SOUTHEASTERN FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
KING'S WAY MORTGAGE COMPANY, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1985-12-31
No. 84-2414
Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and HUBBART, JJ.
481 So. 2d 530 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Southeastern Fire Insurance Company appealed a judgment entered against it in a bench trial on an insurance policy collection action. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting the defendant's argument that the trial court should have disregarded the plaintiff's sole witness testimony as inadmissible, holding that once admitted into evidence, testimony must be weighed for credibility rather than excluded post hoc.


Holding

The trial court did not err in admitting and considering the witness testimony. Once testimony is admitted into evidence, the trial court must weigh its credibility at the close of trial rather than disregarding it on grounds of inadmissibility. The testimony constituted sufficient, competent evidence to support the judgment.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court, having admitted testimony into evidence, must weigh its credibility at the close of all evidence and is not free to disregard it on the ground that it was…

[2] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge based on the alleged inadmissibility of testimony previously admitted by the trial court will be rejected if competent evidence su…

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Key Quotes

“Once having admitted the testimony in evidence, the trial court was required to weigh the credibility of this testimony at the close of all the evidence at trial — and was not free, as urged, to disregard this testimony on the ground that it was inadmissible under the rules of evidence.”

Establishes the principle that admitted testimony must be evaluated for credibility rather than excluded post hoc as inadmissible

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Facts & Procedural History

This was a non-jury trial action to collect under an insurance policy. The plaintiff presented testimony from a sole witness to support its claim. The…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the defendant from an adverse judgment entered after a non-jury trial in an action to collect under an insurance policy. The defendant’s sole point on appeal is that the trial court erred in awarding a judgment for damages to the plaintiff because, it is urged, there is a total lack of competent evidence to support the judgment. We reject this contention based on the following, briefly stated, legal analysis.

The entire basis for the defendant’s above-stated sufficieney-of-the-evidence point consists of an attack on the admissibility of the testimony given by the plaintiff’s sole witness below. A separate point on appeal is not raised concerning the admissibility of this testimony. The defendant urges that the trial court, at the close of all the evidence, should have disregarded the testimony of the plaintiffs sole witness because it was entirely inadmissible — even though the trial court had previously admitted the testimony during the trial.

We disagree. Once having admitted the testimony in evidence, the trial court was required to weigh the credibility of this testimony at the close of all the evidence at trial — and was not free, as urged, to disregard this testimony on the ground that it was inadmissible under the rules of evidence. We have, accordingly, examined the testimony attacked in this appeal and find that it constitutes sufficient, competent evidence to support the judgment entered below. See e.g., Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13,16 (Fla.1976); Read v. Frizzell, 60 So. 2d 172, 173-74 (Fla.1952); MacGregor v. Sachs, 57 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla.1952); Padron v. State, 153 So. 2d 745, 746 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 157 So. 2d 818 (Fla.1963); compare McCormick on Evidence §§ 54, 60 at 140-41, 153-54 (E.Cleary 3d ed. 1984).

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Seymour Singer v. Florentino Borbua, 497 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
    …vileged to disregard evidence admitted at trial when considering a motion for directed verdict because all evidence admitted before the jury must be considered when ruling on such a motion. Southeastern Fire Insurance Co. v. King’s Way Mortgage Co., 481 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). See Tiny’s Liquors, Inc. v. Davis, 353. So. 2d 168, 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Seigel v. Mt. Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc., 250 So. 2d 332, 333 (Fla.3d DCA 1971). Moreover, we agree with the plaintiff that, aside from t…
  • McCABE v. Hanley, 886 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
    …s or any reasonable interpretation of the facts, the testimony was never stricken. When the court admits testimony, it must weigh the testimony and is not free to disregard it as inadmissible. See Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. King’s Way Mortg. Co., 481 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Therefore, Dr. Silversmith’s testimony was part of the prima facie case. Tillman v. Baskin, 260 So. 2d 509, 511-12 (Fla.1972), holds that, even in a non-jury case, a trial court cannot weigh evidence in ruling on a motion f…
  • Mace v. M & T Bank (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)
    …gree with this argument."). The precedential lynchpin for the dissent's formalistic approach to the presentation of the issues in this case is the Third District's two-paragraph opinion in Southeastern Fire Insurance Co. v. King's Way Mortgage Co., 481 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), which held that a party's argument that the evidence was insufficient because it consisted solely of inadmissible testimony at a nonjury trial did not warrant reversal. To be sure, the court in describing the facts noted th…
    1 / 2

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