THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RAFAEL GONZALEZ RODRIGUEZ AND AMELIA TANIA COCCERA, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1986-02-18
No. 85-9
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and JORGENSON, JJ.
483 So. 2d 807 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1986) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

The State of Florida appealed a trial court's dismissal of drug trafficking charges against defendants who were arrested during a reverse-sting operation. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in dismissing the charges as a sanction for the state's failure to produce a DEA confidential informant file, because the state had neither an obligation nor ability to comply with the request and the defendants suffered no cognizable harm.


Holding

The trial court's dismissal order was reversed because: (1) the state was neither obliged nor had the ability to comply with the request for the DEA file; and (2) the defense failed to demonstrate any cognizable harm or irreparable prejudice resulting from the failure to produce the file, which is required to sustain the ultimate penalty of dismissal.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court may not dismiss an information as a sanction for the state's failure to produce a confidential informant file for in-camera inspection when the state is nei…

[2] Dismissal of an information is an inappropriate sanction when the defense fails to demonstrate cognizable harm resulting from the state's failure to produce evidence.

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Key Quotes

“the state was neither obliged, see State v. Valdes, 443 So.2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); State v. Mesa, 395 So.2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), nor had the ability, State v. Alfonso, 433 So.2d 1357 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), to comply with the request in question so that there was no basis to impose any sanction whatever”

Establishes that dismissal as a sanction was improper because the state could neither be obligated nor capable of complying with the discovery request

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Facts & Procedural History

Rafael Gonzalez Rodriguez and Amelia Tania Coccera were charged with trafficking in cocaine after being apprehended while purchasing five kilos of coc…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

The defendants-appellees were charged with trafficking arising out of a “reverse-sting” operation in which they were apprehended while purchasing five kilos of cocaine from undercover police officers. The trial court dismissed the information as a sanction for the state’s failure to make a DEA-confidential informant file available to the court for in-camera inspection.1 This order was palpably incorrect.

Among other reasons for our determination are the facts that (a) the state was neither obliged, see State v. Valdes, 443 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); State v. Mesa, 395 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), nor had the ability, State v. Alfonso, 433 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), to comply with the request in question so that there was no basis to impose any sanction whatever; and (b) the defense failed utterly to demonstrate that the failure to produce occasioned it any cognizable harm at all, let alone the irreparable prejudice to its position required to sustain the ultimate penalty of dismissal. State v. Del Gaudio, 445 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), pet. for review denied, 453 So. 2d 45 (Fla.1984). Accordingly, the order below is

Reversed.

. The c.i. in question had apparently introduced the parties but was not involved in the transaction itself and was not a potential witness for the state. Hence, there was no initial obligation for the prosecution even to disclose her name. State v. Mesa, 395 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Nevertheless, the defense discovered her identity on its own and thereafter deposed both her and her "supervising” DEA agent at great length concerning her connection with the case and the relationship, including specifics as to the financial arrangements, between the c.i. and the DEA. The alleged purpose of the requested inspection of the DEA file itself, which the agent resisted in accordance with DEA policy as embodied in 28 CFR § 16.22 (1984), was to determine if there was a written contract between the c.i. and the DEA, which might be producible under Brady v. Maryland. The tenuousness of the connection, if any, between the totally speculative contents of the file and any conceivable legitimate defensive purpose, as well as the cumulative nature of any such evidence to the testimony already elicited, are both readily apparent.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Perez, 493 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
    …PER CURIAM. Of the two grounds upon which the trial court may arguably have granted the defendants-appellees’ motion to dismiss, one, the failure to produce the alleged confidential informant, is foreclosed by State v. Gonzalez Rodriguez, 483 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), and cases cited; the other, based upon the fact that payment to the c.i. was contingent upon the quantity of drugs seized as a result of his efforts, is contrary to State v. Prieto, 479 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Accordingly,…
  • State v. Manderville, 512 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
    …er dismissal of the case was an appropriate sanction, we hold that dismissal was not warranted. Dismissal of a criminal case for violation of court orders is a drastic sanction which should be employed only as a last resort. See State v. Rodriguez, 483 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1334 (Fla.1986); State v. Del Gaudio, 445 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 453 So. 2d 45 (Fla.1984). The appropriate sanction for the state’s failure to obey the court’s order, and one which would hav…
  • State v. Oreste Edward Panice and Clarence Eddis Bowers, 488 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
    …y violation. These alleged derelictions were not demonstrated even to have existed. See Valenzuela v. State, 426 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Assuming that they did, dismissal was a wholly inappropriate and excessive sanction. State v. Rodriguez, 483 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); State v. Del Gaudio, 445 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), pet. for review denied, 453 So. 2d 45 (Fla.1984). The final order under review is therefore reversed. To the extent that the trial court suppressed any evidence other than…

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