possession of the marital residence to a spouse must be limited as to time or conditions that terminate the right of occupancy.
[2] A trial court's discretion in awarding permanent alimony and equitable distribution of marital property will be affirmed if within ample discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial judge awarded the former wife the exclusive use and possession of the jointly owned marital home without any limitations as to time or conditions that might terminate her exclusive right of occupancy.”
Identifies the problematic nature of the award being reviewed—its indefinite and unconditional character.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDan Warren and Mary Frances Warren were divorced by final judgment signed April 2, 1984. The trial judge awarded the former wife exclusive use and pos…
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PER CURIAM.
The former husband appeals from a final judgment of dissolution signed April 2, 1984, and from a successor trial judge’s denial of his motion for rehearing, following the trial judge’s recusal on June 15, 1984. We find no error in the successor trial judge’s denial of appellant’s motion for rehearing,1 even if we assume this is an appealable order.2 We also affirm the dissolution judgment in all respects except the award of exclusive possession of the marital residence to the former wife. The equitable distribution of marital property and award of permanent alimony were generous, but they were within the ample discretion of the trial judge. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1983).
The trial judge awarded the former wife the exclusive use and possession of the jointly owned marital home without any limitations as to time or conditions that might terminate her exclusive right of occupancy. This award was characterized by the trial court as spousal support or alimony. It may also have been based on the special need of appellee because at the time of the trial, appellant’s sixteen year old daughter was residing with appellee in the marital home. See Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1980).
Based on this record and judgment, we are unable to ascertain what a reasonable period of exclusive occupancy would be, or for what purpose. We therefore remand this issue for hearing before a trial judge, to set an appropriate period of exclusive possession and to determine if such reasons for exclusive use still exist. Duncan, 379 So. 2d at 952; Firkel v. Firkel, 391 So. 2d 351, 352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). This award of exclusive use to appellee of the marital home should be viewed in the context of the other awards in the judgment, which we are affirming.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED.
SHARP and COWART, JJ., and BAKER, J.P., Associate Judge, concur. . See Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So. 2d 367 (Fla.1958); Groover v. Walker, 88 So. 2d 312 (Fla.1956).
. See State ex rel. Poe v. Allen, 196 So. 2d 745 (Fla.1967); Jones v. State, 423 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Bay Area News, Inc. v. Poe, 364 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 456 (Fla.1979); Puga v. Suave Shoe Corp., 417 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981); Whigam v. Bornstein, 118 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1960); Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(4).
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Citator
Cited By
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Gussie Hanks v. Hanks, 553 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…discretion. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980).1 However, it was error to award the husband exclusive possession of the store property for an indeterminate period. Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949, 952 (Fla.1980); Warren v. Warren, 480 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). While this may be a circumstance where exclusive possession of the property is appropriate so that the husband can operate the grocery store business, the trial court awarded him exclusive possession even past the time in which…
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Babooram Sugrim v. Sumattee Sugrim, 649 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…judgment. See Collins-worth v. Collinsworth, 624 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (final judgment of dissolution which failed to designate specific purpose for exclusive use and possession award and set no time limit on award error); Warren v. Warren, 480 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (award to wife of exclusive use and possession of jointly owned marital home without any limitations as to time or conditions that might terminate exclusive right of occupancy was an abuse of discretion). The husband also argues…
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Allen v. Allen, 542 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…occupancy of the marital home or the specific conditions which will terminate that exclusive occupancy requires remand to the trial court for clarification and amendment of the judgment. Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1980); Warren v. Warren, 480 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a de novo hearing on the issue of exclusive occupancy, if necessary. NIMMONS and MINER…
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)
- Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1983)
- Groover v. Walker, 88 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1956)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Alfred Gordon POE & Doris v. Poe, 196 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1967)
- Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1958)
- Robustiano Puga & Medmold, Inc. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 417 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Jones v. State, 423 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- BAY Area News, Inc. v. POE, 364 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Firkel v. Firkel, 391 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)