GOLETHA WRIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the victim's labor pains and hospitalization constituted exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of the speedy trial period, and that an unexcused defense continuance waived the defendant's right to a speedy trial.
The defendant was convicted of sexual battery and kidnapping. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for discharge based on speedy trial ground…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the defendant’s conviction for sexual battery with use of force not likely to cause serious personal injury [§ 794.011(5), Fla.Stat. (1983) ], and kidnapping [§ 787.01, Fla.Stat. (1983) J,1 upon a holding that: (1) the victim’s apparent labor pains, hospitalization and doctor’s orders to remain in bed were exception al/unforeseeable circumstances2 permitting an extension of the speedy trial period pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(f)(1), and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in so finding, Routly v. State, 440 So. 2d 1257, 1261 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 3591, 82 L.Ed.2d 888 (1984); and (2) the trial court correctly held that an unexcused defense continuance within the original 175 day trial period, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1), operated as a waiver of the defendant’s right to be tried within that period. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980).
Affirmed.
. The conviction was entered pursuant to the defendant’s plea of nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(1), motion for discharge, which we hold was properly denied for the reasons stated herein.
. The record does not reflect that either the prosecution or the defense knew the date of the witness' predicted delivery. Thus, we are not asked to decide, and expressly decline to do so, whether an extension of the speedy trial period would be permissible where a trial is scheduled in close proximity to the time a witness whose "testimony is uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial”, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(f)(1), is expected to be incapacitated for the delivery of a baby.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Watts v. State, 516 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…of witness’ intention to disregard subpoena and leave town; court opined in dicta that it was “doubtful” that exceptional circumstances extending speedy trial period could be proved), rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 989 (Fla.1983). But see Wright v. State, 486 So. 2d 651, 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (witness’ labor pains were unforeseeable); Valle v. State, 444 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. 3d DCA) (witness’ early departure for vacation prior to trial beginning was unforeseeable), rev. denied, 451 So. 2d 851 (Fla.1984); Dedmon v…
Authorities Cited
- Honorable Robert A. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980)
- Routly v. State, 440 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1983)