LEROY PORTEE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, but during jury polling after verdict, one juror indicated she had not agreed with the guilty verdict. The trial court re-instructed the jury on unanimity and sent them back to deliberate. The defendant appealed, claiming the court's remarks coerced the dissenting juror into joining the verdict in violation of his right to a deadlocked jury, but the appellate court affirmed, finding the instructions properly preserved the jurors' option to deadlock.
The trial court's instructions did not constitute fundamental error. Although the instructions emphasized the requirement for unanimity, they clearly preserved the jury's option to deadlock by repeatedly informing the jurors that if they could not arrive at a unanimous verdict, a mistrial would be declared and the case retried. The instructions did not convey that the jurors must reach a verdict, only that any verdict they reached must be unanimous.
[1] A trial court's instructions to a jury after a poll reveals a dissenting juror must clarify that a verdict must be unanimous, not that a verdict must be reached.
[2] A trial court's remarks to a jury, which include the possibility of a mistrial due to a deadlock, do not impermissibly coerce a dissenting juror into returning a guilty v…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in the present case it is clear that the trial court's words, in their entirety, informed the jury that in the event they reached a verdict that verdict must be unanimous, not that they must reach a verdict”
Establishes the critical distinction: the court told jurors that any verdict must be unanimous, not that they must arrive at a verdict, preserving the deadlock option.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter a jury returned a guilty verdict for second-degree murder, the trial court polled the jury and one juror (the foreman, Ms. Mullins) announced sh…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Jury Unanimity cases and more on FLexlaw
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
After the verdict finding the defendant guilty of second-degree murder was published, a poll of the jury was taken. Following the announcement by one juror that she had not joined in the verdict, the trial court undertook to remedy the situation by re-explaining to the jurors the need for unanimity.
The defendant argues on this appeal that the court’s remarks and instructions, to which he did not object below, collectively constitute fundamental error because they so coerced the unconvinced juror into agreeing with her fellow jurors as to render the ensuing guilty verdict invalid.
The remarks and instructions in question follow:
“THE COURT: All right. Now, ladies and gentlemen, my instructions to you are obviously that whatever verdict you return must be unanimous, in other words, you all must agree on the same verdict. I don't know how you could have possibly misunderstood my telling you that when I told you that on two or more occasions.
“Now, do I understand correctly, Ms. Mullins, that you are the foreman of this jury and that you did not agree to this verdict of murder in the second degree?
“MS. MULLINS: Right.
“THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, go back in the jury room and deliberate again. I’m going to send all the verdict forms back in with you again.
“MS. MULLINS: If I can ask a question, what is the procedure of this?
“THE COURT: Ma’am, you have all got to agree on a verdict. If you can’t agree on a verdict, then the Court would eventually have to declare a mistrial and try the case all over again.
“Remember, whatever the verdict is it must be unanimous, everybody must agree to that verdict whatever that verdict may be.
“Mr. [Bailiff], give them the evidence and take them back in the jury room.
“MS. MULLINS: What if it still comes out to the same thing?
“THE COURT: Ma’am, if you cannot arrive at a unanimous verdict, then there has to be a mistrial and we will try the case over again.
“MS. MULLINS: Well, there is going to be a mistrial, then.
“THE COURT: Ma’am, it is not a mistrial because you are all going back in this jury room and rethink your positions and discuss it all over again. Now go back in the jury room. Mr. [Bailiff], take that evidence in and give them back that verdict form because they can either return that verdict again or they can tear it up and return another verdict form.”
Had the trial court’s words conveyed to the jurors that they must arrive at a verdict, we could agree with the defendant that he would have been wrongfully deprived of a right to a deadlocked jury and that fundamental error would have been committed. But unlike Bell v. State, 311 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), in which the lower court, without any words of qualification or explanation, informed the jurors that all six had to agree, in the present case it is clear that the trial court’s words, in their entirety, informed the jury that in the event they reached a verdict that verdict must be unanimous, not that they must reach a verdict. Although the trial court’s last words to the jurors might be read to mean that they had but two alternatives — a verdict of guilty or not guilty — these words must be read together with the immediately preceding statements that “[i]f you can’t agree on a verdict, then the Court would eventually have to declare a mistrial and try the case all over again” and “if you cannot arrive at a unanimous verdict, then there has to be a mistrial and we will try the case over again,” which unmistakably made it known that a deadlock was a possibility open to them. And having made that known, the trial court, unlike the trial court in Rodriguez v. State, 462 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 471 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1985), said nothing to convey to the jurors its personal antipathy to, and the community’s loss from, a case which does not result in a verdict.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Moore v. State, 592 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. State v. Bryan, 290 So. 2d 482 (Fla.1974); McElrath v. State, 516 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Warren v. State, 498 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 503 So. 2d 328 (Fla.1987); Portee v. State, 496 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 506 So. 2d 1042 (Fla.1987); Lewis v. State, 369 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).…
Authorities Cited
- Ernie Lee Bell v. State, 311 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Orestes Rodriguez v. State, 462 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)