LEONARD SUTTON, APPELLANT,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT CLAYTON STRICKLAND, JR., CAPTAIN DEESE, CO.I JOHN GRIFFIS, AND CLASSIFICATION OFFICER MR. WILLIAMS, APPELLEES
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the inmate's petition, finding he failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
An inmate filed a pro se complaint alleging he was erroneously given a disciplinary report, placed in confinement, and denied gain time and due proces…
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SHIVERS, Judge.
Appellant Sutton, an inmate at Florida State Prison, filed a pro se pleading entitled “Complaint” in the Bradford County Circuit Court. In the complaint, appellant stated he was erroneously given a disciplinary report for refusal to work and was placed in disciplinary confinement for approximately three months. As a result of this confinement, he alleged he was denied the “right to earn gain time” and deprived of due process and equal protection under the Florida Constitution. The complaint requested the defendants be enjoined from taking his gain time and that he be granted “all other relief the court deems just and proper.”
The trial court treated the pleading as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and denied the writ on the basis that the petition was facially insufficient. Sutton now appeals the denial and argues that the matter should be remanded for the trial court to consider the pleading as a civil complaint.
We affirm the trial court’s denial on the basis that the appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Department of Corrections’ procedure regarding disciplinary reports and disciplinary action is contained in Rule 33-3.08, Florida Administrative Code. That rule also provides, in section (5)(e), for appeals of disciplinary action through the Inmate Grievance Procedure outlined in Rule 33-3.07, Florida Administrative Code.
Since it does not appear from the record, nor is it alleged, that appellant utilized that procedure prior to filing his action in the trial court, we affirm the trial court’s actions. See Morris v. Wainwright, 409 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). We do so without prejudice to appellant’s right to seek redress under the Inmate Grievance Procedure. Ingram v. Lt. Forte, County Jail Administration, 473 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
JOANOS and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Harvard v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1999)…have dismissed his petition. See generally Shevin ex rel. State v. Public Service Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla.1976)(explain-ing that the extraordinary remedy of mandamus is unavailable unless no other adequate remedy exits); Sutton v. Strickland, 485 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (holding that a petitioner’s challenge to his confinement status through writ of habeas corpus was subject to dismissal where the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies through the Department of Corrections’ inmate…
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Runner O. Santana v. Henry, 12 So. 3d 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…ger, 579 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (alleged poor ventilation), or gain-time calculations not affecting DOC’s current right [*846] to hold the petitioner, see Williams v. State, 519 So. 2d 723, 724 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Sutton v. Strickland, 485 So. 2d 25, 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), or anything less than a state prisoner’s alleged right to immediate release from custody. “The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ of ancient origin designed to obtain immediate relief from unlawful imprisonmen…
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Robert E. Banks v. Jones, 197 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…eview even by habeas corpus is limited in nature. The present ha-beas corpus review is limited and does not [*1177] allow an inmate to bring an action in circuit, court until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. See Sutton v. Strickland, 485 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The Department has a full opportunity during the administrative process to demonstrate it has met the limited due process rights afforded an inmate concerning classification decisions. See, e.g., Plymel, 770 So. 2d at 249. Decis…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Millard Whitfield v. State, 409 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Holmes v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 409 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Ingram v. LT. Forte, 473 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Carvel Corp. v. Division OF Administration, 473 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)