WILLIAM JONES, A/K/A RASHAD OLIPHANT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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William Jones was convicted of grand theft after a jury trial, but the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed his conviction because the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction regarding the presumption arising from possession of recently stolen property. The instruction improperly suggested that the property was already stolen and that Jones, being in possession, was presumed guilty.
The court reversed Jones' conviction because the jury instruction was erroneous. The instruction improperly presumed the property was stolen and that Jones, as its possessor, was guilty—a presumption that conflicts with the presumption of innocence and is inapplicable when the stolen status of the property itself is disputed.
[1] A jury instruction stating that possession of recently stolen property gives rise to an inference of knowledge of theft is improper when the evidence conflicts as to whet…
[2] A jury instruction that presumes guilt based on possession of recently stolen property is improper when the central issue is whether the property was stolen.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[W]here there is conflict in the evidence as to the intent with which property alleged to have been stolen was taken ... the question should be submitted to the jury without any intimation from the trial court as to the force of presumptions of fact arising from ... the testimony.”
Establishes the principle that when the stolen status and defendant's intent are disputed, the jury should decide without presumptive instructions.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones took an automobile from a used car dealer after leaving his truck as part of a purchase agreement. The dealer claimed he had consented only to a…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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ANSTEAD, Judge.
William Jones was convicted by a jury for grand theft. He appeals his conviction, asserting that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and by giving the following jury instruction:
Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.
We find there was sufficient evidence for the case to be submitted to the jury.
We reverse Jones’ conviction, however, as the giving of the jury instruction was error. The property in question was an automobile which Jones claimed was in his possession pursuant to a legitimate purchase agreement with a used car dealer. Jones left his truck, which was to be used as part of the purchase price, with the dealer. The dealer had consented to Jones taking the car, but claimed he consented to it being taken only for a test drive and that no purchase agreement had been finalized. The dealer did not report the car stolen until eight days later, however. The only issue at trial was whether Jones intended to steal the car or took it innocently, in other words, whether the car was stolen. The challenged jury instruction, however, states as a fact that the property was stolen and establishes the presumption that the person in possession was the thief. Such an instruction serves no purpose in a case such as this. “[Wjhere there is conflict in the evidence as to the intent with which property alleged to have been stolen was taken ... the question should be submitted to the jury without any intimation from the trial court as to the force of presumptions of fact arising from ... the testimony.” Curington v. State, 80 Fla. 494, 86 So. 344, 345 (1920).
Under the instruction, before the jury could make the presumption, it would have to find that the property was stolen. If the jury found that the car was stolen, however, it would find Jones guilty and the case would be resolved. In other words, there would then be no need for the presumption. The presumption applies in a different type of case, that is, where the property is undisputably stolen and the question is who stole it. The only possible effect of the instruction here was to allow the jury to presume Jones was guilty because he was in possession of the car. This goes against the presumption of innocence inherent in our criminal justice system. Curington.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial in accord herewith.
GLICKSTEIN, J., and WARNER, MARTHA C., Associate Judge, concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1996)…, either failed to explain or gave an incredible or unbelievable explanation for his possession of the property. Id. Second, the instruction applies only where the property is undisputedly stolen and the question is who stole it. See Jones v. State, 495 So. 2d 856, 857 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). “[W]here there is conflict in the evidence as to the intent with which property alleged to have been stolen was taken ... the question should be submitted to the jury without any intimation from the trial court as to the fo…
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Geza Horvath v. State, 217 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.” This instruction tracks the language of section 812.022, Florida Statutes. The case of Jones v. State, 495 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), is instructive. In Jones, the defendant took a car from an automobile dealership, claiming it “was in his possession pursuant to a legitimate purchase agreement with a used car dealer.” Id. at 857. The dealer, however, claimed t…
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Moore v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)
Authorities Cited
- Curington v. State, 80 Fla. 494 (Fla. 1920)
- Milton v. Jackson Cnty., 80 Fla. 516 (Fla. 1920)