LEWIS LAWRENCE LEIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
JASON BERKMAN AND BARBARA BERKMAN, APPELLEES
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The court reversed an injunction that prevented the release of a defendant's property, holding that such injunctions cannot be granted solely to preserve assets for a future money judgment. The court emphasized that established legal principles must be applied neutrally.
No, an injunction cannot be granted solely on the ground that the preservation of a defendant's assets is required to satisfy a subsequent money judgment.
[1] An injunction may not be granted solely to preserve a defendant's assets for the satisfaction of a potential future money judgment.
[2] The emotional circumstances of a case do not justify a departure from settled legal principles.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The law is unequivocally established that an injunction against the disposition of a defendant’s assets simply may not be granted upon the ground that their preservation is required to satisfy a subsequent money judgment.”
This quote states the core legal principle that the court applied to reverse the injunction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiffs sued the defendant for compensatory and treble damages, alleging burglary and theft. During the litigation, the trial court enjoined th…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
Claiming that he had burglarized and stolen property from their home, the Berk-mans sued Leight for compensatory and treble damages, for conversion and under the civil theft statute. During the pendency of the litigation, the trial court, on the plaintiffs’ motion, enjoined the City of Miami Beach Police Department from releasing to Leight property it had seized from his premises under a search warrant. Since it is conceded that any specific items owned by the Berkmans have been returned to them, the sole asserted justification for the order was to preserve assets from which they may “collect the judgment” sought in the primary action.
We reverse with directions to dissolve the injunction. The law is unequivocally established that an injunction against the disposition of a defendant’s assets simply may not be granted upon the ground that their preservation is required to satisfy a subsequent money judgment.1 Stewart v. Manget, 132 Fla. 498, 181 So. 370 (1938); Stading v. Equilease Corp., 471 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Ciabotti v. Milo, 432 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Supreme Service Station Corp. v. Telecredit Service Center, Inc., 424 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Oxford International Bank and Trust, Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 374 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.1980).
The appellees argue that they are innocent victims of the defendant and that he is a convicted, imprisoned thief who likely stole the property in question from others who are not parties to the suit. None of these factors, however emotionally appealing, can justify a departure from our duty to apply neutral and settled principles of law to all who come before us.
Reversed with directions.
. Attachment, as authorized by Section 76.01, et. seq., Fla.Stat. (1983), provides the obvious remedy for the potential harm the plaintiffs allegedly fear. That procedure, however, involves a set of statutory burdens, including posting a bond for at least twice the claimed debt, § 76.12, which the plaintiffs have not satisfied.
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Konover Realty Assocs., Ltd. v. Mladen, 511 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…ast Associates, Inc. v. Hickey, 320 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), or indeed for any restraint upon the use of a defendant’s unrestricted assets3 prior to the entry of judgment. Stewart v. Manget, 132 Fla. 498, 181 So. 370 (1938); Leight v. Berkman, 483 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Stading v. Equilease Corp., 471 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Ciabotti v. Milo, 432 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Supreme Service Station Corp. v. TeleCredit Service Center, Inc., 424 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The rule h…
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Ihsan Barbouti v. Loizos Lysandrou, 559 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…satisfy an eventual judgment — was as a practical matter fully provided by the use of the writ of garnishment which the trial court simultaneously sustained. See Acquafredda v. Messina, 408 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); see also Leight v. Berkman, 483 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Konover Realty Assocs. v. Mladen, 511 So. 2d 705, 706 n. 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). See generally ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F. 2d 1351 (5th Cir.1978). II Turning to the attack by the defendants upon the availability of…
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Pianeta Miami, Inc. v. Lieberman, 949 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…ki & Funt, P.A., 494 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). It is well settled that an injunction cannot be used to restrain the use of a party’s unrestricted assets prior to the conclusion of an action at law. Konover, 511 So. 2d at 706; Leight v. Berkman, 483 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (citations omitted); Supreme Serv. Station Corp. v. Telecredit Serv. Ctr., Inc., 424 So. 2d 844, 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Furthermore, we have found that the preservation of funds in a contingent claim for money damages does n…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Oxford Int'l Bank & Tr., Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch, 374 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Harris v. Fla. Dep't OF Labor & Emp. Sec., 374 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Stewart v. Manget, 132 Fla. 498 (Fla. 1938)
- Supreme Serv. Station Corp. v. Telecredit Serv. Ctr., Inc., 424 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Stading v. Equilease Corp., 471 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Ciabotti v. Milo, 432 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Angora Enters. v. Condo. Ass'n OF Lakeside Vill., Inc., 432 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)