MICHAEL WATTS A/K/A MICHAEL WATSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1987-12-15
No. 84-2203
Before HUBBART and NESBITT and PEARSON, DANIEL S., JJ.
516 So. 2d 346 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1987) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Michael Watts appealed his conviction for kidnapping and sexual battery based on a speedy trial violation under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellate court reversed and remanded with directions to discharge the defendant, holding that the trial court erroneously extended the speedy trial period when essential witnesses' nonappearance was foreseeable rather than unforeseeable.


Holding

The court held that: (1) Watts filed a valid speedy trial demand and was not brought to trial within the required time while remaining available; (2) the trial court erroneously extended the speedy trial period because the witnesses' nonappearance was foreseeable, not unforeseeable as required by the rule; and (3) Watts was entitled to discharge under the Florida speedy trial rule.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant is entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule when the state fails to bring the defendant to trial within the stipulated time after a bona fide demand,…

[2] A witness's repeated refusal to appear in court on prior occasions renders their nonappearance on the speedy trial deadline unforeseeable and unavoidable for purposes of…

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Key Quotes

“the trial court erroneously extended the speedy trial time upon motion of the state under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(2)(ii), (f) for the "unforeseeable and unavoidable absence of a person whose presence or testimony is uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial," although it is undisputed on this record that the two essential witnesses in this case who failed to appear in court, as required, had repeatedly refused to appear in court on numerous other occasions in this case, and, accordingly, their nonappearance on the last day of the speedy trial period was hardly "unforeseeable"”

Establishes that witnesses' pattern of prior refusals made their absence foreseeable, defeating the unforeseeable circumstance requirement for speedy trial extension

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Facts & Procedural History

Watts filed a bona fide demand for speedy trial and remained continuously available for trial. Two essential witnesses, whose presence was necessary f…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the defendant Michael Watts a/k/a Michael Watson from a final judgment of conviction for kidnapping and sexual battery and an order placing him on probation. The judgment of conviction and probation order were based on a nolo contendere plea entered by the defendant with the specific reservation that he could appeal the denial of his dispositive motion to discharge under the speedy trial rule. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191.

We reverse and remand with directions to discharge the defendant upon a holding that (1) the defendant filed a bona fide demand for a speedy trial below under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(2), (c) and admittedly was not thereafter brought to trial within the stipulated speedy time, although he was continuously available for trial during this time; (2) the trial court erroneously extended the speedy trial time upon motion of the state under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.19 l(d)(2)(ii), (f) for the “unforeseeable and unavoidable absence of a person whose presence or testimony is uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial,” Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.191(f), although it is undisputed on this record that the two essential witnesses in this case who failed to appear in court, as required, had repeatedly refused to appear in court on numerous other occasions in this case, and, accordingly, their nonappearance on the last day of the speedy trial period was hardly “unforeseeable” under the above-stated rule, cf. Brunson v. State, 422 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (state knew some three weeks before of witness’ intention to disregard subpoena and leave town; court opined in dicta that it was “doubtful” that exceptional circumstances extending speedy trial period could be proved), rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 989 (Fla.1983).

But see Wright v. State, 486 So. 2d 651, 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (witness’ labor pains were unforeseeable); Valle v. State, 444 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. 3d DCA) (witness’ early departure for vacation prior to trial beginning was unforeseeable), rev. denied, 451 So. 2d 851 (Fla.1984); Dedmon v. State, 400 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (prosecutor not told of witness’ anticipated absence until night before trial), disapproved on other grounds, 419 So. 2d 1088 (Fla.1982); and (3) the defendant was therefore entitled to discharge under the Florida speedy trial rule. See Davis v. State, 474 So. 2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); cf. Cappetta v. State, 471 So. 2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 3d DCA) (trial court’s stated basis for extension of speedy trial period not supported on record, defendant discharged), rev. denied, 480 So. 2d 1296 (Fla.1985); Rico v. State, 463 So. 2d 1172, 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (same).

The final judgment of conviction and probation order under review are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to discharge the defendant.

Reversed and remanded.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Miketa v. The Honorable Gisela Cardonne, 549 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
    …circumstances, the subject continuance was not attributable to the petitioners and should not have been charged to them. This being so, the petitioners’ speedy-trial rights were denied below, and they are now entitled to a discharge. Watts v. State, 516 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Apolinari v. Ulmer, 483 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1335 (Fla.1986); Davis v. State, 474 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Black v. State, 468 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Brunson v. State, 422 So. 2d 956 (Fla…
  • Luchina v. The Honorable Howard C. Berman, 555 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
    …tablish sufficient grounds to extend the time within which appellant was entitled to be brought to trial under Rule 3.191(d)(2), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (1987). See R.L.K. v. Hastings, 370 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Watts v. State, 516 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). ANSTEAD, WALDEN and POLEN, JJ., concur.…
  • Sullivan v. State, 728 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
    …ver provided this information. Because the State’s minimal showing in this case failed to demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances, the trial court erred in extending the time within which Sullivan had to be tried. See Watts v. State, 516 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (holding trial court erroneously extended speedy trial time upon motion of State where nonappearance of two essential witnesses was not “unforeseeable”); Rico v. State, 463 So. 2d 1172, 1173-74 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (vacating de…

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