AURELIO PADRON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and sentence, and the defendant's entrapment argument lacked merit.
The defendant was charged with practicing dentistry without a license. The state's witness testified that the defendant agreed to make dentures for he…
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The appellant-defendant was charged with the offense of practicing dentistry without having first obtained and recorded a certificate from the Florida State Board of Dental Examiners, in violation of Sec. 466.-02 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.1 The defendant was arraigned in the Criminal Court of Record for Dade County, pleaded not guilty and waived his right to a jury trial. Thereafter the defendant was tried and found guilty as charged. The defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied and a sentence of 60 days in the County Jail was imposed, *746This appeal is from that judgment and sentence.
It appears from the record that the state’s principal witness, Mrs. Myrna Shadron, an investigator for the Florida State Board of Dental Examiners, while making a routine check of dental technicians, telephoned the defendant and asked him about making some dentures for her. Three days later, she went to the defendant’s home and met him for the first time. When she entered the defendant’s home she stated that he told her, “ ‘Well, the first thing I want you to do is sit down in this chair. I want to give you a good talking to before I do any work for you.’ ” After she sat down the defendant said, “ ‘That God Damn dental board and Floyd Miner are laying for me. Before I do any work for you, if you tell anyone I did work for you, and bring anyone, I won’t know you, if you come in with anyone. If those conditions suit you, it will be all right with me.’ ” Mrs. Shadron agreed to the condition that she would not bring anyone. Mrs. Shadron further testified as follows:
“I had taken my lower plate out when I went down there. He disappeared from view in the house and I didn’t see where he went, and he had the wax in his hand. [S]he put the wax in a circle and made the impression with this piece of wax. Then he went out of view from me for the second time, and when he came back he was making a mixture in a bowl to take the impression with, and took the lower impression and the top impression, and all at the same time he was talking me into buying a complete set instead of just the lower, and said the price would be only one hundred dollars; and I agreed to the price, and after he made the two impressions he said, T will call you for your next appointment.’ ”
The defendant testified in his own behalf that Mrs. Shadron came to his house on the 20th of April, 1961, and attempted to induce him to make some dental plates for her but that he refused to do so and told her that he was not in the business of making dental plates. He denied taking an impression with wax or denture trays, tie admitted seeing Mrs. Shadron several weeks later, at which time she again tried to persuade him to make some teeth for her, and he refused. He further testified that he made no appointments with Mrs. Shadron and never called her at any time. The testimony of the defendant amounted to a complete denial of the act charged.
The able and long experienced trial judge who heard this case served as both the trier of the facts and the arbiter of the law. It, thereupon, became his duty to weigh the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses. Where there were conflicts in the testimony it was within the province of the judge to reject any testimony he found to be untrue and to accept and rely upon such testimony as he found worthy of belief. The trial judge found that the evidence sustained all the essential elements of the crime and that such evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and sentence.
Upon an examination of all the evidence appearing in the record, if it appears that the essential elements necessary to constitute the crime clearly appear therein, an appellate court will not interfere with the conclusions of the trial judge. His determination is entitled to the weight of a jury verdict before an appellate court. Farley v. State, 88 Fla. 159, 101 So. 239; Peele v. State, 155 Fla. 235, 20 So.2d 120; Smith v. State, Fla.App.1960, 118 So.2d 257.
The defendant’s next and final contention is that the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to find the accused not guilty by reason of entrapment. We find no merit in this contention.
The defendant interposed no defense of entrapment, but specifically contended that he did not commit any of the acts charged. *747Having maintained throughout the trial that he did not commit the crime, it logically followed that there could he no entrapment. Neumann v. State, 116 Fla. 98, 156 So. 237.
The record has been carefully examined and the evidence is found sufficient to support the judgment and the sentence.
Affirmed.
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State v. Steele, 348 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…ged under the statute. It is the duty of the trier of fact to weigh and evaluate all of the attendant circumstances, not to fasten upon one circumstance to the exclusion of all others. See Read v. Frizzell, 60 So. 2d 172 (Fla.1952); Padron v. State, 153 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). [*403] In the instant case, the respondent Steele contended that under all the circumstances of the case he was not guilty of careless driving. He asserted that the rear-end collision was unavoidable because of the sudden change…
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Bellman v. Yarmark Enters., Inc., 180 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)…fact” may find a witness who has been impeached completely unworthy of belief, and in such circumstances it is within his province to reject such testimony. See Roundtree v. Davis, 124 Fla. 212, 167 So. 820 (1936); and Padron v. State, Fla.App.1963, 153 So. 2d 745. The credibility of the evidence of these two witnesses was an essential element in the proof of usury. The chancellor heard the testimony and observed the demeanor of the witnesses. His findings come to this Court with a presumption of correctness…
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Se. Fire Ins. Co. v. King's WAY Mortg. Co., 481 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…itutes sufficient, competent evidence to support the judgment entered below. See e.g., Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13,16 (Fla.1976); Read v. Frizzell, 60 So. 2d 172, 173-74 (Fla.1952); MacGregor v. Sachs, 57 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla.1952); Padron v. State, 153 So. 2d 745, 746 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 157 So. 2d 818 (Fla.1963); compare McCormick on Evidence §§ 54, 60 at 140-41, 153-54 (E.Cleary 3d ed. 1984). Affirmed.…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Neumann v. State, 116 Fla. 98 (Fla. 1934)
- Peele v. State, 155 Fla. 235 (Fla. 1944)
- Farley v. State, 88 Fla. 159 (Fla. 1924)
- Smith v. State, 118 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- Marshall v. Marshall, 155 Fla. 322 (Fla. 1944)