NORMAN LESTER AMOSS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to drug possession and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence from a vehicle search. The court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion because appellant, as a passenger, lacked standing to contest the search, but reversed the trial court's imposition of court costs without notice or opportunity to object.
Appellant lacked standing to challenge the vehicle search as a mere passenger, so the trial court properly denied the suppression motion. However, the trial court erred in assessing court costs against appellant without notice or opportunity to object, as these procedures are required for indigent defendants.
[1] A mere passenger in a vehicle generally lacks standing to contest the search of that vehicle.
[2] The burden is on the defendant to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle to contest its search.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A mere passenger normally does not have standing to contest the search of a car in which he is riding.”
Establishes the legal principle that appellant, as a passenger, lacked standing to challenge the vehicle search.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant and a co-defendant were lawfully stopped for trespassing on city-owned property posted off-limits to private vehicles. A search of the co-de…
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BARFIELD, Judge.
Appellant pled nolo contendere to possession of a controlled substance, in violation of section 893.13(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). He specifically reserved the right to challenge the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless stop and search of his co-defendant’s vehicle. The court-appointed appellate counsel filed an initial brief, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), asserting that he was unable to argue, in good faith, that the trial court had erred in denying the suppression motion because appellant, as a mere passenger in the vehicle, lacked standing to contest the search.
We agree. Appellant and his co-defendant were lawfully stopped for trespassing on city owned property, posted off-limits to private vehicles. See Dilyerd v. State, 467 So. 2d 301, 304 (Fla.1985). At the suppression hearing, the issue of standing was not raised by either party. In moving for suppression of the evidence, it was appellant’s burden to establish that he had a reason able expectation of privacy in the passenger compartment of his co-defendant’s vehicle. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v. Rome, 500 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); State v. Bartz, 431 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); State v. Hutchinson, 404 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), rev. den., 412 So. 2d 466 (Fla.1982). A mere passenger normally does not have standing to contest the search of a car in which he is riding. Rakas; Sears v. State, 493 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Because appellant failed to bear his burden of establishing standing to contest the search of his co-defendant’s truck, we need not address the legality of the search. We accept the appellate counsel’s Anders brief, and we affirm the trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress.
However, as counsel correctly asserted in his brief, the trial court erred in assessing court costs against appellant without notice or opportunity to object. Notice and a hearing are required prior to imposing statutory costs on an indigent defendant. Shipley v. State, 528 So. 2d 902 (Fla.1988); May v. State, 519 So. 2d 618 (Fla.1988); Moore v. State, 530 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The failure to object .to the imposition of the court costs is not fatal to preserve the issue for proper appellate review. Shipley; Harriel v. State, 520 So. 2d 271 (Fla.1988); Moore. This case is remanded with directions that the trial court give appellant notice and opportunity to object to the imposition of costs.
We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE and REMAND in part.
SHIVERS, C.J., and ZEHMER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Hernandez, 718 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…, as a general proposition, that a mere passenger of a vehicle lacks standing to contest a search of the vehicle which has been lawfully stopped. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); see also Amoss v. State, 547 So. 2d 716, 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). A passenger, however, does have standing in one of two situations: (1) where the vehicle was unlawfully stopped, see Fontana v. State, 581 So. 2d 585, 585 (Fla.1991); Wulff v. State, 533 So. 2d 1191, 1191-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 19…
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Welch v. State, 741 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…v. Hernandez, 718 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (passenger who was lawfully stopped lacked standing to challenge the subsequent search of the vehicle where he asserted no ownership or possessory interest in the car or its contents); Amoss v. State, 547 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (mere passenger normally does not have standing to contest the search of a car in which he is riding). However, under the Florida Constitution,4 interpretation of Fourth Amendment issues and parallel Florida constitutional provi…
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State v. Deen, 625 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…ecord also shows that Deen failed to demonstrate that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car in which he was a mere passenger. See State v. Fontana, 566 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), aff'd, 581 So. 2d 585 (Fla.1991); Amoss v. State, 547 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Accordingly, we reverse the suppression order that the trial court entered in favor of both Deen and Lewis and remand the cause for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1978)
- Mays v. State, 519 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1988)
- Harriel v. State, 520 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Dilyerd, 467 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1985)
- Shipley v. State, 528 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Hutchinson, 404 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Moore v. State, 530 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- State v. Bartz, 431 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- State v. Audley Sears, 493 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)