JERRY JANELLI, APPELLANT,
v.
ANTHONY PAGANO AND MARGARET PAGANO, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1986-08-08
No. 85-2942
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOON-OVER and HALL, JJ., concur.
492 So. 2d 796 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1986) Positive Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

Appellant Jerry Janelli appealed a final judgment nearly two years after it was rendered, claiming the appeal was timely due to a motion for rehearing and a subsequent amended judgment. The Florida District Court of Appeal rejected both arguments and dismissed the appeal as untimely.


Holding

The appeal was untimely and must be dismissed. Although a timely motion for rehearing extends the rendition date, no notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of the rehearing denial. Additionally, while an amended judgment adding attorney's fees is separately appealable, an appeal from such an amended judgment does not reach back to the original judgment unless the notice of appeal was timely as to that original judgment.


Headnotes

[1] A timely and authorized motion for rehearing extends the rendition date of a judgment and the time for appeal.

[2] An appeal from an amended final judgment that only designates the amount of attorney's fees does not reach back to review issues determined by the original judgment.

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Key Quotes

“a timely and authorized motion for rehearing extends the rendition date of the judgment until ruled on and, thus, accordingly extends the appeal time”

States the general rule that motions for rehearing extend the deadline for appealing, but this rule did not save appellant's appeal because no appeal was filed within thirty days of the rehearing denial.

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Facts & Procedural History

A final judgment was entered on November 29, 1983, disposing of all issues in the complaint and counterclaim, including entitlement to attorney's fees…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Notice of appeal was filed on December 20, 1985, from a final judgment filed November 29, 1983. Appellees move to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Appellant contends that because of two circumstances concerning the rendition of the final judgment, the time for appeal has been extended.

Appellant submits that the original order was under proper notice for rehearing. It is true that a timely and authorized motion for rehearing extends the rendition date of the judgment until ruled on and, thus, accordingly extends the appeal time. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.020(g). Here, however, the motion for rehearing was denied on August 21, 1984, and no notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of that date. Therefore, the disposition of the motion for rehearing does not make this appeal timely.

Appellant further contends that the final judgment was subsequently amended. The record shows that the first judgment of November 29, 1983, disposed of all issues in the complaint and counterclaim, including entitlement to attorney’s fees, but reserved jurisdiction as to the amount of attorney’s fees. On November 22, 1985, the trial judge entered an amended final judgment. The only change from the original final judgment was the desig-. nated amount of attorney’s fees. A subse quent attorney’s fee order is a final order appealable as such apart from the final judgment. See Hubert v. Division of Administration, 425 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Accordingly, where only attorney’s fees are added in an amended judgment, an appeal from that judgment does not reach back to the original judgment but only brings the propriety of the attorney’s fees up for review. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Hutchins, 489 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), and Grasland v. Taylor Woodrow Homes, Ltd., 460 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Although the notice of appeal herein was filed within thirty days of the amended judgment, the appeal is not timely as appellant in his brief is raising issues which were determined by the original judgment and that judgment must have been appealed within thirty days of its rendition.

Accordingly, the motion is granted and this appeal is hereby dismissed.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOON-OVER and HALL, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Indus., Inc., 22 So. 3d 36 (Fla. 2009)
    …ction from becoming final. However, being “collateral” does not mean they are subsumed by the underlying judgment. A judgment imposing such sanctions is ap-pealable independently of the final judgment in the underlying action. See Janelli v. Pagano, 492 So. 2d 796, 796-97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (“A subsequent attorney’s fee order judgment is a final order appeal-able as such apart from the final judgment.”); see also Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Locke, 572 F. 3d 610, 614 (9th Cir.2009) (“An award of attorney fe…
  • First Cont'l Corp. v. Bashir H. Khan, 605 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
    …, where a judgment is amended in a material respect, the appeal time runs from the date of the amendment, provided the amendment is material, not minor or formal. Accord, St. Moritz Hotel v. Daughtry, 249 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla.1971); Janelli v. Pagano, 492 So. 2d 796, 796-797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); B.G. Leasing, Inc. v. Heider, 372 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Bonura v. Holloway, 334 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Drummond v. Gerwe, 264 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Brick v. Brick, 258 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 4th DCA 1…
  • …1990). Tyler was required to file his notice of appeal within thirty days of Judge Young’s order dated July 22, 1996. Because Tyler did not file his notice of appeal until September 30,1996 this court is without jurisdiction. See Janelli v. Pagano, 492 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Accordingly, this appeal is hereby dismissed. PARKER, C.J., and PATTERSON and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur.…

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