C.K., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1986-04-22
No. 85-1442
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARK-DULL and FERGUSON, JJ.
487 So. 2d 93 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1986) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for obstructing a police officer, but the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain or arrest the juvenile, and therefore had no lawful duty that could be obstructed.


Holding

The court held that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that the juvenile had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a felony or misdemeanor, and therefore had no lawful duty being executed that the juvenile could have obstructed. The adjudication for obstructing a police officer was reversed.


Headnotes

[1] A police officer must have articulable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor to justify a detention or arres…

[2] An adjudication of delinquency for obstructing a police officer requires that the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty.

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Key Quotes

“Neither at the time when appellant was ordered to remain where he was nor when he was arrested was there an articulable suspicion that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a felony or misdemeanor.”

Establishes the lack of reasonable suspicion required to justify detention or arrest

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Facts & Procedural History

A police officer responded to a wooded area based on a suspicious persons report and found four school-aged males crouched and distributing items the …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

A police officer, acting on a “suspicious persons” report, responded to a wooded area where four school-aged males, including appellant, were crouched, distributing what the officer believed to be coins. The officer ordered them to “stay where you are.” They all fled. Appellant, discovered hiding under a trailer home not far away, was placed under arrest. He was adjudicated delinquent for obstructing a police officer in the lawful execution of a legal duty. Arguing the correctness of the adjudication, the State contends that the legal duty which the officer was executing was the detention and/or arrest for the crimes of loitering and prowling, theft, and/or unlawfully damaging a vending machine with intent to commit theft.

No evidence was presented by the State in support of any offense. Neither at the time when appellant was ordered to remain where he was nor when he was arrested was there an articulable suspicion that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a felony or misdemeanor. R.L.L. v. State, 466 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), relied upon by the State, is, as appellant argues, clearly distinguishable. In that case the juvenile was in a vehicle with a person who was in apparent violation of a municipal ordinance and drug statute.1 It was held there that “[although [appellant’s] presence in itself might not have bec-n probable cause sufficient to justify an arrest, the circumstances were such that the officers were entitled to briefly detain appellant while they pursued their investigation.” Id. at 1231.

In this case there was no justification for a detention or arrest because of the absence of a reasonable suspicion that laws were being violated. See Lee v. State, 368 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 3d DCA) (Schwartz, J., specially concurring) (one can resist unlawful arrest without violence), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 349 (Fla.1979); Lowery v. State, 356 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (same); Marshall v. State, 354 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA) (same), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 920, 98 S.Ct. 2270, 56 L.Ed.2d 762 (1978).

There was, therefore, no lawful duty being carried out by police officers which appellant could have obstructed.

Reversed.

. In R.L.L., appellant and a woman were seated in a parked car. When police officers on patrol approached the vehicle, the woman attempted to hide an object which the officers could see was an open can of beer. Having the open beer can in the car was a violation of a municipal ordinance. When the woman was asked for identification she opened and searched her purse, revealing what one of the officers recognized as a marijuana bag. The officers asked both people to step out of the car and began to read them their Miranda rights. Appellant ran away shortly after the rights were read.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Nelson v. State, 543 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
    …, standing alone, will not justify a stop of an individual by a police officer, Wilson v. State, 433 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), nor will it support a charge of obstructing a police officer in the lawful execution of a legal duty. C.K. v. State, 487 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Reece pursued Nelson on a mere hunch that Nelson’s flight was suspicious. Once Reece found Nelson, Nelson complied with the officers’ requests. Accordingly, Nelson’s conduct did not constitute the crime of resisting an officer.…
  • F.E.C. v. State, 559 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
    …nal activity. Nelson v. State, 543 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Likewise, flight accompanied by knowledge of the officers’ intent to detain does not constitute obstructing absent a well-founded suspicion in the mind of the officer. C.K. v. State, 487 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). In this case, Deputy Burnham had no suspicion that F.E.C. had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a felony or misdemeanor. F.E.C.’s knowing flight to avoid confrontation by the officer, therefore, did not constitu…
  • In the Interest of R.S. v. State, 531 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
    …4 ALR 3d 1008 (1972), including this court’s decision in English v. State, 293 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); compare Johnson v. State, 433 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). See also, B.H. v. State, 505 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); and C.K. v. State, 487 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). REVERSED. SMITH, C.J., and JOANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. . Appellant lives with his mother at the apartment complex. . Jacobson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (Fla.1985); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,…

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