RICHARD L. MORRIS, APPELLANT,
v.
PEARL J. MORRIS, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1986-01-16
No. 85-233
COBB, C.J., and COWART, J., concur.
481 So. 2d 564 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1986) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The husband appealed a divorce judgment incorporating a property settlement agreement, claiming the agreement was unconscionable and the child support amount was excessive. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal to set aside the agreement but reversed and remanded regarding the child support award, finding it unsupported by the actual expenses incurred.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's decision to enforce the property settlement agreement, finding no fraud or misrepresentation and that the husband had the ability to pay. However, the court reversed and remanded on the child support issue, holding that $600 per month was excessive and unsupported by the actual expenses incurred, which did not approach that amount.


Headnotes

[1] A property settlement agreement incorporated into a final judgment of dissolution will not be set aside as unconscionable absent fraud, misrepresentation, or a lack of ab…

[2] A party's failure to read a property settlement agreement before signing does not, in itself, render the agreement unconscionable.

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Key Quotes

“by the husband's hindsight, he might have made a bad deal. However, the court found no fraud or misrepresentation by the wife.”

Establishes that mere regret about a settlement agreement is insufficient to set it aside without proof of fraud or misrepresentation.

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Facts & Procedural History

The parties were married in 1962 and had one child born in 1967 who suffers from brain damage and epilepsy and is cared for in a group home. In Novemb…

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Opinion of the Court
UPCHURCH, Judge.

UPCHURCH, Judge.

The husband appeals from an order denying his petition for relief from a final judgment of dissolution. We reject the husband’s contention that the trial court should have set aside the parties’ property settlement agreement. However, we do agree with the husband that the amount of child support is excessive. The parties were married in 1962. They have one child, born in 1967, who suffers from brain damage and epilepsy and who, for the most part, is cared for in a group house supervised by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.

In October, 1982, the wife petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. The following month, the parties executed a property settlement agreement. The agreement provided for shared parental responsibility of the child with primary residential care to be with the wife. The husband agreed to pay $600 per month child support and $600 per month alimony. He also agreed to transfer his interest in the house, furnishings and a car to the wife, to be responsible for medical and dental expenses for the wife and child, to provide medical insurance and to contribute $1000 to the wife’s legal fees. The husband was not represented by counsel but did appear at the final hearing. The trial court later entered a judgment which dissolved the marriage and incorporated the provisions of the agreement.

In October, 1983, the husband moved to set aside the judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) on the ground that he had not filed a financial affidavit and thus the court lacked jurisdiction to enter a final judgment adjudicating his ability to pay. In the alternative, the husband moved to modify the final judgment on the basis that his expenses had increased and that the agreement was unconscionable. The petition was denied and the husband was ordered to pay the support arrearages.

On appeal, the husband contends that the property settlement agreement was unconscionable. The husband claims that he did not read the agreement, that he was in a hurry on his way to work out of state, that he was not represented by counsel and that he never filed a financial affidavit. The trial judge concluded that the husband was in a hurry to get a divorce and to get remarried and that, by the husband’s hindsight, he might have made a bad deal. However, the court found no fraud or misrepresentation by the wife. The court also found the husband had the ability to make the required payments. The record supports these determinations and thus we conclude that the court was correct in refusing to set aside the agreement. See e.g., Carnell v. Carnell, 398 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). However, we find that the court should have modified the judgment with regard to the child support.

The testimony reflects that the fee for maintaining the child in a group house is $416.00 per month, of which Social Security pays $244.30 per month. The wife also testified to certain expenses in connection with the child, such as $40.00 for transportation and $100.00 for schooling, but the items enumerated did not approach the $600.00 ordered by the court. We therefore reverse the order and remand with directions to award an amount of child support more in line with the amount actually expended by the wife.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in part.

COBB, C.J., and COWART, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Farrell v. Layda Tunon Farrell, 661 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
    …proving his claim that the settlement agreement was reached by means of duress so as to require the court to set the agreement aside. See McCallum v. McCallum, 577 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 587 So. 2d 1328 (Fla.1991); Morris v. Morris, 481 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). We find that the record fully supports the court’s determination on this point and the court did not err in declining to set aside the agreement. Finally, we find no merit to the former husband’s remaining point on appeal where…
  • Francine Matusow v. Matusow, 498 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
    …representing her during the “past year and through the trial and hearing on attorney's fees” but, only required the husband to pay $15,-000 of this amount. This appeal ensued. The wife contends that under the following authority, Morris v. Morris, 481 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Novack v. Novack, 305 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); See also Hancock v. Hancock, 417 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Davis v. Fisher, 391 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958), th…

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