TRI-STATE SYSTEMS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Tri-State Systems appealed the Department of Transportation's denial of an outdoor advertising permit, arguing that a cable-TV broadcasting tower constituted sufficient commercial activity under Florida's sign control statute. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the agency's interpretation that broadcast towers are not commercial activity was permissible and supported by substantial evidence.
A cable-TV broadcasting tower does not constitute commercial activity within the meaning of Chapter 479. The Department of Transportation's interpretation that broadcast towers fall outside the definition of commercial activity is permissible and supported by substantial evidence, as evidenced by zoning codes in Florida cities that classify broadcast towers as agricultural rather than industrial.
[1] A broadcast tower does not constitute "commercial activity" for the purpose of an outdoor advertising permit when zoning codes classify such towers as agricultural rather…
[2] Agency interpretations of statutory terms are entitled to great deference absent clear error or conflict with legislative intent.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Agency determinations with regard to a statute's interpretation will receive great deference in the absence of clear error or conflict with legislative intent.”
Establishes the standard of review for agency statutory interpretations
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTri-State Systems applied for an outdoor advertising permit pursuant to Chapter 479, which governs signs within 660 feet of interstate rights-of-way. …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Administrative Agency Deference cases and more on FLexlaw
[*1193] MILLS, Judge.
Tri-State Systems, Inc. appeals from a final administrative order denying its application for an outdoor advertising permit pursuant to Chapter 479. We affirm.
In 1972, the State agreed to make provisions for effective control of the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising signs which are within six hundred and sixty (660) feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way and visible from the main-traveled way. To that end, Section 479.-11(1) provides that no sign shall be erected in this area except in zoned or unzoned commercial areas. The latter is defined by Section 479.01(10) as “an area within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of the interstate ... in which there is located one or more industrial or commercial activities generally recognized as commercial or industrial by zoning authorities in this state ...” (emphasis supplied).
Tri-State applied for an outdoor advertising permit pursuant to Chapter 479, relying for the required commercial activity on a cable-TV broadcasting tower. The issue before the hearing officer in this case was whether such a tower was “commercial activity” sufficient to support the issuance of the permit. The hearing officer found that it was not and recommended that the permit be denied. The agency adopted this recommendation and denied the application in the final order herein appealed.
There is no statutory definition of “commercial activity” other than that the activity should he “generally recognized as commercial or industrial by zoning authorities of the state.” Agency determinations with regard to a statute’s interpretation will receive great deference in the absence of clear error or conflict with legislative intent. Sans Souci v. Division of Land Sales and Condominiums, 421 So. 2d 623, 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Department of Environmental Regulation v. Goldring, 477 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla.1985). Its interpretation of the critical term, here “commercial activity,” does not have to he the only one or the most desirable one; it is enough if it is permissible. Florida Power Corp. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 431 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Here, the agency’s interpretation was supported by evidence that the zoning codes of two Florida cities relegate broadcast towers to an agricultural rather than an industrial classification. Because there is competent, substantial evidence to support the agency’s conclusion that “commercial activity” does not include a broadcast tower, we affirm.
WENTWORTH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Mayo Clinic Jacksonville v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 625 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…is entitled to great deference and should not be overturned unless clearly erroneous or in conflict with the legislative intent of the statute. PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1988); Tri-State Sys., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 491 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Although the Board’s construction would ordinarily be accorded great deference, as it is the agency charged with the administration and regulation of physicians licensed under chapter 458, Florida Statutes (1989),3 we overrule…
-
Hancock Advertising, Inc. v. Dep't OF Transp., 549 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…erpretation will receive great deference in the absence of clear error or conflict with legislative intent.” McDonald’s Corp. v. Department of Transp., 535 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (quoting Tri-State Systems, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 491 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)); § 120.68(9), Fla.Stat. (1987); see Gay v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., 59 So. 2d 788 (Fla.1952); Cohen v. School Bd. of Dade County, 450 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), and “this court may not substitute its judgment for that…
-
Motel 6 v. Dep't of Bus. Reg., 560 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…rely that it not be unreasonable or outside the range of possible interpretations. Department of Professional Reg., Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). See also Tri-State Sys., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 491 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“interpretation of critical term ... does not have to be the only one or the most desirable one; it is enough if it is permissible”). Because the Department’s construction of section 509.201(2)(a), as it [*1324] applies to…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sans Souci v. Div. OF Fla. Land Sales & Condos., 421 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Dep't OF Env't Reg. v. Goldring, 477 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1985)
- Fla. Power Corp. v. State, 431 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)