ROBBY DOUGLAS PUGH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a trial court must make specific findings of fact to support an enhanced sentence under the habitual offender statute, and a conclusory statement is insufficient.
[1] A trial court must make specific findings of fact demonstrating that an extended sentence is necessary to protect the public from a defendant's further criminal conduct t…
[2] A conclusory statement that an extended sentence is necessary for public protection is insufficient to support a habitual offender finding.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was found to be a habitual felony offender and received an enhanced sentence. The trial court's order merely referred to the appellant's cri…
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SHIVERS, Chief Judge.
Appellant, Robby Douglas Pugh, appeals the trial court’s order finding him to be a habitual felony offender pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes, and imposing an enhanced sentence of ten years. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
In order to impose an enhanced sentence under the habitual offender statute, the trial court must make specific findings of fact which show on their face that an extended term is necessary in order to protect the public from the defendant’s further criminal conduct. A mere conclusory statement that a finding of habitual offender was necessary to protect the public is insufficient. Rosemond v. State, 489 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Weston v. State, 452 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In the instant case, the trial court merely referred to appellant’s criminal history and concluded that an extended sentence was necessary for the protection of the public. As in this court’s decision in Spivey v. State, 533 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), the court’s bare conclusions “do not meet the standard for specification of reasons why appellant is dangerous and must be incarcerated for an extended term in order to protect the public.” 533 So. 2d at 309. Cf. Winters v. State, 500 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (wherein the trial court stated specific facts and circumstances relied on in concluding that defendant’s criminal history indicated he was a danger to the community); White v. State, 481 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (wherein the trial court analyzed defendant’s conduct and noted that it demonstrated a conscious pattern of lawlessness).
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s habitual offender finding and reverse and remand for resentencing. The trial court may reconsider application of the habitual offender statute upon resentencing and, in the event the statute is found to apply, state specific reasons in support of its conclusion that an enhanced sentence is necessary for the protection of the public. Meehan v. State, 526 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SMITH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Power v. State, 568 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…writing as long as they are made in a reported judicial proceeding. Parker v. State, 546 So. 2d 727 (Fla.1989). Upon remand, the trial court may reconsider application of the habitual offender statute when resentencing Power. Moreno; Pugh v. State, 547 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Additionally, when imposing sentences for each of the felonies punishable by life, the “habitual offender” boxes were checked on the judgment and sentence form. Because life sentences are not subject to habitual offender enhanc…
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Adams v. State, 559 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…judge make findings of fact in support of the imposition of an extended sentence. These findings must show on their face that an extended term is necessary in order to protect the public from the defendant’s further criminal conduct. Pugh v. State, 547 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Bohannon v. State, 546 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Weston v. State, 452 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 456 So. 2d 1182 (Fla.1984). These specific findings need not be in writing so long as they are made at a reported…1 / 2
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Ozell Debose, Jr. v. State, 580 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…f fact that show an enhanced sentence was necessary to protect the public from appellant’s further criminal conduct. Appellant claims that mere reference to his prior criminal history and a conclusory statement is insufficient, citing Pugh v. State, 547 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In Pugh, the court held that the trial court must provide specific reasons in support of its conclusion that an enhanced sentence is necessary for the protection of the public. In Parker v. State, 546 So. 2d 727 (Fla.1989), the…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Weston v. State, 452 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Winters v. State, 500 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Spivey v. State, 533 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- DCA Homes, Inc. v. City OF Miramar, 481 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Rosemond v. State, 489 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Muntaner v. Miller GAS Co., 526 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Hemmerle v. Sunland Props., Inc., 526 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)