MARTON GROSSMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
EMMA J. SELEWACZ, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM SELEWACZ, DECEASED, APPELLEE
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In a specific performance action involving transfer of stock, the trial court retained jurisdiction only to implement the judgment's terms, not to modify it substantively. After affirming the original judgment, the court properly denied appellant's post-mandate motion to add a money judgment for stock shares that were sold by the defendant's financial advisor without her knowledge before the judgment was entered.
The trial court properly denied the motion for a money judgment. Once a judgment becomes final, the court loses the power to change its substantive provisions by adding new relief, even though it could have awarded damages in the original judgment. The retained jurisdiction was limited to entering orders necessary to carry out the terms of the existing judgment.
[1] A court that has affirmed a judgment and issued its mandate is without power to substantively alter the original judgment by adding an award of damages.
[2] A court's retention of jurisdiction to enter further orders necessary to carry out the terms of a specific performance judgment does not authorize the court to add new su…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the judgment in this case was only for specific performance and the retention of jurisdiction was only 'to enter such further orders as may be necessary to carry out terms thereof.' When that judgment became final, the court was without power or authority to change the substantive provisions thereof by adding an award of damages.”
Establishes the core holding that once a judgment becomes final, retained jurisdiction cannot be used to add substantively different relief like damages.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGrossman obtained a final judgment requiring Selewacz to transfer a stock certificate and any dividends or stock splits. After the appellate court aff…
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PER CURIAM.
In this action for specific performance appellant Grossman obtained a final judgment requiring appellee to execute all documents necessary to reflect on the corporate records transfer to appellant of a certain stock certificate.
Additionally, the judgment required appellee to release and transfer any and all stock dividends or stock splits received by her or her husband’s estate relating to the aforesaid stock certificate. In that judgment the court retained jurisdiction to enter such further orders as may be necessary to carry out its terms. After this court had affirmed that judgment and the mandate was issued, Mrs. Selewacz complied in all respects except as to eight thousand shares which had been received as part of a stock split and which, without either her knowledge or consent, had been sold by her financial advisor before the final judgment had ever been entered. Appellant then moved for entry of a money judgment against Mrs. Selewacz for the value of those eight thousand shares, and brings this appeal from an order denying that motion.
It was not error for the court to deny the motion. While it is true that in the original judgment the court could have awarded damages either in lieu of or in addition to the specific performance ordered, see National Industrial Bank of Miami v. Forbes, 270 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), the judgment in this case was only for specific performance and the retention of jurisdiction was only “to enter such further orders as may be necessary to carry out terms thereof.” When that judgment became final, the court was without power or authority to change the substantive provisions thereof by adding an award of damages. Valdes v. Planned Investment Association, 490 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1986); Katz v. Katz, 417 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Board of County Commissioners of Pasco County v. Hesse, 351 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
Appellant’s motion for entry of a money judgment was accompanied by a separate motion for an order of contempt which the court likewise denied based upon its finding that the eight thousand shares of stock had been sold prior to the final judgment without either the knowledge or consent of Mrs. Selewacz and in disregard of her orders to her financial advisor not to sell the stock. The court also found that Mrs. Sele-wacz had received no money as a result of such sale and on that basis held that she could not be liable for a money judgment. The question of her legal liability for a money judgment was not before the trial court and we therefore modify the court’s order by striking that particular language. As thus modified, the order appealed is affirmed.
AFFIRMED, AS MODIFIED.
HERSEY, C.J., DOWNEY, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., JR., (Retired), Associate Judge, concur.
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Steele v. Greely B. Steele and Dessie Steele, 558 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…f Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii). . The trial court specifically found that appellant Dwight Steele had increased the debt on the land solely for his own benefit. . We find this case distinguishable from cases such as Grossman v. Selewacz, 516 So. 2d 1136 (Fla.4th DCA 1987), and Valdes v. Planned Inv. Ass'n, Inc., 490 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), wherein our sister courts held that the lower tribunals were without jurisdiction to enter orders granting money damages and injunctive relief, respectiv…
Authorities Cited
- Katz v. Mervyn Katz, 417 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Nat'l Indus. Bank OF Miami v. Verdell Forbes, 270 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Valdes v. Planned Inv. Ass'n, Inc., 490 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Pasco Cnty. v. Hesse, 351 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)