JORGE VALDES, APPELLANT,
v.
PLANNED INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION, INC., APPELLEE
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The appellate court reversed a final judgment awarding injunctive relief because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue it after already entering a final judgment for damages without reserving jurisdiction. The court found that a later nunc pro tunc amendment to include the reservation was improper as it corrected a substantive error, not a clerical one.
No, the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the injunctive relief judgment. The failure to reserve jurisdiction was a substantive error, not correctable by a nunc pro tunc order.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to enter a judgment awarding injunctive relief when it has previously entered a final judgment for damages without reserving jurisdiction…
[2] A nunc pro tunc amendment to a final judgment cannot correct a failure to reserve jurisdiction to award injunctive relief if the initial failure was not due to mistake, i…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We reverse the Final Judgment for In-junctive Relief upon a holding that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a judgment awarding injunctive relief where, as here, it had some forty days earlier entered a final judgment awarding damages after a trial in which the plaintiff sought both damages and injunctive relief, and such damage judgment contained no reservation of jurisdiction to later award injunctive relief”
Establishes the core reason for reversal: lack of jurisdiction to enter the injunctive relief judgment.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff sought both damages and injunctive relief. The trial court entered a final judgment awarding damages but did not reserve jurisdiction to…
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PER CURIAM.
We reverse the Final Judgment for In-junctive Relief upon a holding that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a judgment awarding injunctive relief where, as here, it had some forty days earlier entered a final judgment awarding damages after a trial in which the plaintiff sought both damages and injunctive relief, and such damage judgment contained no reservation of jurisdiction to later award injunctive relief, see Katz v. Katz, 417 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); DeFilippis v. DeFilippis, 378 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Altieri v. Altieri, 341 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Superior Uniforms, Inc. v. Brown, 221 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Augusta Corporation v. Strawn, 174 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).
This result is not changed by the fact that the trial court ultimately amended nunc pro tunc its final judgment awarding damages to include a clause reserving jurisdiction to award injunctive relief, since the initial failure to reserve such jurisdiction was not the result of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect subject to being corrected under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), see Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1970); Metropolitan Dade County v. Certain Lands Upon Which Assessments are Delinquent, 471 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Van Harren v. Markevitch, 447 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA), pet. for rev. denied, 456 So. 2d 1182 (Fla.1984); Fiber Crete Homes, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 315 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Frisard v. Frisard (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (Case No. 85-1931, opinion filed July 2, 1986) (“[T]he failure to reserve jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees and costs in a final order is a substantive, not a clerical, mistake.”); Hunter v. Hunter, 487 So. 2d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (“The divestment of jurisdiction is a change in substance, and not merely a correction of an omission, and thus is not within the proper realm of a nunc pro tunc order.”).
The appeal of the final judgment for damages is dismissed; the Final Judgment for Injunctive Relief is reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Cited By
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Marton Grossman v. Selewacz, 516 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…r orders as may be necessary to carry out terms thereof.” When that judgment became final, the court was without power or authority to change the substantive provisions thereof by adding an award of damages. Valdes v. Planned Investment Association, 490 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1986); Katz v. Katz, 417 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Board of County Commissioners of Pasco County v. Hesse, 351 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Appellant’s motion for entry of a money judgment was accompanied by a separate [*113…
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Steele v. Greely B. Steele and Dessie Steele, 558 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…und that appellant Dwight Steele had increased the debt on the land solely for his own benefit. . We find this case distinguishable from cases such as Grossman v. Selewacz, 516 So. 2d 1136 (Fla.4th DCA 1987), and Valdes v. Planned Inv. Ass'n, Inc., 490 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), wherein our sister courts held that the lower tribunals were without jurisdiction to enter orders granting money damages and injunctive relief, respectively, after entry of final judgments, because the relief requested in those c…
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Youth FOR Christ OF Sarasota, Inc. v. Sarasota Cnty., 765 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…ounty v. Lovelace, 673 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that while trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce a final judgment, “it did not have jurisdiction to modify its terms” upon the parties’ stipulation); Valdes v. Planned Invs. Ass’n, 490 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (holding that the trial court was without jurisdiction to award injunctive relief when it had entered final judgment forty days earlier awarding only damages); see also Tingle v. Dade County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 245 So. 2d 76 (F…
Authorities Cited
- Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. OF Shelby v. Tillman Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970)
- Fiber Crete Homes, Inc. v. Division OF Administration, 315 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Superior Uniforms, Inc. v. Brown, 221 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- DeFILIPPIS v. DeFILIPPIS, 378 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Certain Lands Upon Which Assessments Are Delinquent, 471 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Altieri v. Altieri, 341 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Augusta Corp. v. Strawn, 174 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Katz v. Mervyn Katz, 417 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- van Harren v. Inaky Markevitch and Serena Markevitch, 447 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Hunter v. Hunter, 487 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)