THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
GLENN GOLDMAN, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1986-09-02
No. 85-1857
Per Curiam
494 So. 2d 239 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1986)

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Synopsis

Florida's appellate court reversed a suppression order because the trial court's finding that the defendant was detained before the officer confirmed a burglary was unsupported by evidence; the initial encounter was not a detention, and when actual detention occurred, the officer had probable cause based on confirmed burglary.


Holding

An initial encounter between an officer and defendant that does not constitute a stop or detention does not implicate Fourth Amendment rights, and a subsequent arrest with probable cause based on a confirmed burglary is valid even if made outside the officer's jurisdiction.


Headnotes

[1] An initial encounter between a law enforcement officer and a person that does not constitute a stop or detention does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections, and a su…

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Key Quotes

“The record indisputably reveals that the initial encounter between the officer and the defendant was not a stop or detention and thus did not implicate any Fourth Amendment rights, and that when the officer later detained the defendant, he knew that, in fact, a nearby residence had been burglarized and had probable cause to believe that the defendant was guilty of burglarizing it.”

Court's explanation of why the suppression order was erroneous

Facts & Procedural History

An officer encountered the defendant during an investigation of a nearby burglary. The trial court found the defendant was detained before the officer…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed in all respects because it is bottomed on a factual finding unsupported by the evidence, namely, that the defendant was detained by the officer who eventually arrested him before the officer confirmed that a burglary had actually been committed.

The record indisputably reveals that the initial encounter between the officer and the defendant was not a stop or detention and thus did not implicate any Fourth Amendment rights, and that when the officer later detained the defendant, he knew that, in fact, a nearby residence had been burglarized and had probable cause to believe that the defendant was guilty of burglarizing it. See State v. Varnedoe, 443 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Cross v. State, 432 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); McKee v. State, 430 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA), pet. for review denied, 437 So. 2d 677 (Fla.1983).

Since the arrest met the standards of a valid citizen’s arrest, see Phoenix v. State, 455 So. 2d 1024 (Fla.1984); Collins v. State, 143 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 148 So. 2d 280 (Fla.1962), it is irrelevant that the arrest was effected outside of the officer’s jurisdiction. This determination makes it unnecessary for us to consider the State’s alternative argument that, in light of a trail of other evidence, the seizures complained of would have inevitably been accomplished in a lawful manner by officers operating without any jurisdictional impediment.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.


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