THOMAS W. MCKAY, PETITIONER,
v.
PAMELA W. MCKAY, RESPONDENT
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The court held that a judge who had a past social relationship with a party should have disqualified himself from administrative duties in the case.
A judge was assigned to hear pending motions in a case. One party moved for the judge to continue presiding, but the judge had a past social relations…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
The petition for certiorari is granted. The order of February 10, 1986, assigning Judge Moie J.L. Tendrich to hear all motions then pending in the case to their conclusion is quashed. Upon remand, Pamela McKay’s “Motion to Continue Assignment of Cause to Presiding Judge” shall be heard by Chief Judge Gerald T. Wetherington or, in his stead and upon his assignment, an administrative judge other than Judge John Gale, who, because he is an admitted former social companion of Pamela McKay, should have disqualified himself from acting administratively or otherwise in this case.1 The quashal of Judge Gale’s order of February 10, 1986, shall not preclude the entry on remand of an order again assigning Judge Tendrich to continue presiding over the case.
. Judge Gale believed, erroneously in our view, that because he was acting administratively, his past close relation to one of the parties was immaterial:
"This hearing has come before me as Administrative Judge. It has nothing to do with the merits of the case. Counsel is likely referring to that I know one of the parties, Pamela McKay. I know her very well although I have no social relationship with her at this time. However, the matter before me is a matter of administrative procedure, ...
"I went with her some years ago, too. It has been some years ago since the divorce, as I understand it. You would be entirely correct if I had anything to do with the merits of the case, which I don’t.”
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Cascone v. The Honorable Robert M. Foster, 774 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…of this argument, he relies on the general principle that a judge who enters an order of disqualification may not take any further action in the case. See Fla.R.Jud.Ad-min. 2.160(f); Bolt v. Smith, 594 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); McKay v. McKay, 488 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). The application of this principle is limited, however, to an order disqualifying a judge from presiding over a particular case. If the principle were applied to a standing recusal order, like the one in this case, the judge would…
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Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Honorable John Gale and Honorable Henry G. Ferro, 552 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…2) remand the cause to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit or, in his stead and upon his assignment, an administrative judge other than the respondent for the purpose of reassigning the cause below. McKay v. McKay, 488 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 431 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Rogers v. State, 341 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 953 (Fla.1977); [*1167] Weiss v. Miami Nat’l Bank, 320 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). It is…