BURTON ENGELS, TRUSTEE, APPELLANT,
v.
TONY VALDESUSO, JR. ENTERPRISES, INC., APPELLEE
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Burton Engels, who purchased mortgaged property at a foreclosure sale, appeals the trial court's decision allowing Tony Valdesuso, Jr. Enterprises to exercise a right of redemption. The court affirmed, holding that Valdesuso, as the record title holder who acquired the property from the mortgagors before the foreclosure sale, could validly exercise the mortgagor's right of redemption rather than being limited to a subordinate mortgagee's redemption rights.
The court held that Valdesuso validly exercised the mortgagor's right of redemption rather than a subordinate mortgagee's redemption right. Because Valdesuso acquired legal title to the property from the mortgagors, it could validly redeem the property after the foreclosure sale but before issuance of the certificate of title, and therefore the trial court correctly denied Engels' motion to set aside the redemption.
[1] A party who acquires legal title to mortgaged property from the mortgagor after a final judgment of foreclosure but before the issuance of a certificate of title may vali…
[2] The right of redemption exercised by a party holding legal title acquired from the mortgagor is distinct from the right of redemption typically held by a subordinate mort…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The mortgagor's right of redemption may be asserted by the mortgagor and 'those claiming under or through him.'”
Establishes the principle that the mortgagor's redemption right extends to successors in title, not just the original mortgagor.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA foreclosure action was initiated on May 30, 1985, against property owners Anthony and Vera del Pozzo, with Valdesuso being a subordinate mortgagee. …
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PER CURIAM.
Burton Engels appeals the trial court’s order granting Tony Valdesuso, Jr. Enterprises, Inc. (Valdesuso) the right of redemption in mortgaged property which is the subject of this suit. We affirm.
This case arises from a foreclosure action initiated on May 30, 1985. The senior mortgagee brought suit against Anthony and Vera del Pozzo, the property owners, and the subordinate mortgagees, one of which was Valdesuso. A lis pendens was recorded.
On September 4, 1985, Valdesu-so acquired title to the property from the del Pozzos in settlement of a previously filed action to foreclose.
On September 12, Valdesuso recorded the deed. The court granted the senior mortgagee’s uncontested motion for summary judgment on September 20, 1985, and ordered that the property be sold at a foreclosure sale to be held on October 25, 1985. At the foreclosure sale, Engels received the certificate of sale as the successful bidder. Valdesuso did not bid. Instead, prior to the issuance of the certificate of title, Valdesuso paid the amount of the final judgment into the court in exchange for a certificate of redemption. The court denied Engels’ motion to set aside the redemption and Engels brought this appeal.
Engels’ major contention is that as a subordinate mortgagee Valdesuso’s right of redemption was extinguished when, after the lis pendens was recorded, it failed to either contest the foreclosure proceedings or the sale, or attempt to pay off the senior mortgagee and take a subrogated position. See Islamorada Bank v. Rodriguez, 452 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Glendale Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Giladagnino, 434 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Shipp Corp. v. Charpilloz, 414 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
In response, Valdesuso correctly points out that the right of redemption which it exercised was the right of redemption it acquired from the mortgagors, the del Pozzos, and not the redemption right generally enjoyed by a subordinate mortgagee.1 The mortgagor’s right of redemption may be asserted by the mortgagor and “those claiming under or through him.” John Stepp, Inc. v.
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 379 So. 2d 384, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); see Robbins v. Blanc, 105 Fla. 625, 142 So. 223 (1932).
When Valdesuso exercised its right of redemption, it did so as the record title holder and not a subordinate mortgagee. Since Valdesuso acquired legal title to the property from the mortgagors, it could val idly redeem the property after the foreclosure sale but before the court issued the certificate of title. See Allstate Mortgage Corp. v. Strasser, 286 So. 2d 201 (Fla.1973); Cooper Smith Properties, Ltd. v. Flower’s Baking Co., 432 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA), review dismissed, 438 So. 2d 831 (Fla.1983); § 45.031(1), Fla.Stat. (1985); cf. John Stepp, Inc., 379 So. 2d at 384 (purchaser who acquired title to property from mortgagor after court entered final judgment of foreclosure and who recorded deed after judicial sale was entitled to exercise right of redemption prior to issuance of certificate of title).
Consequently, the court correctly denied Engels’ motion to set aside the redemption.
For the foregoing reasons, the order under review is
Affirmed.
. The term "right of redemption” takes on different meanings depending on whether it refers to the right exercised by a mortgagor or a subordinate or junior mortgagee.
When it is used with respect to a mortgagor, it refers to his right, prior to being foreclosed from that right, to satisfy the mortgage indebtedness which encumbers his property. When the phrase is used with reference to a junior mortgagee, ... it refers to his right to satisfy a prior mortgage by payment of the debt it secures and thereby become equitably subrogated to all rights of the prior mortgagee.
Shipp Corp., 414 So. 2d at 1123 (citation omitted).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Eurovest, Ltd. v. Segall, 528 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…y of a mortgage does not affect his equitable right of redemption nor his right to participate in excess proceeds of the sale following any foreclosure proceeding. See Rosen v. Dorn-Kothe, Inc., 126 Fla. 717, 171 So. 646 (1936); Engels v. Valdesuso, 497 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); see also Robbins v. Blanc, 105 Fla. 625, 142 So. 223 (1932). Thus, appellee is not without remedy. We next address Segall’s claim that the mortgage was a “scam”. Apparently the claim is a veiled attempt to set aside the mortgage…
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Riley v. W.E. Grissett, Jr., 556 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…ing of a certificate of title.” (citing Rosen v. Hunter, 227 .So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969), et al.)). Even though a mortgagor’s right of redemption may be asserted by those claiming under or through him, Engels v. Valdesuso, Jr. Enterprises, Inc., 497 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), including lessees of the mortgagor, Dundee Naval Stores Company v. McDowell, 65 Fla. 15, 61 So. 108 (Fla.1913), a leasehold interest in property is a lesser interest than that held by a mortgagor. See De Vore v. Lee, 158 Fla. 608…
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Marina Funding Grp., Inc. v. Peninsula Prop. Holdings, Inc., 950 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…hen the phrase is used with reference to a junior mortgagee, ... it refers to his right to satisfy a prior mortgage by payment of the debt it secures and thereby become equitably subrogated to all rights of the prior mortgagee. Engels v. Valdesuso, 497 So. 2d 698, 700 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (citation omitted). Clearly, Peninsula had the right to re-foreclose against Broward/Marina as a matter of substantive law. Raskin v. Otten, 273 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Polster v. Gen’l Guar. Mortgage Co., 1…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Allstate Mortg. Corp. OF Fla. v. Strasser, 286 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1973)
- Shipp Corp., Inc. v. Charpilloz, 414 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Cooper Smith Props., Ltd. v. Flower's Baking Co. OF Fla., Inc., 432 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Coleman v. State, 105 Fla. 625 (Fla. 1932)
- Robbins v. Blanc, 105 Fla. 625 (Fla. 1932)
- The Islamorada Bank v. Rodriguez, 452 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Vanderbilt Towers v. Summit Props., 379 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guadagnino, 434 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- John Stepp, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n OF Miami, 379 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)