MARIA DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1986-04-03
No. 85-1071
UPCHURCH, J., concurs., COBB, C.J., concurs in part; dissents in part, with opinion.
487 So. 2d 1104 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1986) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Davis appeals her sentencing for attempted second degree murder and second degree murder convictions. The appellate court vacated both sentences and remanded for resentencing, finding that the trial court improperly applied sentencing guidelines without Davis's affirmative election and imposed an upward departure sentence based on invalid factors.


Holding

The trial court erred in imposing the 15-year guidelines sentence without Davis's affirmative election to be sentenced under the guidelines. Additionally, the trial court erred in imposing the 25-year upward departure sentence because four of the five stated reasons were insufficient to support a departure, being based on prior record, facts inherent in the crime itself, and violation of probation.


Headnotes

[1] Sentencing under the guidelines requires an affirmative election by the defendant when the offense occurred prior to the guidelines' effective date and the defendant was…

[2] Reasons for a departure sentence based on a defendant's prior record, facts inherent in the crime, or violation of probation are insufficient to support a departure sente…

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Key Quotes

“An affirmative election by the defendant is required to make the guidelines applicable in such a case.”

Establishes the requirement for defendant election to apply sentencing guidelines.

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Facts & Procedural History

Davis was convicted of attempted second degree murder in 1976. While still on probation for that offense, she committed second degree murder in 1984. …

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Opinion of the Court
SHARP, Judge.

SHARP, Judge.

Davis appeals from a fifteen year sentence she received for attempted second degree murder after her probation for that offense was revoked, and a twenty-five year sentence for second degree murder. We agree error occurred in the sentencing and we therefore vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing.

With regard to the first sentence, the offense for which Davis was convicted occurred in 1976. She committed the second offense in 1984 while she was still on probation for the first offense. Although the judge at sentencing thought he was imposing a guidelines sentence, the record fails to show that Davis affirmatively elected to be sentenced under them for this offense. An affirmative election by the defendant is required to make the guidelines applicable in such a case. Ames v. State, 470 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Further, we cannot say that the trial court obviously would have imposed the maximum statutory penalty (as he did in this case) in any event. Compare Kaymore v. State, 482 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).

With regard to the second sentence, the trial judge imposed a twenty-five year term, which was a “departure” 1 upwards by two brackets. In explaining the departure sentence, the judge gave the following reasons:2

1. Defendant has a substantial record of prior convictions of the law, violations dating from 1971.

2. Defendant has displayed to the court the inability to conform to probation and to obey the laws of society.

3. In view of the defendant having been on probation and committed this offense that she is not amenable to probation.

4. Further that the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced involves the use by her of a dangerous weapon.

5. Defendant’s prior history of assaultive and violent behavior establishes a pattern of conduct that renders her a continuing and serious threat to the community.

The first four reasons are insufficient to support a departure sentence, since they are based on Davis’ prior record,3 facts inherent in the crime itself, and violation of probation (which was already included as a factor in Davis’ scoresheet and which in any event would only support a one bracket increase).4 We cannot say that beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial judge would have sentenced Davis to the twenty-five year term without considering the four invalid reasons. Albritton v. State, 476 So. 2d 158 (Fla.1985).

VACATE SENTENCES; REMAND FOR RESENTENCING.

UPCHURCH, J., concurs.

COBB, C.J., concurs in part; dissents in part, with opinion.

. Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.701(d)(ll).

. In this case the trial judge had his five reasons for the departure sentence typed and attached to the sentencing scoresheet. They are titled "Aggravating Circumstances.” However, they are not signed. In view of State v. Jackson, 478 So. 2d 1054 (Fla.1985) and Boynton v. State, 473 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 4th DCA), approved, 478 So. 2d 351 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1232, 89 L.Ed.2d 341 (1986), the reasons. for departure sentences should preferably be in the form of an order, or at least be acknowledged by the judge’s signature.

. See Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d 1218 (Fla.1985).

. Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.701(d)(14); Boldes v. State, 475 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

Other
COBB, Chief Judge,

COBB, Chief Judge,

concurring in part; dissenting in part.

I concur in vacating the twenty-five year sentence for second degree murder in regard to the 1984 offense. But I would affirm the fifteen-year sentence for the 1976 conviction because the record before us reveals that the trial judge intended to impose the maximum sentence for that. He recited a number of reasons — violation of probation, use of a dangerous weapon, history of violent behavior, etc. — to justify departure and, upon confirming that the maximum sentence was fifteen years, he immediately imposed it. A remand for re-sentencing in regard to that offense serves no useful purpose; we should merely affirm the sentence and remand with directions to correct the record to reflect that the fifteen-year sentence was not imposed under the guidelines. See Kaymore v. State, 482 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Riddle v. State, 488 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
    …See Boldes v. State, 475 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Also, a defendant’s probationary status at the time of the offense constitutes an invalid reason for departure because that factor is already scored under “legal constraint.” Davis v. State, 487 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Burch v. State, 462 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). As to the trial court’s first reason for departure, a defendant’s juvenile record may be considered a valid reason for departing from the guidelines. Weems v. State, 451 So.…
  • Degroat v. State, 489 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
    …manded (under Albritton) for resentenc-ing in the following cases: Lee v. State, 486 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Wilson v. State, 490 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 5th DCA April 17, 1986); Cawthon v. State, 486 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Davis v. State, 487 So. 2d 1104, (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Morris v. State, 483 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Smith v. State, 482 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Brown v. State, 481 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); White v. State, 481 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Parker v. State,…
  • Clinton v. State, 492 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
    …entence. The circuit court judge improperly departed and increased appellant’s sentence from the recommended guideline sentence. We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. Riddle v. State, 488 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Davis v. State, 487 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Boldes v. State, 475 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Burch v. State, 462 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED. DAUKSCH, COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur.…

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