STEPHEN H. TARR, APPELLANT,
v.
MARGARET COOPER, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF RICHARD L. RAWLINS, SR., DECEDENT, APPELLEE
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Stephen Tarr appeals a summary judgment dismissing his claim against Richard Rawlins' estate for breach of an oral contract to inspect and purchase an aircraft. The trial court applied Florida's Dead Man's Statute to bar Tarr's testimony about the oral contract terms, and the appellate court affirmed, finding insufficient admissible evidence to establish all material contract elements.
The Dead Man's Statute prohibits Tarr from proving the essential terms of the oral contract with Rawlins. Although some writings and independent witness testimony establish certain material terms, admissible evidence does not support all essential contract elements necessary to proceed to trial. Summary judgment was properly granted.
[1] The Dead Man's Statute prohibits a party from testifying about transactions or communications with a decedent when the opposing party is the representative of the deceden…
[2] A party seeking to prove an oral contract with a decedent may not rely on testimony that is barred by the Dead Man's Statute.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the Dead Man's Statute, section 90.602. Florida Statutes (1995), prohibits the Buyer from proving the terms of the oral contract with Decedent”
Establishes the statutory bar preventing the plaintiff from testifying about the oral contract after the defendant's death
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTarr agreed to purchase a used aircraft in Georgia, contingent on inspection. He engaged FAA-certified mechanic Richard Rawlins under an oral contract…
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PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-appellant Stephen H. Tarr (“Buyer”) appeals an adverse summary judgment based on the Dead Man’s Statute. We affirm.
Buyer agreed to purchase a used single engine aircraft located in Dalton, Georgia. The purchase was contingent on the aircraft satisfactorily passing inspection.
Buyer entered into an oral contract with Richard L. Rawlins, Sr. (“Decedent”), an aircraft mechanic certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), whereby Decedent was to go to Georgia, inspect the aircraft, act as Buyer’s agent in concluding the purchase, and ferry the aircraft to Miami, Florida. Buyer gave Decedent instructions about the circumstances under which the Decedent should (a) complete the purchase at the agreed price; (b) negotiate a lower price; or (c) terminate the inspection and abort the purchase. Decedent eomplet-ed the purchase for the Buyer and delivered the aircraft to Miami.
Buyer contends that several months after delivery, he discovered that the aircraft had severe wing spar corrosion. He alleges that Decedent should have discovered the condition during the aircraft inspection and that, pursuant to Buyer’s instructions, Decedent should have negotiated a lower price or should have consulted with Buyer before concluding the purchase.
Shortly after discovery of the wing spar problem, Decedent was killed in an automobile accident. Buyer submitted a claim to the estate for damages, which the estate refused to pay. This lawsuit followed.
The personal representative moved for summary judgment on the theory that the Dead Man’s Statute, section 90.602. Florida Statutes (1995), prohibits the Buyer from proving the terms of the oral contract with Decedent. The trial court granted summary judgment and Buyer has appealed.
After careful consideration, we conclude that the trial court was correct. Several writings and the testimony of an independent witness establish some, but not all, of the material terms of the Buyer’s oral contract with Decedent. Since there is no admissible evidence to support some of the essential elements of Buyer’s case, we conclude that the summary judgment must be affirmed on authority of Fabian v. Ryan, 486 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Buyer relies on Sun Bank/Miami, N.A. v. Saewitz, 579 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), but that ease is not applicable here. In Sun Bank, it was possible for the claimant to establish by process of elimination that a check with the notation “loan” on it had been a loan to, not from, the Decedent. In the present case, by contrast, it is not possible for Buyer to establish all of the material elements.
Affirmed.
COPE and SORONDO, JJ., concur. GREEN, J., specially concurs. GREEN, Judge, specially concurring.
I concur in the result only.
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Authorities Cited
- Fabian v. Ryan, 486 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- SUN Bank/Miami, N.A. v. Saewitz, 579 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)