SAMUEL T. WILLIAMS, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1986-06-26
No. 67380
BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDonald, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
492 So. 2d 1308 Florida Supreme Court (1986) Negative Treatment
Cited by 195 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a departure sentence imposed above the sentencing guidelines and held that the trial court improperly relied on factors already considered in the guidelines calculation and on the judge's disagreement with the guidelines' recommended sentence. The Court clarified that appellate courts must examine all reasons for departure and reverse if none provide clear and convincing justification.


Holding

An appellate court must examine all reasons for departure, and if none of the reasons constitute a clear and convincing justification for departure from the guidelines, the court must reverse and remand for resentencing within the guidelines. Trial judges may not depart based on factors already considered in the guidelines, on disagreement with the guidelines' recommended sentence, or on factors insufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard.


Headnotes

[1] A trial judge may not depart from sentencing guidelines based on a factor that has already been weighed in arriving at a presumptive sentence.

[2] A trial court may not depart from sentencing guidelines based on its perception that the recommended sentence is not commensurate with the seriousness of the crime.

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Key Quotes

“A trial judge may not depart from the guidelines based on a factor which has already been weighed in arriving at a presumptive sentence.”

Establishes that double-counting factors is impermissible in sentencing departure decisions.

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Facts & Procedural History

Williams was convicted of a crime and received a departure sentence above the sentencing guidelines. The trial court justified the departure based on:…

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Opinion of the Court
BARKETT, Justice.

BARKETT, Justice.

We have for review Williams v. State, 471 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). In this case, the First District upheld Williams’ departure sentence and certified the following question as being of great public importance:

WHEN AN APPELLATE COURT FINDS THAT A SENTENCING COURT RELIED UPON A REASON OR REASONS THAT ARE IMPERMISSIBLE UNDER FLA.R.CRIM.P. 3.701 IN MAKING ITS DECISION TO DEPART FROM THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, SHOULD THE APPELLATE COURT EXAMINE THE OTHER REASONS GIVEN BY THE SENTENCING COURT TO DETERMINE IF THOSE REASONS JUSTIFY DEPARTURE FROM THE GUIDELINES OR SHOULD THE CASE BE REMANDED FOR A RESENTENCING.

Id. at 632. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The certified question has been answered in State v. Young, 476 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1985). To limit ourselves to simply answering the certified question, however, would leave the impression that the remaining reasons deemed permissible by the district court were clear and convincing reasons for departure. To eliminate any confusion on this issue, we deem it necessary to consider the reasons sustained by the court below. We find them to be insufficient.

The fact that Williams “[h]as engaged in [a] violent pattern of conduct which indicates a serious danger to society” is not a clear and convincing reason for departure from the guidelines under the facts of this case. The only evidence presented to support such a finding is the defendant’s prior record. Williams received twenty-seven points for prior convictions. Thus, his prior criminal history was already considered in computing his recommended punishment under the guidelines. A trial judge may not depart from the guidelines based on a factor which has already been weighed in arriving at a presumptive sentence. State v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523 (Fla.1986); Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d 1218, 1220 (Fla.1985); Napoles v. State, 463 So. 2d 478, 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

It is also improper to depart based on the trial court’s perception that the recommended sentence under the guidelines is not commensurate with the seriousness of the crime. The raison d’etre of the sentencing guidelines is to develop punishment commensurate with the seriousness of the crime. The different categories of crimes, the various scoring opportunities, and the disparate punishment ranges are clearly bottomed on this objective. The guidelines were enacted “to establish a uniform set of standards to guide the sentencing judge” and “eliminate unwarranted variation in the sentencing process by reducing the subjectivity in interpreting specific offense-and offender-related criteria and in defining their relative importance in the sentencing decision.” In re Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sentencing Guidelines), 439 So. 2d 848, 849 (Fla.1983). Accord Santiago v. State, 478 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla.1985); Hendrix, 475 So. 2d at 1219-20. A trial judge may not substitute his own opinion for that of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission simply because he does not agree with the presumptive sentence. Cf. Allen v. State, 476 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (trial judge may not depart simply because he thinks a harsher sentence will deter others). To permit every trial judge to determine his or her own sentence would result in the total elimination of the sentencing guidelines.

The final reason the trial court gave for departing from the guidelines was that the defendant stabbed the victim while she was sleeping and therefore more vulnerable. This factor alone is not a clear and convincing reason to depart.

In summary, none of the reasons advanced justified departure from the guidelines. Accordingly, we quash the decision below and remand this cause to the district court with orders to direct the trial court to sentence petitioner within the recommended range provided by the guidelines.

It is so ordered.

BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDonald, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (99 total)

  • Shull v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1987)
    …accept the state’s position on this point. Generally, when all of the reasons stated by the trial court in support of departure are found invalid, resentencing following remand must be within the presumptive guidelines sentence. Williams v. State, 492 So. 2d 1308 (Fla.1986); Foister v. State, 510 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Royal v. State, 508 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Carter v. State; 485 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 494 So. 2d 1149 (Fla.1986). Some of our district courts, however, ha…
  • Williams v. State, 504 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1987)
    …he trial court’s rejection of the guidelines sentence in this case was merely an expression of his general disagreement with the sentencing guidelines and was, thus, an improper reason for departure under this Court’s decisions in Williams v. State, 492 So. 2d 1308, 1309 (Fla.1986) (“A trial judge may not substitute his own opinion for that of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission simply because he does not [*394] agree with the presumptive sentence.”), and Scurry v. State, 489 So. 2d 25 (Fla.1986). The trial j…
  • Wemett v. State, 567 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1990)
    …defendant picked this victim strictly because of her helplessness. (Citations omitted.) The general rule in sentencing is to sentence within the guidelines; departure from the guidelines is the exception to the rule. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 492 So. 2d 1308, 1309 (Fla.1986). The exception of upward departure is intended to apply when extraordinary circumstances exist to “reasonably justify aggravating ... the sentence.” Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(ll). See, e.g., State v. McCall, 524 So. 2d 663, 665 (Fla.19…

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