EDDIE LEE ROSEMOND, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eddie Lee Rosemond appeals his conviction for sale and delivery of heroin, challenging the trial court's refusal to compel disclosure of a confidential informant's identity and the enhancement of his sentence as a habitual offender. The appellate court affirms the conviction but reverses the sentencing, finding the trial court's habitual offender determination lacked sufficient factual support.
The court affirmed the conviction and the denial of the informant disclosure motion because Rosemond did not raise the confidential informant argument at trial. The court reversed the habitual offender sentence enhancement because the trial court failed to state the underlying facts and circumstances supporting the habitual offender finding and made only conclusory statements. The court rejected the guidelines argument as Rosemond was sentenced before guidelines were implemented.
[1] A claim for relief is not cognizable on appeal if the specific legal ground asserted on appeal was not presented to the trial court.
[2] A trial court's generalized reference to a defendant's prior record is insufficient to justify the imposition of an enhanced sentence as a habitual offender.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial court must state the underlying facts and circumstances relied upon in making a determination that a defendant is a habitual offender. Further, a conclusory statement, as was made in this case, that such a finding was necessary for the protection of the public from further criminal activity by the defendant is insufficient.”
Establishes the required standard for habitual offender sentencing determinations—specific factual findings rather than conclusory statements are mandatory.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRosemond was convicted by jury of sale and delivery of heroin and sentenced to 30 years, with the sentence enhanced based on a habitual offender findi…
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MILLS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for sale and delivery of a controlled substance. Rosemond’s first contention is the trial court erred in refusing to require the State to disclose the identity of its confidential informant. Secondly, he asserts the trial court erred in sentencing him as a habitual offender and in departing from the recommended guidelines sentence. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Rosemond was charged by information with the sale and delivery of a controlled substance, heroin. After a trial by jury, he was found guilty and sentenced to a term of 30 years. The sentence was enhanced pursuant to a finding by the trial court that Rosemond was a habitual offender. Prior to trial in this case, Rosemond filed a motion to compel the identity of a witness. During the hearing on this motion, it was brought out that the officer involved in the case had been introduced to Rose-mond through an informant. The officer stated that this particular informant had helped her in several cases and the disclosure of his identity would jeopardize his safety and other ongoing investigations. The court denied the motion.
Rosemond predicates his claim for relief upon the argument that the trial judge erred in not compelling the disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant involved in the case. However, this argument was not presented to the trial judge. In fact, it was specifically disavowed by counsel for the defense who stated:
That was never my position, Your Honor, that this person was a confidential informer, so if the Court has indicated that the Court believes he was a confidential informer, then that was not the reason. I wasn’t asking that the confidential— that this person be disclosed based on the fact that he was a confidential informer we needed; that that person was not a confidential informer, in fact, just a witness to the transaction—
Further evidence of this fact is revealed in Rosemond’s motion to compel identity of witness, wherein he asserted he was entitled to relief pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.220(a)(l)(i), rather than Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.220(c)(2). Therefore, as Rosemond’s argument was not the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the motion below, it is not cognizable by this Court on appeal. Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982).
As regards the second issue on appeal, Rosemond argues that the trial court’s generalized reference to his prior bad record was insufficient to justify the imposition of an enhanced sentence. We agree. Weston v. State, 452 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), p.f.r.d., 456 So. 2d 1182 (Fla.1984), cited with approval in Walker v. State, 462 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1985). This Court has held that a trial court must state the underlying facts and circumstances relied upon in making a determination that a defendant is a habitual offender. Further, a conclusory statement, as was made in this case, that such a finding was necessary for the protection of the public from further criminal activity by the defendant is insufficient. Winters v. State, 475 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Accordingly, we reverse Rosemond’s sentence and remand for reconsideration of the imposition of an extended term in compliance with the provisions of Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1981).
Rosemond’s final issue on appeal is without merit. He was sentenced prior to the imposition of the guidelines and, therefore, cannot object to his sentence on the basis it exceeds that recommended in the guidelines. See, Section 921.001(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1983).
Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.
WENTWORTH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
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Winters v. State, 500 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…se”. Contrary to appellant’s argument, we find that the trial judge did state the underlying facts and circumstances relied upon in making a determination that appellant is an habitual [*305] offender, as required by this court in Rosemond v. State, 489 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Although there are no magic words that constitute the “specific findings of fact”, Walker v. State, 462 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1985), or “the underlying facts and circumstances”, Rosemond, required to support an habitual offender dete…
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Watson v. State, 492 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)…their face that an extended term of imprisonment is necessary to protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal behavior. See Walker v. State, 462 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1985); Bogan v. State, 489 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Rosemond v. State, 489 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Welsh v. State, 486 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Winters v. State, 475 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Hopkins v. State, 463 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Scott v. State, 446 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Little v. State, 44…
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Robby Douglas Pugh v. State, 547 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…that an extended term is necessary in order to protect the public from the defendant’s further criminal conduct. A mere conclusory statement that a finding of habitual offender was necessary to protect the public is insufficient. Rosemond v. State, 489 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Weston v. State, 452 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In the instant case, the trial court merely referred to appellant’s criminal history and concluded that an extended sentence was necessary for the protection of the public. As…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1982)
- Bennie Lee Walker v. State, 462 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1985)
- Weston v. State, 452 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Winters v. State, 475 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)