GULFSTREAM PARK RACING ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER,
v.
HONORABLE JOHN GALE AND HONORABLE HENRY G. FERRO, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENTS

Fla. 3d DCA | 1989-11-07
No. 89-2116
Before HUBBART, FERGUSON and COPE, JJ.
552 So. 2d 1166 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1989)

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Synopsis

Gulfstream Park Racing Association sought enforcement of this court's prior mandate requiring a circuit court judge to disqualify himself. The court granted the motion, enforced its prohibition mandate, quashed the judge's reassignment order, and remanded for proper reassignment by the Chief Judge.


Holding

The court granted the motion to enforce its mandate, issued a rule absolute in prohibition requiring the judge to disqualify himself, quashed the administrative order entered by the disqualified judge, and remanded the cause to the Chief Judge or other administrative judge for proper reassignment.


Headnotes

[1] A trial judge's explanation of relevant events and denial of factual allegations in a motion for disqualification may constitute grounds for disqualification by exceeding…

[2] A trial judge creates an intolerable adversary atmosphere, establishing grounds for disqualification, by passing on the truth of facts alleged in a motion for disqualific…

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Key Quotes

“the trial judge unfortunately added his own explanation of relevant events and strongly denied certain of the factual allegations of the motion for disqualification, thereby passing 'on the truth of the facts alleged' in the motion in violation of Fla.R.Civ.P. 3.230(d)”

Establishes the basis for the judge's disqualification—violation of civil procedure rules by opining on factual disputes in the disqualification motion

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Facts & Procedural History

Gulfstream Park filed a motion to disqualify a trial judge. The judge denied the motion but also added his own explanation of events and strongly deni…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We treat the petition for extraordinary writs filed by Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc. as a motion to enforce our mandate previously issued in this cause. See Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., 328 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla.1975); Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 381 So. 2d 1161, 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla.Const. In Gulfstream Park Racing Association v. Gale, 540 So. 2d 196 (Fla.3d DCA 1989), we granted Gulfstream’s petition for a writ of prohibition and required that the respondent disqualify himself as a judge in this case. We stated:

“Although we agree that the motion to disqualify was legally insufficient, the trial judge unfortunately added his own explanation of relevant events and strongly denied certain of the factual allegations of the motion for disqualification, thereby passing ‘on the truth of the facts alleged’ in the motion in violation of Fla.R.Civ.P. 3.230(d). Consequently, the trial judge ‘exceeded the proper scope of his inquiry and on that basis alone established grounds for his disqualification’ by creating ‘an intolerable adversary atmosphere’ between himself and the petitioner. Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla.1978), and cases collected. This being so, we conclude that the respondent trial judge should have disqualified himself from sitting in the cause below.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. We assume, however, that it will be unnecessary to issue a formal writ of prohibition and that the respondent trial judge will disqualify himself in this case upon receipt of this opinion.

Prohibition granted.”

We grant the motion to enforce our mandate, issue a rule absolute in prohibition, and direct that the respondent enter an order disqualifying himself as a judge in this case. We further (1) quash the administrative order entered upon remand by the respondent on March 28, 1989 [which reassigned the cause to Division 08 of the circuit court below], and (2) remand the cause to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit or, in his stead and upon his assignment, an administrative judge other than the respondent for the purpose of reassigning the cause below. McKay v. McKay, 488 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 431 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Rogers v. State, 341 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 953 (Fla.1977); Weiss v. Miami Nat’l Bank, 320 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).

It is so ordered.


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