STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
AUDLEY SEARS, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a trial court's order suppressing evidence of cocaine and drug paraphernalia found in a vehicle during a traffic stop. The appellate court reverses, holding that the defendant, a passenger, lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle and therefore could not challenge the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.
A passenger in a vehicle has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of the car and therefore lacks standing to assert Fourth Amendment protections. The search was validly initiated as incident to a lawful traffic stop and justified by the officers' reasonable fear that the defendant's furtive movement indicated the presence of a concealed weapon.
[1] A passenger in a vehicle generally has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle's interior, precluding a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search of that area.
[2] A person must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place to claim Fourth Amendment protection against a search and seizure.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[Capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon ... whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.”
Establishes the foundational test for Fourth Amendment standing based on Rakas v. Illinois
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice officers stopped a vehicle for a noisy muffler violation. As officers approached, they observed passenger Audley Sears holding a white object a…
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PER CURIAM.
The state appeals an order granting Aud-ley Sears’ motion to suppress physical evidence. We reverse.
Two police officers on patrol stopped a car for a noisy muffler violation. Approaching the car, the officers noticed Sears, one of the passengers in the vehicle, holding a white object. Sears moved as if to push something down in the seat behind him, at which point the police, fearing the presence of a weapon, ordered everyone out of the car. A search of the area where Sears had been sitting produced a tightly rolled pamphlet. The police unrolled the pamphlet and discovered that it contained a hypodermic needle and syringe, and a tin spoon coated with cocaine residue.
Sears was charged with possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. At trial, the court granted Sears’ motion for a mistrial and his motion to suppress the pamphlet and its contents.
The state argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting Sears’ motion to suppress because Sears had no expectation of privacy in the vehicle, and therefore the search and seizure could not have violated his fourth amendment rights. Additionally, the state maintains that Sears’ furtive attempt to hide the pamphlet justified the search and seizure, based upon the police officers’ articulable belief that Sears’ actions caused them to fear the presence of a concealed weapon.
“[Cjapacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon ... whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Thus, a challenge to the legality of a search and seizure may not be asserted vicariously, but is appropriate only where government intrusion has infringed a party’s personal fourth amendment rights. Dean v. State, 478 So. 2d 38 (Fla.1985). A passenger normally has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of the car in which he is riding. Rakas, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387.
Sears, a passenger in the car searched here, clearly had no expectation of privacy in the vehicle. He therefore lacked capacity to claim the protection of the fourth amendment in order to suppress the incriminating evidence discovered as a result of the search. Moreover, the search and seizure itself was incident to a lawful stop, and was validly initiated by the police in response to Sears’ furtive movement which led the officers to fear the presence of a weapon. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); State v. Dilyerd, 467 So. 2d 301 (Fla.1985).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the motion to suppress, and remand the case for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
HERSEY, C.J., and DOWNEY and DELL, JJ., concur.
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Dees v. State, 564 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…not give rise to more than bare suspicion); Currens v. State, 363 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (appellant quickly moving hand between his legs when officers approached did not constitute founded suspicion or threat). But cf. State v. Sears, 493 So. 2d 99, 100 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (furtive movement of passenger, pushing something down in seat behind him, justified search of automobile). In the case before us, the officers had received no report connecting the van or its passengers with criminal ■ act…
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Amoss v. State, 547 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…o. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); State v. Hutchinson, 404 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), rev. den., 412 So. 2d 466 (Fla.1982). A mere passenger normally does not have standing to contest the search of a car in which he is riding. Rakas; Sears v. State, 493 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Because appellant failed to bear his burden of establishing standing to contest the search of his co-defendant’s truck, we need not address the legality of the search. We accept the appellate counsel’s Anders brief, and we affir…
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State v. Rome, 500 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). As a mere passenger of the truck, appellee failed to establish a capacity to claim the protection of the fourth amendment in order to invoke the benefit of the exclusionary rule. See Rakas v. Illinois, supra; State v. Sears, 493 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Acebo v. State, 415 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. Davis, 415 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); and State v. Bartz, 431 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Accordingly, the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to su…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1978)
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (U.S. 1983)
- Dean v. State, 478 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1985)
- State v. Dilyerd, 467 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1985)