SEA CABIN, INC. AND JON BARRACK, APPELLANTS,
v.
SCOTT, BURK, ROYCE & HARRIS, P.A., AND RAYMOND ROYCE, APPELLEES
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The court held that admitting portions of an unrelated appellate brief and a settlement offer letter constituted erroneous evidentiary rulings that were not harmless.
[1] An attorney's argument in an appellate brief concerning an unrelated matter does not constitute an admission against interest by an individual client.
[2] A letter from a party's counsel to a third party suggesting that the third party is responsible for the party's damages and proposing a settlement is inadmissible as an o…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants sued a law firm for negligence. The trial court admitted portions of an appellate brief written by appellants' attorney in an unrelated cas…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of a law firm, and a member thereof, upon appellants’ claim of negligence against them. We reverse and remand for a new trial because of erroneous evidentiary rulings which we cannot determine to be harmless.
The trial court allowed the appel-lees to read into evidence, during cross examination of appellant Jon Barrack, portions of an appellate brief written by appellant’s attorney in an unrelated appeal. The portion of the brief read argued that the actions of another party, not the appellees here, caused the damages now claimed by appellants against appellees. We reject the proffered ground that the attorney’s argument constituted an admission against interest by the individual appellant, and the appellees have demonstrated no other legal basis for admission of such evidence. Cf. Leon Shaffer Golnick Advertising, Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Such evidence would obviously be preju dicial since it supported appellees’ contention that their negligence, if any, did not cause any harm to appellants.
Similarly, we believe it was error for the trial court to admit a letter from appellants’ counsel to another party suggesting that the other party was responsible for appellants’ damages and proposing a settlement of appellants’ claim against that party. In addition to the fact that the letter was not authored by appellants, Section 90.408, Florida Statutes (1983) bars the receipt into evidence of offers to compromise. This court has ruled that this bar applies to settlement offers made to third parties as well as parties to the litigation. Taylor Imported Motors, Inc. v. Armstrong, 391 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); and City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), aff'd, 191 So. 2d 38 (Fla.1966).
We find no merit to the other issues raised but, in accord with the above, we reverse and remand this cause for a new trial.
DOWNEY, ANSTEAD and LETTS, JJ., concur.
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Rease v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 644 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…circumstances are different from those cases that have construed section 90.408 to prohibit the admission of offers of compromise and statements made in negotiation in different, but related cases. In Sea Cabin, Inc. v. Scott, Burk, Royce & Harris, 496 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), rev. denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla.1987), in ruling that it was error for the court to admit a letter from plaintiffs’ counsel to a third party suggesting that the third party was actually responsible for the plaintiffs’ damages a…
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27TH Ave. Gulf Serv. Ctr. & Wilfred Gibson v. Smellie, 510 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…ement. It does not diminish the liability of one party by proportionately increasing the liability of another party. Admission of the agreement into evidence was therefore prejudicial error. See Sea Cabin, Inc. v. Scott, Burk, Boyce & Harris, P.A., 496 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), review denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1987). Appellees’ negative characterization of the agreement before the jury would have been improper even if it were a Mary Carter agreement. Swanson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. Reversa…
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Rubrecht v. Cone Distrib., Inc., 95 So. 3d 950 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…r that damages could not be apportioned between the two accidents, was directly affected. See generally City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). Rubrecht relies upon Sea Cabin, Inc. v. Scott, Burk, Royce & Harris, P.A., 496 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), and Charles B. Pitts Real Estate, Inc. v. Hater, 602 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), for the proposition that section 90.408 is applicable to settlements with different parties if the claim is related. In Sea Cabin, the Fourth Di…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Leon Shaffer Golnick Advertising, Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- City OF Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Janet v. Jordan and Janet V. Jordan as Administratrix of the Estate of John Ellison Jordan, 191 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1966)
- Taylor Imported Motors, Inc. v. Armstrong, 391 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)