BETTYANN KILGUS, APPELLANT,
v.
KENNETH R. KILGUS, ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A daughter-in-law was seriously burned when her brother-in-law negligently used lighter fluid on a cooking fire, allegedly at the father's suggestion. The trial court granted summary judgment for the parents, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that a mere suggestion to take an action does not create liability for the suggester, and this case involved negligent conduct rather than a dangerous premises condition.
The parents are not liable. A mere suggestion to another person to take an action does not constitute concert of action, substantial assistance, or aiding and abetting liability, even if the suggested action is performed negligently. Additionally, this case involves injury resulting from negligent conduct rather than from a defective or dangerous condition of the premises.
[1] An injury resulting from a negligent act occurring on premises does not constitute a premises liability claim.
[2] A suggestion to another to take an action that could be performed negligently or non-negligently does not create liability for the suggestor based on the actor's subseque…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This is not a premises liability case because the injury to the daughter-in-law resulted not from a defective or dangerous condition of the premises but from a negligent act occurring on the premises.”
Establishes the distinction between premises liability and negligent conduct occurring on premises, which governs the analysis of the father's potential liability.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA father, mother, son, and daughter-in-law were cooking out at the parents' home. When the cooking fire died down, the son obtained a can of lighter f…
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COWART, Judge.
A father, mother, son, and daughter-in-law were cooking out at the parents’ home. When the cooking fire died down, the son procured a can of lighter fluid and poured it on the smoldering fire. The fire flared, igniting the can of fluid. The son dropped the flaming can, splashing its contents on the daughter-in-law who was seriously burned. The daughter-in-law sued the parents, alleging that the father had suggested the son use the lighter fluid on the dying fire.
The trial court granted a summary judgment for the parents, the daughter-in-law appeals.
We affirm. This is not a premises liability case because the injury to the daughter-in-law resulted not from a defective or dangerous condition of the premises but from a negligent act occurring on the premises. Maldonado v. Jack M. Berry Grove Corp., 351 So. 2d 967 (Fla.1977); Hix v. Billen, 284 So. 2d 209 (Fla.1973); Gerlach v. Trepanier, 440 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Walt Disney World Co. v. Beattie, 428 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 5th DCA), pet. for rev. denied, 440 So. 2d 354 (Fla.1983); Whitlock v. Elich, 409 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
The father’s suggestion to the son to use the lighter fluid to reignite the cooking fire does not render the father liable for the son’s negligence in using the lighter fluid. A mere suggestion to another to take action that may be done negligently or non-negligently does not amount to a “concert of action” between the suggestor and the actor even if that theory of liability is viable in Florida. See Conley v. Boyle Drug Company, 477 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
The father’s suggestion does not constitute the giving of “substantial assistance” to the son’s performance of a negligent act nor does it make the father liable as an “aider and abettor.” See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) comment d (1979); Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F. 2d 472 (D.C.Cir.1983).
AFFIRMED.
COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Maldonado v. Jack M. Berry Grove Corp., 351 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1977)
- HIX v. Billen, 284 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1973)
- Elliott Jones Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
- Whitlock v. Elich, 409 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 477 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Gerlach v. Trepanier, 440 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Walt Disney World Co. v. Beattie, 428 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)