RICHARD FABIAN, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT A. RYAN, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MABEL J. RYAN, A/K/A MABEL REID RYAN, DECEASED, APPELLEE
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Although parol evidence is generally admissible to establish omitted terms of an option to buy in a lease, testimony about the decedent's statements regarding those terms is barred by Florida's Deadman's Statute.
Parol evidence regarding a decedent's statements establishing the terms of an option to buy is excludable under Florida's Deadman's Statute despite the general admissibility of parol evidence to complete an incomplete written agreement.
[1] The Deadman's Statute bars testimony about a decedent's statements to establish terms of an option to buy, even when parol evidence would otherwise be admissible to compl…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where it is apparent from face of document that the writing does not represent whole of transaction, parol evidence admissible to prove missing elements”
Jackson v. Parker, establishing the general rule for admitting parol evidence to complete incomplete agreements
Appellant Fabian leased property from Mabel Ryan under a lease titled "Lease with Oction to Buy" that contained a legal description of the house but o…
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DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
We affirm the judgment below upon a holding that although parol evidence was admissible to establish the terms and conditions of an option to buy where such terms and conditions were obviously omitted from the lease between the appellant and Mabel Ryan, the appellee’s decedent,1 Jackson v. Parker, 153 Fla. 622, 15 So. 2d 451 (1943) (where it is apparent from face of document that the writing does not represent whole of transaction, parol evidence admissible to prove missing elements); see Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F. 2d 1040, 1048 (5th Cir.1971) (where an agreement is regarded as “ ‘incomplete, either obviously, or at least possibly,’ ” parol evidence is admissible “ ‘not to contradict or vary, but to complete’ ” (quoting Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N.Y. 133, 138, 27 N.E. 961, 962-63 (1891))), nevertheless, the appellant’s proffered testimony concerning the details of the option to buy was excludable under the Deadman’s Statute, § 90.602, Fla.Stat. (1983), where the inescapable inference from the testimony was that the decedent, Mabel Ryan, made certain statements to the appellant agreeing to the terms and conditions of the option. See Hulsh v. Hulsh, 431 So. 2d 658, 664 n. 3 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla.1983).
Affirmed.
. The lease, prepared without benefit of counsel, bore the title "Lease with Oction [sic] to Buy,” and contained a legal description of Mrs. Ryan’s house, although only an apartment within the house was being leased.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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SUN Bank/Miami, N.A. v. Saewitz, 579 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…ictly construed and limited to its narrowest application.” Farley v. Collins, 146 So. 2d 366, 368 (Fla.1962); see Day v. Stickle, 113 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). The bank asserts that the judgment must be reversed on authority of Fabian v. Ryan, 486 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 494 So. 2d 1150 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1096, 107 S.Ct. 1313, 94 L.Ed.2d 167 (1987). That contention is a substantial one. In that case Fabian entered into a lease with option to buy. Thedocument was missing…1 / 2
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Tarr v. Cooper, 708 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…of the material terms of the Buyer’s oral contract with Decedent. Since there is no admissible evidence to support some of the essential elements of Buyer’s case, we conclude that the summary judgment must be affirmed on authority of Fabian v. Ryan, 486 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Buyer relies on Sun Bank/Miami, N.A. v. Saewitz, 579 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), but that ease is not applicable here. In Sun Bank, it was possible for the claimant to establish by process of elimination that a check with the…
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Bauerle v. Brush, 820 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…ecedent. Where the inescapable inference from an interested party would show that the decedent agreed to a' material term or ‘ condition which is missing from a written contract, the testimony would violate the Deadman’s Statute. See Fabian v. Ryan, 486 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Hulsh v. Hulsh, 431 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Two district courts have considered the Dead Person’s Statute since its revision in 1976. See Sun Bank/Miami, N.A. v. Saewitz, 579 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Carpenter v. We…
Authorities Cited
- Annibelle Jackson and Henry N. Jackson v. Parker, 153 Fla. 622 (Fla. 1943)
- Hulsh v. Rea R. Hulsh, 431 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- The Chase Manhattan Bank v. The First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1971)