JOSEPH A. WILSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Wilson appeals a twenty-year sentence imposed for probation violation. The court reversed because the original sentence that placed Wilson on probation was void, as it was improperly modified outside the 60-day window prescribed by Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to revoke probation.
No. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke Wilson's probation because the original sentence was legal and the trial court had no authority to modify it after the 60-day period had expired. A defendant cannot confer jurisdiction on the trial court through waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, or consent.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence after the expiration of the time limit provided by rule for sentence modification.
[2] A defendant cannot confer jurisdiction on a trial court by waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, or consent.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since the sentence which originally placed Wilson on probation was void, the court had no authority to revoke his probation.”
Establishes the core holding that lack of jurisdiction to modify the original sentence meant the trial court could not revoke probation based on that void sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilson was sentenced on January 18, 1982, to six months to five years imprisonment for trafficking cocaine and firearm possession. On March 18, 1982—o…
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
Wilson appeals a sentence imposing twenty years' imprisonment for probation violation. Since the sentence which originally placed Wilson on probation was void, the court had no authority to revoke his probation. Therefore, we reverse the sentence now on appeal and remand with instructions.
Wilson was originally charged with trafficking in more than 400 grams of cocaine and with possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He pled guilty and was sentenced to indeterminate concurrent terms of six months’ to five years’ incarceration on January 18, 1982.
On March 18, 1982, one day prior to the expiration of the 60-day limit for the modification or reduction of a sentence provided in rule 3.800(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Wilson filed a motion to expand the time in which to modify his sentence. The motion was granted, and on March 19, Wilson filed his motion to modify the sentence.
The sentence was not actually modified until April 13, 1982. The final order modified the sentence to concurrent terms in the Department of Corrections of five years, provided that after he served a term of eleven months and twenty-nine days in a county jail, Wilson would be released and placed on probation for seven years.
On September 5, 1984, an affidavit of violation of probation was filed. After hearing, the trial court revoked Wilson’s probation, departed from the guidelines' recommended sentence of five years and sentenced appellant to twenty years’ imprisonment.
The original sentence imposed was a legal sentence. Therefore, the trial court was without jurisdiction to reduce the sentence as the 60-day period following the original sentence had expired. See Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.800(b); White v. State, 404 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
The State contends that Wilson has waived this point by failing to object to the court’s untimely modification. Alternatively, the State contends Wilson is estopped from raising this issue by his having essentially instigated and consented to the error, and thereafter by his having accepted and enjoyed a more lenient sentence. However, as stated in White, “it is well settled that a defendant cannot confer jurisdiction on the trial court by waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, or consent since jurisdiction is established solely by general law.” 404 So. 2d at 805. See also Wolfson v. State, 437 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
Since we are reversing Wilson’s sentence, we need not reach his second and third points except, insofar as the third point is concerned, to direct that on remand should further discretionary action be required, the case be referred to a different trial judge in order to avoid any appearance of conflict of interest or judicial impropriety. Accordingly, the order purporting to place Wilson on probation, the order revoking that probation, and the new judgment and sentence are REVERSED and the cause is REMANDED with directions to reinstate Wilson’s original judgment and sentence. Wilson should be properly credited with all the time he has served.
BOOTH, C.J., and SHIVERS, J., concur.
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14302 Marina SAN Pablo Place SPE, LLC v. Vcp-San Pablo, Ltd., 92 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…in defects of procedural jurisdiction are waivable,3 precedent from this Court requires us to hold that the type of jurisdictional challenge presented in this case cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Wilson v. State, 487 So. 2d 1130, 1130-31 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (rejecting the argument that a criminal defendant who had requested modification of his sentence was estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify his sentence because the modification occurred after…
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Grosse v. State, 511 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b). See State v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 885 (Fla.1978); Sayer v. State, 267 So. 2d 42 [*689] (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Wilson v. State, 487 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 496 So. 2d 143 (Fla.1986); State v. Mancil, 354 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); State v. Sotto, 348 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1219 (Fla.1978). Appellant contends that he has suffered an i…
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Evans v. State, 647 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…979). The parties cannot, even by stipulation, confer jurisdiction upon a court where no jurisdiction exists. Sclafani v. County of Dade, 323 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). See State v. Schafer, 583 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Wilson v. State, 487 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Wolfson v. State, 437 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). “It is well settled that defendant cannot confer jurisdiction on the trial court by waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, or consent since jurisdiction is established solely by gene…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wolfson v. State, 437 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- White v. State, 404 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)