O.L., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Court affirmed a $300 restitution order in a juvenile delinquency case but reversed the provision allowing parties to agree on the payment schedule, holding that trial courts cannot delegate judicial authority to determine the manner of restitution.
A trial court may not delegate to the parties its judicial authority to determine the amount or manner of restitution, even though it has discretion to set the restitution amount itself.
[1] A trial court may not delegate its judicial authority to determine the manner and schedule of restitution payments to the parties, even though it retains discretion to se…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceO.L., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for causing $300 in damage. The trial court ordered restitution of $300 and directed the parties to agree…
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PER CURIAM.
O.L. appeals from an order, issued pursuant to an adjudication of delinquency, which requires that he make restitution in the amount of $300 for damage he caused. The order further provides that the parties are to agree on the payment schedule. We affirm the order insofar as it requires restitution in the amount of $300 but reverse that portion which permits the parties to decide on the manner of payment.
The trial court’s determination that the amount of $300 is not “greater than an amount the child and his parents could reasonably be expected to pay or make” is within its discretion. § 39.-11(1)(a)1, Fla.Stat. (1985).
A trial court may not, however, delegate its judicial authority to the parties to determine the amount or manner of restitution. See F.R. v. State, 473 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); J.J.S. v. State, 465 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); T.W. v. State, 395 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
Since the trial court impermis-sibly delegated to the parties the authority to determine the manner of payment, and considering that the amount that O.L. will be required to pay per period has a bearing on the reasonableness of the total restitution scheme, cf. W.R. v. State, 462 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (restitution order which required juvenile delinquents, with parents who earned meager incomes and had numerous dependents and substantial monthly expenses, to each pay $52 per month held unreasonable), we reverse the order insofar as it permits the parties to determine the restitution scheme.
Accordingly, this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
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D.M. v. State, 550 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…ommunity control, save for that portion of the restitution provision which delegates to “all interested] parties” the responsibility of developing “a payment schedule”; on remand, the trial court itself shall set the payment schedule. O.L. v. State, 497 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). In all other respects, however, we reject the respondent’s attack on the restitution provision. (1) The trial court properly ordered the juvenile to make restitution for, inter alia, the cost of the infant seat and stroller whi…
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In the Interest of J.W. v. State, 559 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…to make a finding regarding financial ability to make restitution, and because the trial court left the amount of restitution and the manner of payment up to the parties and counselors. See § 39.11(l)(a)l., Fla.Stat. (1989); see also O.L. v. State, 497 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); W.R. v. State, 462 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); T.W. v. State, 395 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Reversed and remanded.…
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D.G. v. State, 516 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…e’s aggravated battery is reversed upon a holding that (a) the trial court failed to determine that the juvenile and his parents could be reasonably expected to pay the amount of restitution ordered, § 39.11(1), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1986); O.L. v. State, 497 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); and (b) the order fails to specifically determine, as it must, the amount of restitution and the manner of payment and instead delegates this to the parties, O.L. v. State, 497 So. 2d 971. Reversed and remanded for further proc…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- J.J.S. v. State, 465 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- In the Interest of W.R. v. State, 462 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- F.R. v. State, 473 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- T.W. v. State, 395 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Claudette Canley v. State, 395 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)